Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T07:55:19.996Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

IIT is ideally positioned to explain perceptual phenomena

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Andrew M. Haun*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI53719, USA. [email protected]; https://centerforsleepandconsciousness.psychiatry.wisc.edu/people/andrew-haun-phd/

Abstract

The target article's critique of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is misguided on several fronts, which I hope are addressed in other comments, but here I focus on the connection (or supposed lack thereof) between IIT and rigorous phenomenology, and IIT's connection to the psychophysics of perception.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2009). Qualia: The geometry of integrated information. PLoS Computational Biology, 5(8), e1000462.10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. Chandler Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2019). Why does space feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of spatial experience. Entropy, 21(12), 1160. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21121160CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tononi, G. (2014). The conscious grid (response to Scott Aaronson). Retrieved from http://integratedinformationtheory.org/download/conscious_grid.pdfGoogle Scholar