“Corporate reputation” is a term that on the face of it hardly needs explanation. Historians have long used it in an unproblematic fashion to refer to the way a firm is perceived by others. Yet as with many such terms, corporate reputation can be theorized or at least formally defined. Scholars in the fields of marketing and organization increasingly are doing both; since the 1980s they have attempted to distinguish reputation from the related constructs of image, identity, status, legitimacy, celebrity, and brand equity. The project is ongoing, and a strong consensus has not yet been reached on how to define corporate reputation. Charles Fombrun, whose definitions have been perhaps the most widely used, suggests the following: “a collective assessment of a company's attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference group of companies with which the company competes for resources.” Fombrun's definition contains three core ideas: firms have multiple reputations, depending on which stakeholders are being considered; corporate reputation is a comparative construct, because a firm is always judged in relation to something else—in this case, the firm's competitors; and firms' reputations are a source of competitive advantage or disadvantage.

Historians, who for valid intellectual reasons rarely attempt the formal definition of terms, have not participated in the theorizing of corporate reputation. Yet the peculiar skills of historians are much needed; for if the study of corporate reputation has underemphasized the role of institutional phenomena such as rules, norms, processes, and structures, it has all but ignored historical context and historical processes.

Examining the development of credit reporting in the United States, this article shows how new, formal methods of assessment of risk and trustworthiness came to mediate business reputations in the credit market over the past century and a half. It focuses on the conflicts over reputation provoked by the new means of assessment and how those conflicts were controlled through organizational procedures and routines as new methodologies were introduced. After World War II seemingly objective quantitative methodologies for evaluating credit worthiness were developed, but they did not eliminate the place of reputation in business decision-making.

Many commentators believe that the business press “missed” the story of the twenty-first century—the 2008 economic crisis. Condemned for being too close to the firms they were supposed to be holding to account, journalists failed in their duties to the public. Recent historical studies of business journalism present a similarly pessimistic picture. By contrast, this article stresses the importance of the press as a key intermediary of reputation in the nineteenth-century marketplace. In England, reporters played an instrumental role in opening up companies' general meetings to the public gaze and in warning investors of fraudulent businesses. This regulation by reputation was at least as important as company law in making the City of London a relatively safe place to do business by the start of the twentieth century.

Focusing on the private investment bank of J. P. Morgan & Co., this article examines the unique perspective that the history of private investment banking offers the study of reputation with regard to the role of social ties. Drawing from a larger study that looks at intersecting social and economic networks of New York private bankers before the Second World War, the article studies the ways in which the Morgan partners' social networks worked to maintain their reputation by creating an institutional structure for firm cohesion, establishing access to information and resources outside the firm, and fostering a culture of exclusivity that signaled the firm's standing and its ties relative to their competitors or other elite bankers.

The literature on multinational corporations argues that a foreign firm can legitimize its activities, improve its reputation in a host country, and reduce the risk of hostile actions by the host government (including expropriation) by approaching and incorporating influential members of the domestic elite in its business. By using the concept of obsolescing political legitimacy, we argue that this legitimating strategy can lead to a loss of reputation and eventual illegitimacy when the host country undergoes significant social and institutional changes. When these changes take place, the domestic society can perceive that the multinational benefited from a previous social and institutional order increasingly considered as illegitimate. Under these circumstances, the new order will question the legitimacy of the multinational's operations, increasing the risk of expropriation. We illustrate our hypothesis with the case of the political strategies of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) in Chile in the twentieth century.

Historical narratives have enriched, and can even do more to enhance, the concept of corporate reputation by deepening our understanding of how reputation changes over time and among different stakeholders. This literature review highlights this theme of reputation for two audiences—business historians and corporate reputation theorists. By showing how different social and political contexts shape expectations for business behavior, historical study can add new dimensions to the study of corporate reputation.