After the First World War the belief became substantially widespread among developed countries that the venerable institution of war should be abandoned from their affairs. It was an idea whose time had come. Historically, the war does not seem to have been all that unusual in its duration, destructiveness, grimness, political pointlessness, economic consequences or breadth. It does seem to have been unique in that (1) it was the first major war to be preceded by substantial, organized anti-war agitation, and (2) for Europeans, it followed an unprecedentedly peaceful century during which even war enthusiasts began, perhaps unknowingly, to appreciate the virtues of peace. Thus the war served as a necessary catalyst for opinion change. The process through which the change took place owes much to British war aims and to their efforts to get the United States into the war. The article concludes with some reflections on the historical movement of ideas.

Liberal apologists for the free market commonly claim for it the virtue of promoting toleration by eroding – through financial penalties – economically irrelevant ‘discrimination’. This claim is contested both by a consideration of a range of evidence from economic anthropology and by a critique of the conceptual position held to sustain it. Anthropological evidence suggests that ‘perfect’ markets frequently generate long-term non-contractual dyadic ties which undermine the one-off spot-contract constitutive of the ideal market. Furthermore, the pursuit of such ties often follows and so reinforces ethnic or religious distinction. Conceptually, the liberal argument's validity hinges on the assumption that market actors prefer to maximize money-holdings rather than express intolerance or maintain discrimination. This assertion is not only empirically false, but, if true, would ironically undermine the liberal claim that free markets are ‘neutral’ with regard to actors' preferences. Thus, libertarian claims about the effect of the operation of the market can only be sustained by violating their own theoretical premisses.

Comity in Congress is adherence to the norms of courtesy and reciprocity within a ‘regular order’. There has been a decline of comity in the United States Congress since the 1970s. Institutional causes, such as legislative reform, increased reliance on the media and an influx of new members, are discussed and discarded. Instead, a societal explanation appears to be more useful: the decline of comity in the Congress reflects the decline of comity in the country. A comparison of the late twentieth century with the pre-Civil War era supports this general argument. It also offers little hope for the return of civility.

Duverger's law regarding the impact of electoral systems on party competition depends upon two effects: the mechanical and the psychological. The former is well defined and well documented, whereas the latter has more often been a matter for theoretical speculation. In this article we provide an operational definition of the psychological effect of electoral systems and measure its impact across twenty democratic systems over more than a century. Our findings suggest that it does exist, that it works as Duverger predicted and that its impact is about the same magnitude as the mechanical effect.

The analyses presented in this note have extended earlier work on tactical voting in Great Britain by looking at variations between constituencies in the flow-of-the-vote matrix that are consistent with hypotheses of tactical voting. They have suggested that about 4 per cent of the British electorate voted tactically in 1983, as did nearly 6 per cent in 1987. The volume of tactical voting was greater in Conservative-held than in Labour-held seats, and in both was greater the more marginal the seat. In general, the opposition party with the greatest chance of unseating the incumbent, as suggested by the result of the previous election, gained from the tactical voting process, and there is evidence that greater campaign effort, as indexed by constituency spending, helped them in this.

In his introduction to a definitive collection of articles on British by-elections, David Butler observed that by-elections ‘may offer some guide to the public mood; but who now would dare to give a figure for the likely difference between a by-election today and what would happen in an immediate general election?’

Numerous scholars have documented a dramatic increase in incumbency advantage in US congressional elections and also state legislative elections over the past four decades. For example, Gelman and King show that incumbents in the House of Representatives now receive about twelve extra percentage points solely as a result of holding congressional office during the campaign; the comparable figure for most of the first half of this century was only 2 per cent. This advantage of incumbency has made members of the US House and many state legislators nearly invulnerable to electoral defeat.