Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional views of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must provide evidence that people do not cooperate without such incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared “bonus” that would be provided only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices; contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that cannot be explained by “economic man” or “selfish gene” theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor shaping the evolution of Homo sapiens. The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and makes novel predictions about human choice.

How does subjective magnitude, S. increase as physical magnitude or intensity, I, increases? Direct ratings (magnitude scales; partition or category scales) can be fitted by the power function, S = aIb, in which S equals I raised to a power or exponent, b, and multiplied by a measure constant, a. The exponent is typically about twice as large for the magnitude scale (Stevens) as for the corresponding partition or category scale, but the higher exponent may be explained by the overly expansive way people use numbers in making magnitude estimations. The partition or category scale and the adjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale for a given modality or condition generally agree with the neurelectric scale and the summated just noticeable difference (jnd) scale. A unified psychophysical law is proposed in which each jnd has the same subjective magnitude for a given modality or condition, subjective magnitude increases as approximately a power function of physical magnitude with the exponent ranging from near 0 to 1 (compressive function), and subjective magnitude depends primarily on peripheral sensory processes, that is, no nonlinear central transformations occur. An undue reliance on Weber's law blinded Fechner to the fact that the true psychophysical scale is approximately a power function. Rejecting Weber's law, which is not valid, means that we no longer have to choose between letting the summated jnd scale be a logarithmic function (Fechner's law) and introducing a nonlinear central transformation to make it into a power function (Brentano–Ekman-Teghtsoonian's law). Fechner and Stevens erred equally about the true psychophysical power function, whose exponent lies halfway between that of Fechner (an exponent approaching zero) and that of Stevens. To be reconciled, Fechnerians must give up the assumptions that Webers law is valid and that the jnd has the same subjective magnitude across modalities and conditions; Stevensians must give up the assumption that the unadjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale is a direct measure of subjective magnitude.