Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms’ lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

Mining companies are increasingly seen as co-governors of sub-Saharan Africa's gold mining industries, sharing sovereignty with states through private governance initiatives. Using interviews with company executives from the continent's largest gold mining firms this paper highlights the private authority of these firms vis-à-vis the state. This paper firstly examines the globalization and governance literature, focusing on why states share sovereignty with non-state actors. Secondly, a “three faces of power” framework is employed to understand how authority is exercised. Thirdly, private governance regimes specific to the mining industry are outlined. Finally, individuals’ and firms’ attitudes towards these private governance regimes are examined through an analysis of elite interviews. The theoretical and empirical analysis demonstrates that firms are formulating rules in order to increase certainty and reduce investment risk. These firms are engaging in private governance initiatives to build reputations as industry experts thereby controlling the regulation of their sector, rather than sharing authority with states.

The Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995 requires lobbyists to disclose information about their lobbying activities. The resulting data is used by the website OpenSecrets.org (run by the Center for Responsive Politics) to give snapshot pictures of the amount of lobbying groups do. The same data has also been used by scholars to measure the impact of lobbying and to evaluate rent-seeking expenditures by firms. Unfortunately, users of the data are unaware of a reporting option for organizations under the LDA that has consequences for the validity of the data. LDA data does not accurately reflect the amount of money that an organization has spent trying to influence federal law because organizations may choose a reporting requirement under which they must also disclose the amount of money they spent to influence state laws. In this article I analyze the implications of this fact. I begin with a discussion of the problem's scope and then show how it misleads scholars.

Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

We argue that international trade affects party systems but that this impact is conditioned on the types of societal interests trade brings about. When factor mobility is high, trade promotes class-based grievances that are unlikely to affect the structure of the party system. However, when factor mobility is low, trade will increase the diversity of group interests and policy preferences, thereby pressuring structural change in the party system. A consequence is an increase in the effective number of political parties. The empirical analysis supports these expectations. This paper contributes to our understanding of the political impact of economic liberalization on representative democracy.

Emerging markets are rapidly gaining importance in the world economy and many multinational corporations (MNCs) are taking advantage of this economic development by expanding their activities there. Due to the high level of perceived uncertainty and lack of formal institutions in these markets, firms cope by relying on network relationships with other organizational actors – including societal and political actors – in their environment. In these uncertain environments, where political and economic change is frequent, firms may have to negotiate their relationships frequently – building new ties and severing old ones. In this paper, findings from a case study of Turkey reveal that while the role of political actors in emerging markets should not be neglected, the value of political ties are contingent on the market environment and can change in the face of state policy change. Hence, MNCs tend to buffer the political hazards through their connections to the business and civil society organizations. Consequently, we suggest that researchers in this field might improve the explanatory power of their models by including consideration of the context that firms are embedded in. Then the focus needs to be shifted towards the interplay between different actors and the indirect impact of network ties along with the direct effects.