ONE way in which governments may exercise political control over their subjects is by removing their status as citizens. Doing so – denying the individual the political and social rights that are constitutive of full membership of their community – involves making a radical choice, and accordingly such a decision must be properly regulated. One of the ways in which UK law does so is by preventing the exercise of the broad statutory power to rescind the citizenship of a UK national because it is “conducive to the public good”, where doing so would render that person stateless (British Nationality Act 1981, s. 40(2), (4)). Individuals may only be stripped of their citizenship under this provision on the condition that they remain full members of another political community.

IN Identoba and Others v Georgia (Application No 73235/12), 12 May 2015, the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights held that Georgia's failure to prevent, and effectively investigate, attacks against an anti-homophobia march violated Articles 3 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), read in conjunction with Article 14.

THE Supreme Court's decision in Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 344 is a prime example of the balance that must be struck between the rights of the individual and the need to prevent terrorism. In this case, the majority placed their emphasis on the latter. Strong criticisms were made, however, of the relevant legislation. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 empowers “examining officers” (constables, immigration officers and customs officers) to stop, question, search, and detain persons at ports or borders. The powers apply whether or not the examining officer has grounds to suspect that person of being a terrorist (para. 2(4)). It is an offence to fail wilfully to comply with an examining officer's request (para. 18).

BARRY Beavis fought the law of contract and the law won. To the disappointment of motorists nationwide, he failed to show that an £85 shopping centre parking fine was an unenforceable penalty at common law (or under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999). Ironically, he lends his name notwithstanding to a leading case which confirmed the existence of the penalty doctrine (a joined commercial challenge also failed on the facts): ParkingEye Ltd. v Beavis; Cavendish Square Holding v El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1373.

IN Salt v Stratstone Specialist Ltd. (t/a Stratstone Cadillac Newcastle) [2015] EWCA Civ 745; [2015] C.T.L.C. 206, the Court of Appeal usefully emphasised that rescission is the primary remedy for misrepresentation (whether that misrepresentation be fraudulent, negligent, or innocent). The Court decided that the discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission under s. 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 can only be exercised where the right to rescind still exists, which helpfully resolves an issue of some controversy. The Court of Appeal also held that rescission for misrepresentation is not barred just because the asset sold has dropped in value or been registered, and cast doubt on the notion that lapse of time can by itself bar rescission. The short but important decision in Salt v Stratstone Specialist Ltd. is welcome and full of interest.

RATIONALISING the doctrine of anticipatory breach is notoriously difficult. This may explain the complete lack of attempt by the UK Supreme Court to address its conceptual difficulties in its recent judgment in Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All E.R. 1082. It is therefore of interest that the Singapore Court of Appeal in The “STX Mumbai” [2015] SGCA 35; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 1 explained why the doctrine of anticipatory breach can be applied to executed contracts (in the sense of being fully executed by the innocent party). Whilst anticipatory breach applies similarly under English law, the English courts have never considered the underlying justification, save to say in a case with a partially executed contract that “it would be very strange and hardly unworkable” if the innocent party had to wait until the time for performance (Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd. [1973] A.C. 331, 356, per Lord Simon).

WISHART v Credit and Mercantile Plc [2015] EWCA Civ 655 is an unusual priorities case. At its heart is an informal business partnership between two close friends: S and W. Together, the pair undertook a series of property developments. In all their ventures, S took the lead on financial matters. With the approaching sale of a particularly lucrative development, S and W considered how to spend their gains. W indicated that he would like to purchase a residential property for himself and his family, and entrusted the arrangements for the acquisition to S. W removed himself entirely from the process, failing even to look at the contract of sale. As such, he did not realise that S had inserted himself as the purchaser of the property. Upon sale, W and his family moved into the property, oblivious to the subterfuge. S then secured a loan of £500,000 on the property by way of a legal mortgage in favour of C&M. The sum was promptly gambled away, and S, now declared bankrupt, disappeared. C&M obtained possession of the property and sold it for £1.1 million, using just under £700,000 of the proceeds to recoup their loan and expenses. It was at this point that W re-entered the narrative, appearing before the court to argue that, by virtue of an overriding interest, he was entitled to the proceeds of the sale over C&M.

IS the right to vote in European Parliament elections a matter for EU law? Until recently, the answer to this query seemed to be a clear “no”. Indeed, while Article 223(1) of the TFEU does confer on the European Union the competence to lay down a uniform procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament (“MEPs”), this competence has not been exercised so far. Consequently, Article 8 of the Act concerning the election of the MEPs by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (OJ 1976 L 278 p. 1, henceforth “the 1976 Act”), provides that the “electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions”. Apart from the general principles of “direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot” and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, enshrined respectively in Article 14(3) of the TEU, Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, and Article 20(2)(b) of the TFEU, there is nothing in EU law that governs specifically the eligibility to vote in EP elections.

ACROSS Europe, the legal recognition of same-sex relationships has changed rapidly. Of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe, 26 countries currently recognise same-sex relationships, whether through marriage or registered partnership. Italy, however, remains the only founding member of that organisation that does not provide any formal system for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.

MELITA Jackson died in 2004, leaving an estate worth £486,000. In 2002, she had made a will in which she left a £5,000 legacy to the BBC Benevolent Fund and divided the remainder of her estate between the Blue Cross, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“the Charities”). Mrs. Jackson had also written a letter of wishes in which she explained her decision to exclude her only daughter, Heather, from her will. Heather had left home in 1978 at the age of 17, without her mother's knowledge or agreement, in order to live with Mr. Ilott, whom Heather later married. Mrs. Jackson clearly disapproved of her daughter's choice of lifestyle. Heather and her husband had five children (the last one living at home, being due to go to university in 2015) and lived in straitened financial circumstances. For example, Heather never went on holiday, found it difficult to afford clothes for the children and a range of food, and possessed many items that were old or second-hand. Despite attempts at reconciliation, mother and daughter were estranged for some 26 years, and Heather was fully aware before Mrs. Jackson's death that she was due to be excluded from the will.

THE appeal in R. (on the application of SG) (previously JS) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Child Poverty Action Group and another intervening) [2015] UKSC 16 concerned a challenge to the cap on welfare benefits, one of the measures introduced as part of the Government's austerity-driven economic and social policy. The “benefit cap” operates to limit the amount of welfare benefits that can be received by non-working households, to the equivalent net median earnings of a working household. The Welfare Reform Act 2012 contains provisions allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations providing for a “benefit cap” scheme. It is implemented through the Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit) Regulations 2012 and operates by a reduction in housing benefit once a specified maximum amount is reached. Benefits covered by the cap include housing benefit, child benefit, and child tax credit. Once the cap is reached, no account is taken of the number of children in the family. The lawfulness of the Act itself was not challenged. The appellants’ argument was that the implementation of the scheme was discriminatory and contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998.

The difference of judicial opinion in the Supreme Court in Evans provokes reflection on fundamental constitutional principles, such as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A statute that on its face seems to permit a government minister to override a judicial decision of which he disapproves inevitably raises acute concern; the correct reading of the statute depends on the most persuasive integration of basic principles, placing the text within its wider constitutional context. The Justices deployed distinctions between law, fact, and public interest in rather different ways, reflecting their divergent interpretative approaches. The role of constitutional convention is also of particular interest – central to the legal issues arising, on one view, but largely irrelevant on another. At the root of these disagreements lie contrasting conceptions of law and adjudication.

This article argues that mistakes in written contracts should be corrected under the equitable doctrine of rectification rather than the common law of interpretation. But rectification on the basis of a common mistake should only be granted where both parties are actually mistaken. Any other approach is inconsistent with the nature of the equitable jurisdiction, and blurs the boundary between common mistake and unilateral mistake rectification.

This paper examines the role of rights and fundamental rights in English public law and private law in recent times. It argues that the idea of fundamental rights has been more significant in the filed of public law and seeks to explain why. It compares the operation of domestic fundamental rights with the rights in the European Convention of Human Rights and suggests a methodology for identifying the existence and scope of the former. The paper considers the possible legal effects which might follow from repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Risk control clauses are often used in insurance contracts with a view to preventing the assured from altering the risk during the currency of the policy. An insurance warranty is the most commonly used risk prevention clause in practice. Having been subjected to severe criticisms for years, the legal regime concerning insurance warranties and other risk control clauses has recently been revamped by the Insurance Act 2015, which will apply to all contracts of insurance concluded after 12 August 2016. This article intends to elaborate on the appropriateness of the reforms introduced by the 2015 Act from risk assessment and management perspectives. It is also intended to offer a critical analysis on the potential impact of the changes on insurance law and practice.

The police do not owe a duty of care to protect victims from the criminal acts of a third party when investigating or suppressing crime save in exceptional circumstances. This is justified as an application of the omissions principle and on several other grounds. The article argues that most of these justifications are unconvincing and it sets outs a positive rationale for the imposition on the police of a duty of care in respect of sufficiently proximate victims of a negligent omission. The scope of this duty can be coherently delimited by re-adjusting the existing framework of negligence liability of public authorities.