Comparatively few studies have analyzed the social behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) at a cross-national level. To address this gap in the literature, we propose a “transnational” model of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that permits identification of universal domains, yet incorporates the flexibility and adaptability demanded by international research. The model is tri-dimensional in that it juxtaposes: 1) Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998, 2000) typology of MNC strategies (multinational, global, “international,” and transnational); 2) the three conceptual domains of CSR (human rights, labor, and the environment) proposed by the UN Global Compact (Compact 2003); and 3) Zenisek’s (1979) description of three CSR perspectives (ideological, societal, and operational). The end result is a multidimensional typology that permits the organization and development of empirical CSR research in an international setting.

Is it unethical to advertise lotteries? Many citizens think that states should not be actively promoting and encouraging the public to spend hard-earned dollars on a bet that they are virtually guaranteed to lose. Perhaps more importantly, business ethicists are concerned that lottery advertising may be targeting the most vulnerable markets: households with the lowest income and education levels. If this were true, then it would increase the already disproportionately large burden of lottery taxes on the poor. Fortunately, our research finds no evidence to support the contention that advertising is responsible for high rates of lottery participation and expenditures by lower income groups or that low-income groups are more affected by advertising than high-income groups. On the contrary, awareness of lottery advertising seems to be associated with a higher probability to play Lotto only for the middle income group. This means that lottery advertising may actually reduce the regressivity of lottery taxes.

Some critics raise moral objections against corporate social responsibility on account of its supposedly undemocratic nature. They argue that it is hard to reconcile democracy with the private discretion that always accompanies the discharge of responsibilities that are not judicially enforceable. There are two ways of constructing this argument: the “perfect-market argument” and the ‘social-power argument.” This paper demonstrates that the perfect-market argument is untenable and that the social-power argument is sometimes valid. It also asserts that the proponents of the perfect-market argument are mistaken in their assumption that perfect markets are conducive to democracy. There are strong reasons to hold that perfect markets are undesirable from a democratic point of view. A proper conceptualization and differentiation of the relation between “the private and the public” can make this clear. The proponents of the social-power argument sometimes maintain that the democratic deficit can be compensated for by consulting the stakeholders affected. Against this, I will argue that the social power argument has nothing to offer affected parties. Still, it will be shown that modern theory on corporate social responsibility is not well accommodated to the democratic deficit as revealed by the social power argument.

Organizational justice is a behavioral science concept that refers to the perception of fairness of the past treatment of the employees within an organization held by the employees of that organization. These subjective perceptions of fairness have been empirically shown to be related to 1) attitudinal changes in job satisfaction, organizational commitment and managerial trust beliefs; 2) behavioral changes in task performance activities and ancillary extra-task efforts to assist group members and improve group methods; 3) numerical changes in the quantity, quality and efficiency of divisional outputs; and—though this is far more tentative—4) eventual changes in the competitive advantage and financial performance of the full organization. The authors propose that these constructs can be applied to all stakeholders, rather than just to the current employees of the firm, and that objective determinations of fairness by the managers can be related to subjective perceptions of fairness by the stakeholders that will result in the sequential series of attitudinal, behavioral and numerical changes that will lead to performance improvements. In short, the authors propose a normative stakeholder theory of the firm, based upon ethical principles, that will have testable descriptive hypotheses derived from the behavioral constructs.

This paper contends that rationality is more properly evaluated as a property of an organization’s relationships with its stakeholders than of the organization itself. We predicate our approach on the observation that stakeholders can hold goals quite distinct from those of owners and top managers, and these too can be rationally pursued. We build upon stakeholder theory and Weber’s classic distinction between wertrationalitat and zweckrationalitat, adding to them the “new institutionalist” concept of the organization field (1983, 1991). Stakeholders employ a variety of direct and indirect mechanisms to rationalize relations with the firm. We discuss four: internal subunits, legislated stakeholder participation, legislated access to information, and direct stakeholder activism. These developments are blurring the distinction between the environment and the organization by importing the values and goals of external stakeholders into the internal organization. They are also precipitating a more structured set of relationships among the actors who comprise the field. To the extent that the zweckrationalitat values of managers and owners as well as the wertrationalitat concerns of stakeholders are met, the firm is more rational.

This article sets out two central theses. Both theses primarily involve a fundamental criticism of current contractarian business ethics (CBE), but if these can be sustained, they also constitute two boundary conditions for any future contractarian theory of business ethics. The first, which I label the self-discipline thesis, claims that current CBE would gain considerably in focus if more attention were paid to the logic of the social contract argument. By this I mean the aims set by the theorist and method of reasoning by which normative conclusions are drawn in the contract model. The second, to which I refer as the domain-specificity thesis, argues that current CBE needs to be better adapted to its field of application and the specific goals which it aims to establish. I will substantiate these two theses on the basis of a comparative analysis of CBE with two earlier families of social contract theories.

Teachers and managers strive to be determining causes, leading those whom we instruct or supervise to act in some ways rather than others. If we are seeking to be causes, then we ought to admit our mission and monitor how well we are doing. Yet, instead of owning up to our failures, we hide behind claims such as “some students are unteachable because their habits are bad,” or “we have little time to affect our students who are being indoctrinated by other business school professors to believe that narrow self-interest does and should rule the world.” Perhaps it is we who have failed our students, not the reverse. Examining our business ethics pedagogy is crucial because regulation is not by itself going to prevent future scandals. This paper presents three structures for teaching business ethics in a liberal arts, transformative way. While no pedagogy comes with a guarantee, these approaches at least have the potential to transform students because they force students to have “some skin in the game.”