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Intergroup competition may not be needed for shaping group cooperation and cultural group selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Carsten K. W. De Dreu  and
Daniel Balliet
Carsten K. W. De Dreu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, and Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]
Daniel Balliet
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]
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Abstract

Because intergroup interactions often are mixed-motive rather than strictly zero-sum, groups often negotiate settlements that enable both cultures to thrive. Moreover, group prosperity rests on in-group love (rather than out-group hate) that emerges also absent intergroup competition or comparison. It follows that cultural group selection (CGS) reflects group effectiveness in organizing in-group trust and cooperation, rather than winning (in)direct intergroup competitions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e36
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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