Vaesen's description of uniquely human tool-related cognitive abilities rings true but would be enhanced by an account of how those abilities would have evolved. I suggest that a process of technological selection operated on the cognitive architecture of ancestral hominids because they, unlike other tool-using species, depended on tools for their survival.

In line with Dixon et al.'s argument, I contend that prejudice should be understood in broadly political rather than in narrowly psychological terms. First, what counts as prejudice is a political judgement. Second, studies of collective action demonstrate that it is in “political” struggles, where subordinate groups together oppose dominant groups, that prejudice can be overcome.

Comparisons across languages have long been a means to investigate universal properties of the cognitive system. Although differences between languages may be salient, it is the underlying similarities that have advanced our understanding of language processing. Frost is not unique in emphasizing that the interaction among linguistic codes reinforces the inadequacy of constructing a model of word recognition where orthographic processes operate in isolation.

The claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.

Vaesen suggests that motor control is not among the primary origins of the uniqueness of human tool use. However, recent findings show that cognitive processes involved in control of human limb movements may be much more sophisticated than it was believed previously. The sophistication of movement control may substantially contribute to the uniqueness of humans in tool use.

The analysis offered by Dixon et al. fails to acknowledge that the attitudes that drive prejudice are attitudes that are constructed in particular contexts. These attitudes (e.g., toward men as childcare workers) can diverge strongly from attitudes toward the group in general. Social change is thus best achieved through challenging the requirements of roles and by changing group stereotypes.

Existence of similarities of overall brain activation, specifically during emotional and other common psychological operations (discussed by Lindquist et al.), supports a proposal that emotion participates continuously in dynamic adjustment of behavior. The proposed participation can clarify the relationship of emotion to musical experience. Music, in turn, can help explore such participation.

We question the plausibility of Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) argument that localised pathogen-host coevolution leads to out-groups having pathogens more damaging than those infecting one's own family or religious group.

Guala contests the validity of strong reciprocity as a key element in shaping social behavior by contrasting evidence from experimental games to that of natural and historic data. He suggests that in order to understand the evolution of social behavior researchers should focus on natural data and weak reciprocity. We disagree with Guala's proposal to shift the focus of the study from one extreme of the spectrum (strong reciprocity) to the other extreme (weak reciprocity). We argue that the study of the evolution of social behavior must be comparative in nature, and we point out experimental evidence that shows that social behavior is not cooperation determined by a set of fixed factors. We argue for a model that sees social behavior as a dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental factors.

A key argument of Dixon et al. in the target article is that prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action work in opposite ways. We argue for a complementary approach focusing on extreme emotions to understand why people turn to non-normative collective action and to understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

The cortical representation of concepts varies according to the information critical for their development. Living categories, being mainly based upon visual information, are bilaterally represented in the rostral parts of the ventral stream of visual processing; whereas tools, being mainly based upon action data, are unilaterally represented in a left-sided fronto-parietal network. The unilateral representation of tools results from involvement in actions of the right side of the body.

In Vytal and Hamann (2010) we reported a neuroimaging meta-analysis that found that basic emotions can be distinguished by their brain activation correlates, in marked contrast to Lindquist et al.'s conclusions in the target article. Here, I discuss implications of these findings for understanding emotion, outline limitations of using meta-analyses and neuroimaging as the sole basis for deciding between emotion views, and suggest that these views are essentially compatible and could be adapted and combined into an integrated emotion framework.

In this commentary we suggest that Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) parasite-stress theory of social behaviors and attitudes can be extended to mating behaviors and preferences. We discuss evidence from prior correlational and experimental studies that support this claim. We also reanalyze data from two of those studies using F&T's new parasite stress measures.

The properties of a specific orthography dictate the way people read it. We bring considerations from dyslexia to suggest that the claim can be extended further. First, the effect of orthographic neighborhood density can be extended beyond letter-position encoding and beyond the orthographic lexicon. Second, Hebrew and Arabic differ with respect to letter forms, and hence, in letter-position encoding.

Fincher & Thornhill (F&T) present a compelling argument that parasite stress underlies certain cultural practices promoting assortative sociality. However, we suggest that the theoretical framework proposed is limited in several ways, and that life history theory provides a more explanatory and inclusive framework, making more specific predictions about the trade-offs faced by organisms in the allocation of bioenergetic and material resources.

Frost's article advocates for universal models of reading and critiques recent models that concentrate in what has been described as “cracking the orthographic code.” Although the challenge to develop models that can account for word recognition beyond Indo-European languages is welcomed, we argue that reading models should also be constrained by general principles of visual processing and object recognition.

Lindquist et al. argue that emotional categories do not map onto distinct regions within the brain, but rather, arise from basic psychological processes, including conceptualization, executive attention, and core affect. Here, we use examples from cultural neuroscience to argue that psychological constructionism, not locationism, captures the essential role of emotion in the social and cultural brain.

Integrating a historical perspective into studies of prejudicial attitudes facilitates the interpretation of paradoxical findings of the kind cited in the target article. History also encourages research to move beyond the study of prejudice and to consider institutional and structural forces that maintain social inequities. Multilevel approaches can study these factors in both field and laboratory studies.

Chimpanzee/human technological differences are vast, reflect multiple interacting behavioral processes, and may result from the increased information-processing and hierarchical mental constructional capacities of the human brain. Therefore, advanced social, technical, and communicative capacities probably evolved together in concert with increasing brain size. Interpretations of these evolutionary and species differences as continuities or discontinuities reflect differing scientific perspectives.

Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been over-interpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists, but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala's review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.