This article focuses on the nineteenth-century fertilizer manufacturer the Pacific Guano Company, and seeks to understand how it adapted its production in response to the collapse of the Maine menhaden fishery in 1879. This collapse devastated the national market for fish scrap, the firm’s primary input. The company managed to maintain relatively consistent fertilizer output throughout this period of uncertainty by embracing new materials and by actively seeking more stable sources of these novel ingredients. Outwardly, the company gave no indications that it was dealing with supply chain disruption, even though it was, at the same time, rapidly rewriting the recipes for its core products. This disconnect demonstrates how generic categories of nature can help a firm adapt to a crisis and how an environmental change as significant as a fishery collapse can be hidden from the public.

This article uses a prosopographical methodology and new dataset of 1,558 CEOs from Britain’s largest public companies between 1900 and 2009 to analyze how the role, social background, and career pathways of corporate leaders changed. We have four main findings. First, the designation of CEO only prevailed in the 1990s. Second, the proportion of socially elite CEOs was highest before 1940, but they were not dominant. Third, most CEOs did not have a degree before the 1980s, or professional qualification until the 1990s. Fourth, liberal market reforms in the 1980s were associated with an increase in the likelihood of CEO dismissal by a factor of three.

This article examines small and medium-sized scrap and wastepaper enterprises in Finland. They operated in the margins of the nation’s industrial economy during the twentieth century but pioneered many of the business models and practices that, in the last few decades, have become crucial elements of the circular economy. We study why and how they tried to develop profitable business models, and why some succeeded while others failed. We give particular attention to the business environment where they operated and argue that legislation, values, purchasing cartels, and other outside factors had a crucial impact on their profitability. We base our analysis partly on published company histories and other earlier research and partly on interviews and the extensive and usually open collections of business archives. Those sources provide us with the often-lacking inside view of small and medium-sized enterprises in the circular economy business and show how determined these companies were to defend their interests.

This article challenges the prevailing narrative surrounding the Japanese manufacturing industry in the post-World War II era, which predominantly centers on large corporations and male engineers. It sheds light on the vital role played by Japanese housewives in shaping product innovation. It argues that the exclusion of consumers, particularly women, from existing industrial models carries a gendered dimension. By presenting Japanese housewives as active stakeholders who defy stereotypes and enhance their lives by expressing their opinions, we aim to offer a fresh perspective on innovation and product development. The article specifically focuses on the electric appliance industry and draws upon a diverse range of sources, including women’s magazines and corporate archives, to uncover the hidden aspects of gender within the Japanese economic miracle. It shows that housewives have played an active role in product innovation and that women’s magazines have made this possible by acting as intermediaries between women and companies.

The repeated proliferation of restraints to competition should not overshadow the agency of downstream firms when confronted with the ability of cartels to challenge the established innovation strategies of their consumers. This article explores the relations between Renault and the aluminium cartels during the first half of the twentieth century, in peace and war. Strategies were similar on both sides: the creation and maintenance of a balance of power, compromise, and the reopening of competition. Yet, when the cartel set up an automotive department and then rallied to the idea of a people’s car, it attracted the interest of broader stakeholders—engineers, other suppliers, the government, and even trade unions—but failed to persuade carmakers. Large industrial consumers can limit the impact of cartels, and destabilize them, by resorting to vertical integration. However, their underlying aim is not necessarily to destroy the cartel but rather to obtain better terms for their own business. Ultimately, their market power enables them to achieve relative stability. Who derives the main benefits from these compromises, both vertically and horizontally, as they sometimes limit or extend the scope of action of both parties?

This article examines China’s outward investment in the European automotive industry since the late twentieth century. By mapping and analyzing the main investment operations, we argue that private companies played a key role in the internationalization of the Chinese automotive sector. Chinese state-owned enterprises took part, especially in the initial stages of international expansion. Our contribution also analyzes the pattern of internationalization followed by Chinese companies, arguing that it differed from the one followed by well-established automotive firms in advanced economies during previous decades. The findings reveal that achieving the most advanced technology was the key driver of outward investment decisions. However, Chinese investors’ strategy was not uniform; it was flexible and varied significantly depending on the European country and the size of the company targeted. Furthermore, Chinese government industrial policies greatly influenced the international strategies of both state-owned and private companies, particularly the “Go Out” policy.

This paper examines the transformation of Venetian commerce across the twelfth century, arguing that the strategies of Venetian merchants are best described using two distinct models. One was locally integrated and geographically decentralized, typical of merchants who settled abroad and became part of local societies, sometimes retaining few clear links to Venice. The other was far more centralized, characterized by short-term, profit-focused ventures originating in Venice that precluded deep entanglements in foreign economies. Both models were facilitated by the unstructured nature of Venetian overseas administration, which accommodated a degree of autonomy for expatriates while providing the infrastructure necessary for transient commerce. The decline of the integrated model began with the imperial sanctions of 1171 and culminated with the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), after which the centralized model came to dominate. The subsequent importance of the “sedentary merchant” in Venetian trade was shaped as much by political as by economic factors.

The provision of pensions for Civil Servants and other employees in public office, such as the police, as well as in large private businesses, became more widespread in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such pensions, and other non-pay benefits, including sick pay, not only helped with recruitment but also provided a means of managing the retirement of workers who were deemed to be incapable of performing their roles. The rules governing eligibility to receive a pension in the Metropolitan Police in London were closely linked to the certification of poor health. Police doctors restricted the certification of sickness as a reason for retirement because it impacted the size of the force, resulted in the loss of more experienced men, and added to the cost of the pension fund. This strategy generated conflict with the workforce, resulting in industrial unrest. Piecemeal reforms failed to address workers’ concerns until 1890, when the rights to receive a pension were improved. These reforms, rather than stricter vigilance by police doctors, were an effective way of retaining experienced officers in the police force.

This study analyzes the long-term power of mercantilist firms and brands in industries characterized by high uncertainty and asset specificity. It contrasts the reputation-building and protection strategies employed in two similar industries in Portugal in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; namely, those of Madeira and Port wine. The Portuguese crown created a collective brand for Port in 1756, the first regional appellation in the world. Madeira wine only received similar protection in the late twentieth century. This study argues that the Madeira wine industry relied on a different type of mercantilist proto-brand—a diffuse and multi-faceted “global” umbrella brand—of the British East India Company, which during its heyday more than rivaled the power of the Portuguese state as a product certifier and endorser.

This article offers a new interpretation of the coming of state ownership in aluminium-related big businesses in Norway. It shows that the Norwegian aluminium business of the late 1930s and the 1940s was undertaken by a Scandinavian business elite fully capable of filling capital requirements after the war. This elite had, however, entangled itself in the German war effort in Norway mainly by supporting the building of new aluminium plants under the German occupiers’ control. This left it morally vulnerable to the increasing emphasis during the war on aluminium as a strategic metal. The Allied war effort—especially evident in US attitudes—had come to see the cartelized aluminium industry of the 1930s as working against the national interest by impacting national production capacity in a negative way. The Allies bombed the major new plant in Norway in 1943, and after the war the US acted restrictively toward Norwegian capital assets in the US. By pursuing ownership after 1945, the Norwegian state performed strategic ownership roles in large corporations, thereby also protecting these entities from the possible wrath of the US against private owners.

In the 1960s, the optimal size of integrated steel plants significantly increased, while small steel mills known as minimills were gaining ground in the sector. Based on the use of scrap and electricity, these small plants became an alternative technological model to blast furnace steelmaking. Among the major European steel nations, Italy and Spain stood out for the early adoption and significant participation of electric furnaces in total steel production. The article explains the factors that led to the proliferation of small independent steel mills and their subsequent transformation into minimills in these Mediterranean countries. The conclusion is that, despite the different institutional frameworks, the Italian and Spanish response to the steel shortage of the 1950s was similar. This led to the emergence of many small producers, which based their development on low installation costs. In Italy, these businesses leveraged the opportunities of the postwar economic miracle, had access to a favorable supply of raw materials due to the policy of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and were able to resiliently face the restructuring process of the 1980s led by the Commission of the European Communities (EC). In Spain, they took advantage of strong state intervention.

This article contributes to scholarship on business history and gender in twentieth-century energy transitions. It examines Canadian electric power utility marketing plans and materials, newspaper and magazine accounts, and oral history interview records. Utilities initially sought to sell power as capital and labor rationality, mirroring industrial ideals of producing more with fewer resources. As those labor savings were realized, they increasingly sold power as a means to perform new organizational and emotional jobs of creating a more intimate, happier, and child-centered family life. In doing so, they redefined social life, from family-as-labor unit to family-as-leisure unit, while also redefining leisure-as-labor for women. Women in utility marketing materials, as observed in subsequent time-use studies, eventually saw fewer hours of housework and family care, although offset by increasing leisure jobs. Mobilizing social groups to advance an electrification agenda, utilities sold this new labor as an extension of energy service work in homes, public spaces, and leisure facilities.

In April 1785, the British prime minister, William Pitt, proposed to give Ireland “compleat liberty and equality” with Britain “in matters of trade.” Historians cast the stakes around Pitt’s “Irish” proposals in terms of ideologies about trade, but this paper focuses on the concrete economic issues involved. It shows that Pitt’s proposals emerged from years of debates in which contemporaries conceived of the British Atlantic economy in terms of an integration of trade, shipping, and credit that evokes a British system of colonial capitalism. Ireland’s dependent relationship to that system, and the perceived failure of “free trade” to overcome its poverty, generated a battle among Irish “improvers” over rival plans to attract “men of capitals” to Ireland. Pitt played an important role in this fierce Irish debate by favoring one plan, but the British prime minister and his main Irish advisor, Thomas Orde, were never convinced by that plan’s logic of improvement, supporting it instead for fiscal reasons. That calculus made Pitt’s proposals vulnerable to attack from economic interests in Britain that took Ireland’s plans for economic improvement more seriously.

International trade in strategic materials was critical to Allied victory in the Second World War, yet little is known about how that trade functioned in practice. This paper studies wartime imports of Chilean nitrate, which enabled the United States to increase food production without sacrificing munitions output. The US imported nitrate and other resources through a public purchase program that depended on the coordination and cooperation of a vast bureaucracy. Government agencies weighed the benefits and costs of Chilean nitrate differently and intervened at key junctures. For their part, Chilean corporate and diplomatic staff worked meeting rooms in Washington, negotiating the purchase contracts and managing day-to-day business with the US government. Chilean actors meanwhile pursued their own interests while contributing to the Allied victory. The business history of the US–Chilean nitrate trade demonstrates how Chile, sometimes mischaracterized as a disinterested neutral on the fringes of the conflict, played an important role during the Second World War.

This article examines Mahindra & Mohammed (now Mahindra & Mahindra) and the Muhammadi Steamship Company through a microhistory of late colonial Bombay. The paper reveals companies committed to the economic unity of India shortly before the anticolonial struggle culminated in the violent and chaotic Partition of British India in August 1947. In Bombay, the center of Indian industry and not typically associated with the Partition’s dislocations, economic partition was unanticipated even by economic actors closely allied with the Muslim League. The two firms examined here highlight the understudied impact of decolonization and the Partition of the sub-continent on Indian capitalism, and suggests that postcolonial territorial realities implied an economic rearticulation that has often been overlooked.