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The integrated information theory of consciousness: Unmasked and identified

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Bjorn Merker Open the ORCID record for Bjorn Merker [Opens in a new window] ,
Kenneth Williford  and
David Rudrauf
Bjorn Merker
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, Fjälkestadsv. 410-82, 29194Kristianstad, [email protected]
Kenneth Williford
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy & Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX76019, [email protected]://mentis.uta.edu/explore/profile/kenneth-williford
David Rudrauf
Affiliation:
Faculty of Psychology and Education Science, Swiss Center for Affective Science, University Center of Computer Science, University of Geneva, Geneva, 1202, Switzerland. [email protected]://www.unige.ch/fapse/mmef/en/recherche/
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Abstract

In our response to a truly diverse set of commentaries, we first summarize the principal topical themes around which they cluster, then address two “outlier” positions (the problem of consciousness has been solved vs. is intractable). Next, we address ways in which commentaries by non-integrated information theory (IIT) authors engage with the specifics of our IIT critique, turning finally to the four commentaries by IIT authors.

Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e65
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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