Recent developments in the political behaviour of the British electorate have called into question the once-prevalent view that class was what counted when it came to voting and all else was ‘embellishment and detail’. Two streams of thought dominate the recent literature. One notes the continuing prominence of social class in the context of voting behaviour, but stresses the extent to which class is no longer expressable as a simple function of occupation (manual and non-manual), but instead requires paying attention to such aspects of lifestyle as tenancy patterns. The other, best exemplified in Dunleavy's recent work, pays less attention to individual lifestyle and emphasizes instead the extent to which changes in the occupational structure (particularly sectoral location and unionization) have altered the political meaning of workplace (‘production’) locations. The theoretical interest in sectoral location arises from the growth of public sector employment since the early 1960s and the increase in public sector labour militancy in the early 1970s. According to this view, partisan choice is influenced by sectoral location and by union membership, which is itself not a matter of lifestyle nor a simple extension of social class, but is bound up with sectoral (public/corporate/small private) location of occupation.

The United Kingdom's economy is relatively highly concentrated and the importance of decisions taken by very large firms for the economy as a whole encourages direct contacts between government and such firms. The scale and importance of such direct contacts has created a need within very large firms for a specialized capability to interpret the external political environment, and to relate that appreciation to the development of the firm's corporate strategy. A number of large firms in the United Kingdom have developed specialized government relations divisions in the last ten years. The titles of such divisions vary, but their most important function is the strategic co-ordination of the firm's relationships with government and other political actors.

In a recent article, Alan Ware argues the following:

(1) Manipulation is important to liberals because governments and law courts are justified in overriding some person's wants, when determining his interests, only when his wants have been manipulated (pp. 175, 177). (I shall call this person ‘B’.)

(2) Manipulation only occurs when some specified person (A) is both morally and causally responsible for the change in B's wants (pp. 165–6 and sec. III).

Therefore

(3) Liberals can override B's wants, when determining his interests, only when B's wants have been determined by some specified A who is both morally and causally responsible for the change in B's wants (pp. 176–7).

In his Comment on my article Peter Morriss raises several interesting points, but in this reply I shall try to show that the objections he makes to my analysis are not convincing. I consider first the more general arguments grouped under my ‘second error’. This permits consideration of the ‘first error’ to be placed in the context of anti-paternalist liberal arguments.

I fear that Alan Ware's Reply to my Comment only serves to reinforce my view that his argument is mistaken. Indeed, without apparently realizing it he concedes much of what I want to claim.