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Human cooperation shows the distinctive signatures of adaptations to small-scale social life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

John Tooby
Affiliation:
Center for Evolutionary Psychology, and Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106. [email protected]
Leda Cosmides
Affiliation:
Center for Evolutionary Psychology, and Department of Psychology and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106. [email protected]

Abstract

The properties of individual carbon atoms allow them to chain into complex molecules of immense length. They are not limited to structures involving only a few atoms. The design features of our evolved neural adaptations appear similarly extensible. Individuals with forager brains can link themselves together into unprecedentedly large cooperative structures without the need for large group-beneficial modifications to evolved human design. Roles need only be intelligible to our social program logic, and judged better than alternatives.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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