Whilst international submarine cables are essential to modern-day life, threats to these cables from competing ocean uses, such as fisheries, persist. Protection of submarine cables, and resolution of potential conflicts among various ocean uses, is needed now more than ever. This article examines and identifies weakness in the current legal regime for submarine cables, with a specific focus on the regulations concerning punishment for the breaking or damage of submarine cables and the integrated management of competing ocean uses. After discussing the legal regime, the article offers some proposals for reform, outlining various options for future action at the international level.

This article examines the 2008 Agreement for Co-operation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [“123 Agreement”] within the context of the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. Attention is paid to three issues in particular, namely how international environmental law has developed to interact with vaguely worded environmental protection provisions, such as those in the 123 Agreement, and the role of experts in this regard, the issue of civil nuclear liability, and the question of what international law might require for environmental impact assessments under the 123 Agreement to pass muster.

Treaties are contractual instruments that may provide special rules of priority in case they conflict with other treaties. When a treaty does not provide such rules, however, priority is determined by the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and/or general principles of law. This article argues that both the VCLT and general principles of law do not provide an adequate solution to treaty conflicts. It suggests that the solution to treaty conflicts rests in a value-oriented reading of international law and the norms incorporated in treaties. Norms represent values and values represent interests or benefits for which international society requires protection. Conflicts of treaty norms are, therefore, conflicts of values that courts and dispute settlement bodies resolve by ordering a hierarchy of competing interests and protecting the most important interests in a given context.

This article provides the first-ever detailed analysis of Non-Precluded Measures (NPM) provisions in India's International Investment Agreements (IIAs) from the perspective of India's regulatory power as a host nation. It critically analyses NPM provisions in fifty-seven Indian IIAs by studying the divergence in their formulation and argues that the present formulation of NPM provisions in Indian IIAs is inadequate for the exercise of regulatory power by India for all its policy needs. Hence, in the light of the growing pros and cons of investor treaty arbitration (ITA), the article concludes that NPM provisions in Indian IIAs should be reformulated in a manner that balances investment protection with India's regulatory power to pursue non-investment-related policy objectives.

A number of commentators, including Michael Hwang and Jennifer Fong who were featured in a recent issue of this journal,1 have contributed to an ongoing debate about the definition of investment by expressing their support for an objectivist theory or the “outer limits” approach as advocated in Salini v. Morocco. However, this article argues that neither the Salini test nor the rival subjectivist theory can offer an internally consistent and viable legal framework for determining the existence of an investment. After critically examining existing approaches to defining investments in arbitral practice, international investment treaties, European Union (EU) law, and international trade law, the article considers the role of ordinary and effective interpretation and a telos behind investment treaty instruments in coining a meaningful definition.

Joint petroleum development has often been considered as a viable solution to the seemingly intractable Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea (SCS). This is, however, more easily said than done. On the other hand, little attention is paid to fisheries co-operation in the SCS despite the fact that fisheries constitute an important part in the economies of coastal states. The present laissez-faire approach to fisheries in the disputed area gives rise to friction and tension. By highlighting the salient features of existing fisheries’ co-operative arrangements in the world, this article demonstrates the merits of a fisheries arrangement in the SCS. It also argues that fisheries co-operation, as a low-profile undertaking, is probably easier to achieve than joint petroleum development. A fisheries arrangement would serve the immediate interests of parties to the Spratly Islands dispute and may pave the way for their future high-profile co-operation, i.e. joint petroleum development.

On 7 May 2009, the People's Republic of China (PRC) protested Vietnamese and joint Malaysian-Vietnamese submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In support of Chinese claims, a map was annexed to the letter of protest portraying a dotted U-shaped line engulfing the greater part of the South China Sea. Following a brief primer on the genesis of the U-line, this article aims to decipher the text of the protest letter accompanying the U-line, suggesting several possible interpretations. This contribution argues that the map is of doubtful probative value in the light of various factors fleshed out in international jurisprudence regarding map evidence. Attention will be paid to the reactions of third-party states to the U-line. This article maintains that effective protest on the part of regional states has prevented the map from becoming opposable to them.

The ASEAN Economic Ministers unveiled the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy on 24 August 2010. This is a non-binding document covering all key issues relating to competition law and policy. This article provides a comparative study of the regional harmonization of competition law and policy among the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CAN, and ASEAN, with a focus on ASEAN. In contrast to the “hard law” approach of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and CAN, ASEAN has opted for a “soft law” approach because it is constrained by (1) the traditional “ASEAN Way”; (2) the diversity in economic conditions and competition regimes among its members; and (3) the lack of a supranational body to enforce common competition rules, or, at least, a mechanism for dispute resolution. The author concludes that this modest step which ASEAN has taken in the regional harmonization of competition law and policy is appropriate for the time being.

Sui generis hybrid international criminal tribunals must conduct business without institutional memory and are only as effective or fair as their constitutive documents allow. The sparse guidance provided for the international crimes court in Cambodia creates uncertainty and arguably ambiguous standards that infringe upon the legality principle and undermine efforts for nulla poena sine lege.

“Acquisitive prescription” should be denied as a rule of international law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty. It is useless in practice and confusing in theory. Replacing it should be the concepts of “historical title” and “tacit agreement”, which would thus expand the traditional five modes for legally acquiring territory to six. This rearrangement would be useful for us to get a clear and correct understanding of this part of international law, and would thus enable international law to play a positive role in dealing with territorial disputes. It would also prevent, hopefully, an exacerbation of the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan as caused by a misunderstanding of this part of international law.

Over the last decade, public-private partnerships between states and a variety of non-state actors have proliferated as vehicles for functional co-operation at the global level. In parallel, there has been an emerging trend to accord such partnerships the privileges and immunities normally reserved for intergovernmental organizations (“IO-type privileges and immunities”). After identifying the legal and normative issues associated with this trend, this article argues that IO-type privileges and immunities should be restricted to entities that are clearly established under and governed by international law, and that any approach to IO-type privileges and immunities as a uniform package deal, regardless of the precise functional requirements of the global public-private partnership and its different categories of staff, or the specific conditions in the relevant national jurisdiction where a given privilege or immunity is sought, should be avoided.

This article analyses offences dealing with the incrimination of organized crime under international and domestic laws in the Asia Pacific region and develops recommendations to improve existing and proposed provisions. The article frames the arguments for and against offences such as “participation in an organized crime group”, “gangsterism”, or “racketeering”, and critically examines the rationale, elements, and application of existing and proposed organized crime offences in the Asia Pacific.

The emerging principle of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) challenges China's traditional emphasis on non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of force. This article considers the impact of the 2011 Libyan intervention on Beijing's evolving relationship with R2P, and assesses its implications for the future development of the doctrine itself. It argues that China's decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, which authorized force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and does not represent a significant softening of Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P's legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council's ability to respond decisively in civilian protection situations.

Water security issues arising from the Central Asian states’ heavy reliance on, and competition over, the shared waters of the Aral Sea Basin have attracted urgent political and academic discussion. However, any analysis of the role that international law plays in addressing these substantive complex problems remains incomplete and imprecise. This article sets the stage for a deeper understanding of international law and of its potential operation in the context of the transboundary waters in the Aral Sea Basin. It seeks to explore the substantive norms operating in the field, namely, the rule of equitable and reasonable use, the no-harm rule, and obligations relating to environmental protection, with a view to understanding how these substantive norms work and ascertaining what conduct is required of the states with respect to their shared watercourses.