Chater & Loewenstein offer an incisive criticism of how behavioral sciences and public policy have become complicit with corporations in blaming public health and societal problems on individual weaknesses, thus deflecting support away from systemic reforms. However, their analysis stops short of holding the field to account in one important respect: its preoccupation with human irrationality and weakness.

Our social policy landscape is characterized by incrementalism, while public calls for more radical reform get louder. But the social sciences cannot be relied upon to generate a steady stream of radical, system-level policies. Long-standing trends in social science – in particular, increasing specialization, an increasing emphasis on causal inference, and the growing replication crisis – are barriers to system-level policy development.

Individual-level research in behavioral science can have massive impact and create system-level changes, as several recent mandates and other policy actions have shown. Although not every nudge creates long-term behavior change, defaults and other forms of choice architecture can not only change individual behavior but also reduce inequities and lead to changes in public policy and norms.

Chater & Loewenstein have done a service to the field by raising the fundamental issue of how the political process distorts well-intentioned efforts at behavioral public policy. We connect this argument to broader research on government failure, particularly public choice theory in economics. We further suggest ways that behavioral research can help identify and mitigate such failures.

System-level change is crucial for solving society's most pressing problems. However, individual-level interventions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing necessary public support for system-level solutions. Participating in individual-level solutions may increase support for system-level solutions – especially if the individual-level solutions are internalized as part of one's social identity.

Pitting i-frame policies against s-frame policies inadvertently propagates a false dichotomy that fails to distinguish between effective i-frame policies that directly change behaviors and ineffective education-based i-frame policies that try to change people's hearts and minds. We argue that people's fixation on changing hearts and minds may be an obstacle for behavioral science in policy.

Unsatisfied with the effects of behavioral economics’ i-frame, “technology of behavior,” Chater & Loewenstein call for a pendulum swing back to the s-frame, suggesting that such an approach offers a more hopeful path toward societal well-being. In this commentary, I offer a framework to think about this pendulum swing, as well as the scope – and limits – of this hope.

s-Frames and i-frames do not represent two opposed types of intervention. Rather they are interpretive lenses for focusing on specific aspects of interventions, all of which include individual and structural dimensions. There is no sense to be made of prioritizing either system change or individual change, because each requires the other.

Chater & Loewenstein argue for a shift in focus from individual- to structural-level approaches to societal ills. This is valid and important but overlooks the barriers inherent in the current US partisan context. Psychology can be applied to help people of mixed allyship join together, to effectively and quickly force institutions and corporations to accept structural change.

We argue that: (1) disappointment in the effectiveness of i-frame interventions depends on realistic expectations about how they could work; (2) opportunities for system reform are rare, and i-frame interventions can lay important groundwork; (3) Chater & Loewenstein's evidence that i-frame interventions detract from s-frame approaches is limited; and (4) nonetheless, behavioural scientists should consider what more they can contribute to systemic reforms.

When it comes to behavioral change, economic design and behavioral science are complements, not substitutes. Chater & Loewenstein give examples from policy design. In this commentary, I use examples, often from my own research, to show how behavioral insights inform the design of the rules that govern market transactions.

Routes to achieving any sort of meaningful success in the enterprise of behavioural change requires an understanding of the rate of failure, and why failures occur. This commentary shows that there is more to diagnosis of failures than fixating on micro- rather than the macro-level behaviours.

Individual-level interventions are often interesting and easy to implement, but are unfortunately ill-equipped to solve most major global problems (e.g., climate change, financial insecurity, unhealthy eating). Resources spent developing, pursuing, and touting relatively ineffective i-frame interventions draw resources away from the development and implementation of more effective s-frame solutions. Behavioral scientists who want to develop solutions to the world's biggest problems should focus their efforts on s-frame solutions.

Recent arguments claim that behavioral science has focused – to its detriment – on the individual over the system when construing behavioral interventions. In this commentary, we argue that tackling economic inequality using both framings in tandem is invaluable. By studying individuals who have overcome inequality, “positive deviants,” and the system limitations they navigate, we offer potentially greater policy solutions.

Chater & Loewenstein criticize behavioral scientists' reliance on individual-level (“i-frame”) analysis, observing that this impoverishes policy interventions and stymies scientific progress. We extend their analysis to argue that structural factors bias and perpetuate behavioral science toward the i-frame. Addressing this problem fully will require structural changes to the training, peer review, and granting structures that confront research scientists.

Chater & Loewenstein, superb and distinguished social scientists, have misfired. Their complaint is baseless: In the real world of policymaking, behavioral science is mostly being used to reform systems, not to alter individual behavior. Nor is there empirical support for the proposition that interventions aimed at helping individuals make systemic reform less likely.

I make three points. First, the i-frame and s-frame are not helpful frameworks for thinking about behavioral public policy. Second, the authors ignore the role of politics: Policies (and the s-frame) require laws and regulations. Third, the research on retirement savings, which is all about the system, undercuts their claims.

We expand Chater & Loewenstein's discussion of barriers to s-frames by highlighting moral psychological mechanisms. Systemic aspects of moralized social issues can be neglected because of (a) the individualistic frame through which we perceive moral transgressions; (b) the desire to punish elicited by moral emotions; and (c) the motivation to attribute agency and moral responsibility to transgressors.

Chater & Loewenstein (C&L) ignore the long history by which social scientists have developed more nuanced and ultimately more helpful ways to understand the relationship between persons and situations. This tradition is reflected and advanced in a large literature on “wise” social–psychological or mindset interventions, which C&L do not discuss yet mischaracterize.

We argue that i-frame interventions can and do increase support for systemic reforms, and s-frame interventions should be pursued in parallel to address key societal issues. Without accompanying i-frame interventions, s-frame interventions can fail. We offer an operant conditioning framework to generate positive spillover effects. Behavioral scientists should develop i-frame interventions that enhance, rather than compete with, s-frame interventions.