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Functional theories can describe many features of conscious phenomenology but cannot account for its existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Max Velmans Open the ORCID record for Max Velmans [Opens in a new window]
Max Velmans*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, LondonSE14 6NW, UK. [email protected]://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/
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Abstract

Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. Although such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e62
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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