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Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

John A. Dove
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Abstract

Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , August 2014 , pp. 291 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2014 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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