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The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2017

Dan M. Kahan
Dan M. Kahan*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06510. [email protected]/kahan
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Abstract

This commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e6
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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