Of the various causes of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, nationalism was certainly one of the most important. In an age of integral nationalism like the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century it proved extremely difficult for a multinational empire like the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to survive. Not only did the Habsburgs face the question of how to retain the loyalty of a dozen different nationalities within the framework of a single empire, but they also had to reconcile ever increasing differences between the Slavs and the Germans and Magyars and between the Germans and the Magyars themselves. In the end, the Habsburg government failed to meet the challenge.

It would be much easier to state what the relationship between the concepts of the “dynasty” and the “imperial idea” does not mean than to explain what it is supposed to mean. Before we can make any serious efforts to do so, we must, first of all, come to a clear understanding of the exact meaning of some of the terms involved. In English-speaking areas the word “empire” is generally understood to mean “an extended territory, usually comprised of a group of nations, states or peoples under the control or domination of a single sovereign power.” Frequently the determining factors are the assumption of a master-subject relationship between “a dominating conquering people and the conquered people,” either by way of a confederacy, in which “one strong member dominates its confederates,” or by even more direct subordination. Furthermore, the notion of an empire is generally associated with an area of considerable size and frequently “with the supreme or absolute power especially of an emperor.1

Observers of the Central European scene after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918 were often disappointed by the vigorous national assertiveness of the Succession States, which seemed to expedite Hitler's aggressions and the Russian penetration of 1944–45. Retrospective assessments of the monarchy's historic role often cited economic unity, the centralized constitutions of both Austria and Hungary, the traditions of the bureaucracy, and the existence of strongly entrenched, pro-imperial classes as centripetal forces in a political complex which from Rudolf I's time often had yielded to particularism and administrative division.

Historians are generally agreed that until the very end of the Habsburg monarchy the army constituted one of the main pillars of the multinational empire.2 Even so, the view that the armed might was always a reliable instrument of the established order and that it was largely unaffected by the nationality problem cannot be accepted. On the contrary, throughout the period from 1815 to 1914 the nationality problem was constantly present in the army. On occasion, as in 1848–49, it actually divided the army against itself; at other times it corroded the loyalty of some contingents, and it often influenced political, administrative, strategic, and even tactical decisions. After 1867 the status of the Hungarian forces within the Dual Monarchy became one of the most crucial, and at the same time one of the most vexing, problems of the empire.

In 1848–49 Austria could have introduced reforms which conceivably might have insured her continued existence for many generations and possibly might have finally made a true state out of the Habsburg domains. … [In] the course of the two [subsequent] generations until 1918 there never appeared an equally promising opportunity for the empire to carry out reform without risking its disintegration. This is not to say that Austria should not have taken this risk, which was smaller at the time of the compromise in 1867 than it was in 1905 and smaller in 1905 at the height of the Hungarian crisis than it was in 1917, when Engels' ominous prediction finally came true that with the victory of the Russian Revolution Austria would disintegrate.

The breakup of the Habsburg monarchy was perhaps the most exceptional change made in the political geography of the European world of our times. It would be too much to say that the shot fired at Sarajevo destroyed the Austro-Hungarian empire. But it is hardly an exaggeration to suggest that the young assassin was a living embodiment of the principle of nationalism in the South Slavic lands and that the shot which he fired was a deliberate blow at the political-geographic structure of the Habsburg monarchy. Those competent to discuss the question are almost unanimous in their verdict: the dissolution of the empire was brought on by a combination of external forces and an internal disintegration. The internal disintegration actually impelled the state to expose itself to the external forces. The works of scholars from many countries and disciplines2 who have carefullyanalyzed the structure and function of the Habsburg empire have been scrutinized with the view of studying the regions which formed this empire, their different characteristics and associations, and their connections with each other and to the state in order to ascertain to what extent the area of the empire constituted a state in the modern sense and to note any weaknesses in its morphology and physiology that helped to account for its collapse. The contribution of political geography to this critical evaluation of nationalism as a disintegrating force of the Habsburg empire lies in an analysis of the major problems of the internal situation of that empire.

During the past hundred years a vast literature ranging from scholarly analyses of a high order to crudely polemical disputations has been devoted to analyzing the question of why all attempts to consolidate the Habsburg monarchy ended in failure. Since 1945 it has become increasingly possible to investigate and explain the causes of failure without national or other partisan bias. The dissolution of the empire in 1918 was, after all, the result not of defeat on the battlefield but of a long organic process.

In order to evaluate properly the position of the Germansin the Habsburg monarchy during the nineteenth century, certain factors whose roots go back to earlier centuries shouldbe taken into consideration. The explanation for many of theproblems under discussion in this paper can be found byexamining these roots.

A little more than one thousand and ten years ago, the annus mirabilis of Otto I taught the unruly Magyars that “nomadism in one country” was not a workable proposition2 and that they had to make adjustments if they wished to belong to the nascent European community. A little less than ten years ago, the Hungarians received another object lesson suggesting that too much emphasis on western civilization might become another source of danger. Since they were separated by a whole millennium, the meaning of the two events is certainly very different. But both were results of a mis judgment of domestic forces and international relations—a phenomenon which was far from uncommon in the history of Hungary.

It is not an easy task for a historian to give an objective picture of the internal relations of the multinational empire. This is especially true with regard to Hungary's part and position in the monarchy. Was Hungary's status in the empire one of preponderancy or dependency? Did Hungary play a disintegrating role in the Dual Monarchy or was she the pillar of dualism? These are difficult questions to answer. Wherever he turns the historian finds articles and books dealing with the monarchy which are replete with arguments and counterarguments. The most common feature of studies thus far is that historians have approached these questions concerning Hungary's role with traditional sympathies or hostilities. Detailed objective accounts based on up-to-date methods for studies on Hungarian political, economic, and social development are missing.

I hope I will meet with sympathy if I state here that my task as a discussant is a difficult one. Faced with four lengthy, excellent, and basically different essays, I am now expected—and within twenty minutes at that—to criticize, to laud, to summarize, and to incite further discussion. Let me therefore take the bull by the horns and challenge the very topic of this discussion. It is my contention that the subject of this debate is neither justified nor valid and that it is precisely because of the contradiction inherent in the topic that our four participants used widely divergent methods and arrived at widely divergent conclusions. I would argue that there were no dominant nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. There were only dominant classes, estates, institutions, interest groups, and professions. True, German and Magyar nationals formed the majority of these dominant strata of society, but the benefits they derived from their privileged position were not shared by the lower classes of their own nationality. If the Austrian Germans-but not the Magyars–generally enjoyed a relatively high living standard, this was due to their geographic position and their industry and not to legislation or to the allegedly dominant position the Germans as a whole occupied in the monarchy. While Profs. Barany, Hanak, and Whiteside were very much aware of the distinction between class privilege and national privilege, they could not, directed as they were by the title of their discourse, fully develop this distinction.