In 2008 and 2009, the House of Representatives directed billions of dollars to the auto industry by passing a bailout and the “cash for clunkers” program. Moving beyond corporate influence via campaign contributions, we demonstrate that the presence of auto workers in a district strongly predicts legislative support for both bills. In addition to this critical legislation, we also analyze over 250 bills on which the auto industry either lobbied or took a public position. We find no patterns relating a district's workers or corporate campaign contributions to these votes on broader legislation where other groups, such as environmental advocates or labor unions, are at the table. Instead, the auto industry garners consistent support only on quasi-private, particularistic legislation. Thus, we contend that on particularistic legislation the presence of workers (not just campaign contributions) drives legislative support; however, when legislators expand the scope of conflict, the influence of a single industry is attentuated by other interests.

The small-business sector faces a persistent dilemma: small firms often lack the human skills and financial resources to modernize and compete. How, then, can small firms overcome collective action problems to forge sector-wide modernization? This paper examines the political dynamics and the process of institutional change that underpin successful industrial upgrading through a comparative, longitudinal analysis of two policy experiments aiming at the modernization of small firm sectors in Portugal. Relying on comparative-historical analysis and process tracing, this study shows that successful industrial upgrading relies on intense and sustained political action, led by strong and stable interest leadership, in the pursuit of well-defined developmental benchmarks, and relying on the implementation of political, organizational and financial strategy according to a specific logic and sequence.

Scholars have long held that partisan politics cause aggregate-level fluctuations in markets. However, if investors hold different policy preferences, the effects of election campaigns on their behavior should be more nuanced. In particular, investors in economic sectors benefiting from neo-liberal economic policies might respond favorably to gains in support by right-leaning candidates, whereas those expected to profit from state-led economic development might react favorably to gains by left-leaning contenders. To test these propositions, I examine stock market performance by economic sector during Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of pre-election polls and stock market returns during the campaign reveals that, although investors did not react to potential partisan policy change in the ways originally expected, they did respond to polling news differently by economic sector. The findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating stock, bond, and currency markets according to economic criteria, and thus the limitations of aggregate level analysis for research on politics and markets.

For more than a decade, political science scholars have stressed the harmonizing effect of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Recent implementation practices in developing countries, however, have challenged this view. In this article, I argue that different manifestations of innovation systems can lead to varying patterns of innovation. I substantiate this claim through a comparison between the pharmaceutical sectors of India and Brazil. Drawing on the NSI approach, my analysis reveals that different forms of state engagement have played a decisive role for the varying directions of post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation in the two countries. The article illustrates that developing countries can opt for different approaches to innovation even after TRIPs and that the socioeconomic effects of global IP regimes can only be assessed properly when taking into account the country-specific configurations of national innovation systems.

Based on three in-depth case studies, the study analyzes how and why Chinese enterprises partner with governments in cooperative ventures which aim to simultaneously achieve poverty alleviation objectives and establish profitable business ventures in rural areas. The analysis draws out specific characteristics of three government-business partnerships in China, which vary in terms of governance structure, resource complementarity and incentives. The findings show that in this state capitalist system, outcomes of government-business partnerships depend on firms having unique resources and capabilities that serve particular policy objectives of the government. By the same token, in order to make partnerships attractive to firms, national and local governments must hold the keys to unique resources needed by enterprises looking to do business in low-income markets. The cases further illustrate that, in order to build and maintain successful government-business partnerships over time, the alignment of incentives plays an important role. In sum, complementary resources and well-aligned interests between firms and governments help to explain why some government-enterprise partnerships are more successful than others.