Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T00:15:19.089Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Benjamin Barber IV ,
Jan Pierskalla  and
Simon Weschle
Jan Pierskalla
Affiliation:
Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
Simon Weschle
Affiliation:
Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms’ lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , August 2014 , pp. 221 - 246
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2014 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Andres, Gary. 1985. “Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a Corporate PAC.” PS: Political Science and Politics 18 (2): 215–219.Google Scholar
Baldwin, Richard E. and Robert-Nicoud, Frederic. 2007. “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers.” Journal of the European Economic Association 5 (5): 1964–1093.Google Scholar
Basinger, Scott J. and Hallerberg, Mark. 2004. “Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom.” American Political Science Review 98 (2): 261–276.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Leech, Beth L. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jeffrey M., Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball, David C., and Leech, Beth L. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Bernhagen, Patrick and Mitchell, Neil J. 2009. “The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union.” European Union Politics 10 (2): 155–176.Google Scholar
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bombardini, Matilde and Trebbi, Francesco. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 87 (1): 18–26.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L. and Reinhardt, Eric. 1999. “Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 1028–1050.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L. and Reinhardt, Eric. 2000. “Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (4): 703–719.Google Scholar
Cameron, A. Colin and Trivedi, Pravin K. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clyde, Merlise and George, Edward I. 2004. “Model Uncertainty.” Statistical Science 19 (1): 81–94.Google Scholar
Coen, David, Grant, Wyn, and Wilson, Graham. 2010. “Political Science: Perspectives on Business and Government.” In: Coen, David, Grant, Wyn, and Wilson, Graham (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Damania, Richard. 2002. “Influence in Decline: Lobbying in Contracting Industries.” Economics and Politics 14 (2): 209–223.Google Scholar
Desai, Raj M. and Olofsgard, Anders. 2008. “Do Politically Connected Firms Undermine their own Competitiveness? Evidence from Developing Countries.” Global Economy and Development Working Paper 18. Washington DC: Brookings Institute.Google Scholar
Desbordes, Rodolphe and Vauday, Julien. 2007. “The Political Influence of Foreign Firms in Developing Countries.” Economics & Politics 19 (3): 421–451.Google Scholar
Drope, Jeffrey M. and Hansen, Wendy L. 2009. “New Evidence for the Theory of Groups: Trade Association Lobbying in Washington, D.C.” Political Research Quarterly 62 (2): 303–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faccio, Mara. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms.” American Economic Review 96 (1): 369–386.Google Scholar
Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” American Economic Review 91 (4): 1095–1102.Google Scholar
Gassebner, Martin, Lamla, Michael, and Vreeland, James Raymond. 2013. “Extreme Bounds Democracy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (2): 171–197.Google Scholar
Gelman, Andrew and Hill, Jennifer. 2008. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gerber, Alan and Malhotra, Neil. 2008. “Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect What Is Published? Public Bias in Two Leading Political Science Journals.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3 (3): 313–326.Google Scholar
Gordon, Sanford C. and Hafer, Catherine. 2007. “Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate.” Journal of Politics 69 (2): 300–319.Google Scholar
Gray, Virginia and Lowery, David. 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Gray, Virginia and Lowery, David. 1997. “Reconceptualizing Pac Formation: It's Not a Collective Action Problem, and It May Be an Arms Race.” American Politics Research 25 (3): 319–346.Google Scholar
Hall, Richard L. and Reynolds, Molly E. 2012. “Targeted Issue Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Indside Ends of Outside Lobbying.” Journal of Politics 74 (3): 888–902.Google Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L. and Mitchell, Neil J. 2000. “Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics.” American Political Science Review 94 (4): 891–903.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L., Mitchell, Neil J., and Drope, Jeffrey M. 2005. “The Logic of Private and Collective Action.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 150–167.Google Scholar
Harstad, Bard and Svensson, Jakob. 2011. “Bribes, Lobbying and Development.” American Political Science Review 105 (1): 46–63.Google Scholar
Hart, David M. 2001. “Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot?: High-Tech PACs, 1977–1996.” Journal of Politics 63 (4): 1230–1249.Google Scholar
Hart, David M. 2003. “Political Representation in Concentrated Industries: Revisiting the “Olsonian Hypothesis”.” Business and Politics 5 (3): 261–286.Google Scholar
Hart, David M. 2004. “ “Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7: 47–69.Google Scholar
Hoeting, Jennifer A., Madigan, David, Raftery, Adrian E., and Volinsky, Chris T. 1999. “Bayesian Model Averaging: A Tutorial.” Statistical Science 14 (4): 382–417.Google Scholar
Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball, David C., Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jeffrey M., and Leech, Beth L. 2012. “Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research.” Annual Review of Political Science 15: 379–399.Google Scholar
Humphreys, Macartan, Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, and van der Windt, Peter. 2013. “Fishing, Commitment, and Communication: A Proposal for Comprehensive Nonbinding Research Registration.” Political Analysis 21 (1): 1–20.Google Scholar
Jensen, Nathan, Li, Quan, and Rahman, Aminur. 2010. “Understanding Corruption and Firm Responses in Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys.” Journal of International Business Studies 21: 1481–1504.Google Scholar
Kabaila, Paul. 2009. “The Coverage Properties of Confidence Regions After Model Selection.” International Statistical Review 77 (3): 405–414.Google Scholar
Kennedy, Ryan and Tiede, Lydia. 2013. “Economic Development Assumptions and the Elusive Curse of Oil.” International Studies Quarterly 57 (4): 760–771.Google Scholar
Kenyon, Thomas and Naoi, Megumi. 2010. “Policy Uncertainty in Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (4): 486–510.Google Scholar
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Mian, Atif. 2005. “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firm? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4): 1371–1411.Google Scholar
Leamer, Edward E. 1985. “Sensitivity Analyses Would Help.” American Economic Review 75 (3): 308–313.Google Scholar
Levine, Ross and Renelt, David. 1992. “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions.” American Economic Review 82 (4): 942–963.Google Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1989. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lowery, David, Gray, Virginia, Anderson, Jennifer and Newmark, Adam J. 2004. “Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions.” Journal of Politics 66 (3): 684–705.Google Scholar
Macher, Jeffrey T., Mayo, John W., and Schiffer, Mirjam. 2011. “The Influence of Firms on Government.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 11 (1): 1–25.Google Scholar
Mao, Wen and Zaleski, Peter. 2001. “The Effect of Industry Concentration on Free Riding.” Review of Industrial Organization 19 (3): 295–303.Google Scholar
Milyo, Jeffrey, Primo, David, and Groseclose, Timothy. 2000. “Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective.” Business and Politics 2 (1): 75–88.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Neil J., Hansen, Wendy L., and Jepsen, Eric M. 1997. “The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity.” Journal of Politics 59 (4): 1096–1113.Google Scholar
Mitton, Todd. 2008. “Institutions and Concentration.” Journal of Development Economics 86 (2): 367–394.Google Scholar
Montgomery, Jacob M. and Nyhan, Brendan. 2010. “Bayesian Model Averaging: Theoretical Developments and Practical Applications.” Political Analysis 18 (2): 245–270.Google Scholar
Moosa, Imad A. and Cardak, Buly A. 2006. “The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: An Extreme Bounds Analysis.” Journal of Multinational Financial Management 16 (2): 199–211.Google Scholar
Munger, Michael C. 1988. “On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process: An Update.” Public Choice 56 (3): 295–298.Google Scholar
Naoi, Megumi and Krauss, Ellis. 2009. “Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 874–892.Google Scholar
O'Hara, R.B. and Sillanpää, M. J. 2009. “A Review of Bayesian Variable Selection Methods: What, How and Which.” Bayesian Analysis 4 (1): 85–118.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pittman, Russell. 1977. “Market Structure and Campaign Contributions.” Public Choice 31 (1): 37–51.Google Scholar
Richter, Brian Kelleher, Samphantharak, Krislert, Timmons, and Jeffrey F. 2009. “Lobbying and Taxes.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 893–909.Google Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1995. “Political Economy of Trade Policy.” In: Grossman, Gene M. and Rogoff, Kenneth. (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, Vol III. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier North Holland.Google Scholar
Sala-i Martin, Xavier X. 1997. “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions.” American Economic Review 87 (2): 178–183.Google Scholar
Schmitter, Philippe C. and Streeck, Wolfgang. 1999. “The Organization of Business Interests. Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advances Industrual Societies.” MPIfG Discussion Paper 99 (1). Cologne, Germany: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.Google Scholar
Schneider, Ben Ross. 2004. Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sturm, Jan-Egbert and de Haan, Jakob. 2005. “Determinants of Long-Term Growth: New Results Applying Robust Estimation and Extreme Bounds Analysis.” Empirical Economics 30 (3): 597–617.Google Scholar
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, Berger, Helge, and de Haan, Jakob. 2005. “Which Variables Explain Decisions of IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis.” Economics & Politics 17 (2): 177–213.Google Scholar
Teorell, Jan, Charron, Nicholas, Samanni, Marcus, Holmberg, Sören, and Rothstein, Bo. 2011. The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.Google Scholar
Weymouth, Stephen. 2012. “Firm Lobbying and Influence in Developing Countries: A Multilevel Approach.” Business and Politics 14 (4): 1–26.Google Scholar
Zardkoohi, Asghar. 1985. “On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process.” Southern Economic Journal 51 (3): 804–817.CrossRefGoogle Scholar