The English common law tort of passing off came into the spotlight in 2015 with the UK Supreme Court case of Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group settling the current position regarding the question of the territorial scope of goodwill. This article undertakes a comparative study of the tort with Section 18 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code which, it argues, has been interpreted by the Thai Supreme Court to offer a materially similar remedy to the English tort in two important conceptual aspects: the requirement for misrepresentation and the so-called “hard line” approach to the territorial scope of goodwill, as affirmed by Starbucks. The analysis carries important implications for comparative lawyers and legislators in both the UK and Thailand, and challenges assumptions based on a simplistic categorization of Thailand as a civil law jurisdiction.

The Straits Settlements comprised a group of British territories located in the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia. It initially comprised Penang, Singapore, and Malacca, and was formed in 1826. Unlike Malacca which was a thriving city with a substantial Chinese community, Penang and Singapore were relatively uninhabited when the British arrived, but Chinese immigration to both territories swiftly took place and on a large scale. For much of the nineteenth century, British policy towards the Chinese community in the Straits was one of minimal governance. They were largely left to order their affairs privately and this suited the Chinese, who tended to be aloof from the machinery of government and were also unfamiliar with English law. While there were many positive aspects of such private ordering, some negative features included the manner in which secret societies evolved and the treatment of coolies. It was only when the colonial government introduced strong measures that these negative aspects were ameliorated.

In 2006, China enacted its first rescue-oriented Enterprise Bankruptcy Law with the aim of establishing its corporate rescue culture. But the corporate reorganization procedure that is at the heart of the new bankruptcy law has not been used frequently. It is appropriate to ask why the use of China’s new corporate rescue law has been so low. Meanwhile, in the existing corporate reorganizations under the 2006 Law, most debtors were excluded from the reorganization process, so that the Chinese new debtor-in-possession model, which seems to be a desirable control format, was largely shelved. Why so? This article explores these two issues through the use of empirical data collected from Zhejiang, a province with a significantly larger number of reorganizations than most other Chinese provinces.

This article explores horizontal non-discrimination rights under the Constitution of India (Indian Constitution). The Indian Constitution is unique in that it expressly prohibits private discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, caste, religion, etc. for the purpose of, inter alia, “access to … shops” (Article 15(2)). The article argues that a historically grounded understanding of the word “shops”, in the context of the transformative purposes of the Indian Constitution, necessitates a broad reading that covers all private economic transactions where goods and services are offered to the public at large. Furthermore, seemingly contrary Supreme Court precedent, if it is constitutionally justifiable, must be restricted to its own facts. In sum, Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution provides a radical constitutional remedy that is directly horizontally applicable to private conduct, and goes far beyond remedies developed in other jurisdictions, which have often needed to turn to legislation in order to adequately combat private discrimination in the economic and social sphere.

The supremacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has been the basic norm in Vietnam’s constitution since 1980. While it was not changed in the final constitutional amendments in 2013, this grundnorm was seriously debated during the constitutional reform process between 2010-2013, thus indicating a shift in the constitutional dialogue in Vietnam. This article traces the history of this basic norm throughout constitutional amendments of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and assesses how the basic norm has become increasingly contested. Contestations over this basic norm have played out markedly over the recent constitutional reform process. The discursive power in these contestations has shaken the rationality-based legitimacy of this basic norm to its root. The continuing dominance of this norm depends to a large extent on how the Vietnamese party-state’s practical policy-making and policy implementation initiatives address the increasing tension between the supremacy of the CPV and other principles in the constitution.

This article offers a critical analysis of the human rights system established by ASEAN. It first investigates concrete evidence of the system’s ineffectiveness by comparing the cases of Myanmar and Thailand, which illustrate ASEAN’s failure to address human rights violations both before and after the creation of the ASEAN system. It then examines the substantive and procedural limitations of the ASEAN human rights instruments and mechanisms. Specifically, while restrictions on rights and freedoms contained in the instruments undermine the universality of human rights, ASEAN’s mechanisms lack independence and offer only weak protection mandates to address rights violations. In addition, the absence of a judicial body to hear complaints and issue binding remedies makes the system incomplete. The article recommends the creation of an ASEAN court of human rights and suggests changes to the existing instruments and mechanisms that might accommodate the new court.

This article draws on the common law of unjust enrichment to rationalize and develop the right to recover a non-gratuitously conferred benefit set out in section 71 of Malaysia’s Contracts Act 1950. This attempt at legal transplant and modern restatement is made in the hope of injecting principle and clarity into the antique section with the eventual goal of reviving it for practical and modern use.

This article analyzes the constitutional debate on and development of human rights in Vietnam throughout five constitutions from 1946 to 2013, as well as the prospects and challenges in promoting human rights in Vietnam during and after the development of its 2013 Constitution. It begins with an investigation and discussion of the human rights provisions from the 1946 Constitution to the 1992 Constitution – a period where the socialist human rights tradition was established in Vietnam. It follows with an analysis of the debates on the new human rights and citizens’ rights provisions in the 1992 Constitution, where a new concept of natural human rights emerged. The article continues to explore how the struggle and debates surrounding the competing conception of rights – socialist and positivist on one hand and natural law-based on the other – come into play in shaping the 2013 Constitution. It then proceeds to evaluate the potential challenges involved in the implementation of these rights in the coming years. The authors argue that the development of constitutional human rights in Vietnam is still limited by ideological barriers. It also faces substantial practical challenges owing to, inter alia, the absence of provisions for the immediate implementation of such rights as well as legal mechanisms for the protection of constitutional rights, such as a constitutional review system.

This article analyzes the socio-economic and political contexts behind the 2013 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2013 Constitution), in which demands for deeper institutional reform emerged in Vietnam, and explains the constitutional discourse within Vietnam as to its economic order. Diverse forces and platforms within Vietnam’s party-state and beyond have contributed to the exchange of ideas and values on the economic order. As a result of this public discourse, the provisions on the economic order of the 2013 Constitution are ideological compromises, reflecting the contradicting views within the party-state and society in Vietnam on the role of the market, private property, and the freedom to conduct business. The 2013 Constitution has taken a step towards a free market economy by recognizing the decisive role of the market in the national economy. It emphasizes the importance of the private sector and promises that it will be treated fairly among all other economic sectors. From this perspective, the 2013 Constitution contains the seeds of future political and legal guarantees which could protect individual liberties. However, in line with the socialist ideology adopted by its predecessors, the 2013 Constitution reaffirms the dominance of the public sector and the leading role of state-owned enterprises, and preserves the ambiguous “ownership of the entire Vietnamese people of land and natural resources”. Due to this ambiguity, the 2013 Constitution fails to lay down the foundations for far-reaching comprehensive institutional reforms that Vietnam urgently requires.

In 2012–2013, the people of Vietnam participated in a lengthy process of public consultation to amend the constitution and land law. This article analyzes the approach that party leaders took during the 2013 constitutional consultation and law-making period as the leaders responded to submissions calling for radical reforms of constitutional and legal arrangements of land ownership. This analysis will provide insights into how, if at all, the discussion in 2012–2013 was different from previous discussions in relation to reforming the constitutional and legal arrangements of land ownership in Vietnam. The article argues that despite unprecedented consultation and discussion, party leaders did not intend to make substantive changes to land ownership.

The people’s procuracy is a transplanted Soviet-style institution in Vietnam, which currently exercises the public prosecution function along with the supervision of judicial activities. Debates about the procuracy’s role and function started as early as when the 1992 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1992 Constitution) was drafted and they were facilitated by the judicial reform policies. In the process of revising the 1992 Constitution, heated debates on the procuracy continued. The subject of these debates included almost every fundamental aspect of the procuracy such as its institutional location, functions, duties, organization, and operation. This article reviews the constitutional debates concerning the procuracy between 2011 and 2013. It analyzes and compares the developments of the debates in this period with those that had occurred in the past, highlighting, in particular, key issues that remain unresolved. It argues that the controversy surrounding the procuracy reflects the legal and political complexities in Vietnam, especially the lack of agreement on institutional issues such as the rule of law, socialist legality, and control of powers.