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The representation of inherent properties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Sandeep Prasada
Sandeep Prasada*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Hunter College, City University of New York (CUNY); New York, NY 10065. [email protected]
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Abstract

Research on the representation of generic knowledge suggests that inherent properties can have either a principled or a causal connection to a kind. The type of connection determines whether the outcome of the storytelling process will include intuitions of inevitability and a normative dimension and whether it will ground causal explanations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 500
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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