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Quiddity and haecceity as distinct forms of essentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Bruce Hood
Bruce Hood*
Affiliation:
School of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.bristol.ac.uk/expsych/people/bruce-m-hood/overview.html
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Abstract

Psychological essentialism operates in two realms that have consequences for our attitudes towards groups and individuals. Although essentialism is more familiar in the context of biological group membership, it can also be evoked when considering unique artefacts, especially when they are emotionally significant items.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 492 - 493
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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