In "The language of International Corporate Ethics," Tom Donaldson largues that ethical languages focusing on avoidance of harm to human beings; on rights/duties: and on rules spelled out in a social contract are better for characterizing international corporate responsibility than languages promoting virtue; the mastering of the self; or the maximization of human welfare. While some of what Donaldson says about the strengths and weaknesses of individual theories is quite plausible and relatively noncontroversial, Donaldson does not, in my judgment, establish that the three theories he favors are indeed better equipped to cope with problems of corporate responsibility than the three he dismisses. I will focus upon four major problems with his analysis.

This paper examines judge Richard A. Posner’s “The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law,” as well as a restatement of that position in The Problems of Jurisprudence, and argues that Judge Posner has mistakenly claimed Aristotle’s notion of corrective justice as a significant component of the economic theory of law.

This article considers the principles that underlie the claim that some contracts are unconscionable and that such contracts should not be enforceable. It argues that it is much more difficult to explain unconscionability than is often supposed, particularly in cases where the contract is mutually advantageous or Pareto superior. Among other things, the article considers whether unconscionability is a defect in process or result, whether the gains in an unconscionable contract are disproportionate, whether there is a strong link between the use of standard forms and unconscionability, and whether the principle of inequality of bargaining power can account for unconscionability. After rejecting several standard explanations of unconscionability, I consider several alternative ways in which it might be explained.

Can private companies legitimately regulate sharing markets, and if yes, how? Whereas scholars have either criticized sharing platforms for expanding into private and public arenas or welcomed them to counterbalance encroaching government regulations, studies document their unbridled popularity. On the basis of a special version of social contracts theory pioneered by James Buchanan, we develop a heuristics that helps guide reasoning about the legitimacy of the sharing economy’s regulatory function. First, we discuss the conditions under which free and responsible individuals deliberately subject themselves to rules without their prior direct participation, that is, exit, voice, and constitutional limits. Second, we suggest sharing platforms can use novel ordo-responsibilities to establish a sharing constitution that takes these conditions into account. Third, we argue that sharing platforms can legitimately do so within an enabling institutional environment in society, the provision of which relies on the joint efforts of sharing platforms, political actors, and civil society.

In much of the written work on Christian or religious business ethics, a holistic framework is assumed but not argued for practically or supported philosophically. In this article I 1) outline a position of ethical holism, explaining its logic, motives, and consequences; 2) attack the ethical dualism of Carr, Friedman, and French; and 3) defend my theory against five possible objections. My basic thesis is that if a corporation wishes to hire employees who will act in compliance with ethical codes of the corporation, employees who both have a deeply rooted personal ethic that parallels that of the corporation and who see their business practices to be an extension of their personal ethic will be better suited candidates simply because they are more likely to be compliant. In other words, personal convictions and values are relevant to hiring practices, and a view that holds personal and business ethics to be separate affairs (Carr, Friedman, French) is misguided.

Government policies and practices can exert significant influence on ethical behavior in a society. Many governments still rely on a long-standing prerogative of sovereigns, the defense of sovereign immunity, to avoid public inquiry about acts that are clearly immoral. However, the basic theory and frequent practice of invoking sovereign immunity cannot be ethically justified. Moreover, such practices model conduct based on power rather than reason, fairness, or justice, and invite both nations and individuals to view politics and business as a power game to be played and won, rather than as a process of building communities that emphasize reciprocity and commitment to moral principles.

This paper considers the arguments that could support the proposition that intellectual property rights as applied to software have a moral basis. Undeniably, ownership rights were first applied to chattels and land and so we begin by considering the moral basis of these rights. We then consider if these arguments make moral sense when they are extended to intellectual phenomenon. We identified two principal moral defenses: one based on utilitarian concerns relating to human welfare, the other appeals to issues of individual autonomy and private control. We conclude that intellectual property rights could not be defended from a moral perspective that emphasizes autonomy and individual control because copyright and patent restrict fundamental freedoms to transfer and redistribute one’s property. We also find it difficult to defend intellectual property in software from a utilitarian perspective because of the current structure of the market. We mention two characteristics of the software market that make it distinct and promote monopolistic conditions and excessive profit taking: the facility of replication, and the need for compatibility in operating systems. We conclude that there are good reasons to reverse the current market’s structure. We suggest three possible remedies. The government could rigorously enforce antitrust legislation, impose greater monitoring and price controls, or obviate the commercial aspect altogether by denying the application of intellectual property rights to software.

The Machiavellian model is often praised as a realistic description of modern corporate life. My analysis of The Prince follows Rousseau in arguing that the prince can survive and prosper most easily by creating an environment in which almost all the citizens prosper. Far from licensing unrestrained self-aggrandizement, in this model success only comes from providing real value to almost every citizen for the entire period of one's leadership.

Translation from the early sixteenth to the late twentieth century is far from simple; for example, the CEO is in many ways far less powerful than a Medici prince. The closest approximation is a far less bureaucratic organization with very small units possessing maximum autonomy. Also, deciding who is, and who is not, a citizen is not nearly as straightforward as it was for Machiavelli; it probably includes every stakeholder on whom the corporation has a major impact.

The extraordinarily rapid growth of global communications, information technology, and investments have energized hundreds of millions of business people and opened up immense opportunities in most of the countries of the world. Yet this apparently inevitable global business growth also has parallel dangers for people. In two areas the weaknesses of the global economy are evident: (1) Global business and financial operations with little accountability for long-term human needs; and (2) Goals and values of business managers that are not sufficient for business or for life.

When subordinates have suffered an unfairness, managers sometimes try to compensate them by allocating something extra that belongs to the organization. These reactions, which we label as managerial Robin Hood behaviors, are undertaken without the consent of senior leadership. In four studies, we present and test a theory of managerial Robin Hoodism. In study 1, we found that managers themselves reported engaging in Robin Hoodism for various reasons, including a moral concern with restoring justice. Study 2 results suggested that managerial Robin Hoodism is more likely to occur when the justice violations involve distributive and interpersonal justice rather than procedural justice violations. In studies 3 and 4, when moral identity (trait or primed) was low, both distributive and interpersonal justice violations showed similar relationships to managerial Robin Hoodism. However, when moral identity was high, interpersonal justice violations showed a strong relationship to managerial Robin Hoodism regardless of the level of distributive justice.

Research on ethical norms has grown in recent years, but imprecise language has made it unclear when these norms prescribe “what ought to be” and when they merely describe behaviors or perceptions (“what is”). Studies of ethical norms, moreover, tend not to investigate whether participants were influenced by the prescriptive aspect of the norm; the studies primarily demonstrate, rather, that people will mimic the behaviors or perceptions of others, which provides evidence for the already well-substantiated social proof theory. In this review article, we delineate three streams of norms research in business ethics: behavioral, perceptual, and prescriptive. We argue that by properly categorizing norms, and designing studies to investigate when prescriptions, more than mere mimicry, improve ethical outcomes in organizations, researchers can enhance managers’ efforts to promote ethical outcomes in organizations.