This article examines why Japan is a prominent exception to the global trend towards recognition of same-sex marriage and evaluates the prospects for change. It does so through an analysis of five cases brought on Valentine's Day – 14 February 2019. Unlike many jurisdictions where religious opposition to same-sex relationships has been intense and sometimes violent, Japan has a history of relative tolerance towards LGBT individuals. Nonetheless, despite the creation of civil partnership ordinances in some localities, national legislation seems unlikely, and a group of lawyers filed suit in five district courts across Japan. The litigation was brought under the State Redress Act and is based on tort rather than directly on constitutional doctrine. It claims that marriage equality is constitutionally required and that the failure of the government to recognize same-sex marriage constitutes a tort that has harmed the LGB plaintiffs and entitles them to compensation. This article analyzes the nature of the cause of action founded on the State Redress Act, and examines the arguments, which are based more on the plaintiffs’ suffering than on their desire for self-expression. Subsequently, it presents and evaluates the possible outcomes

Cambodia's Constitution, promulgated in September 1993, was to be the foundation of a transition to liberal, multiparty democracy. Yet, despite the document's seeming commitment to those very principles, constitutional provisions are frequently used to undermine liberal rule of law and to impose restrictions on political processes, freedoms, and rights. Focusing on the events of 2016–2017, including the jailing of opposition politicians, controversial legal reforms, and the dissolution of the country's foremost opposition party, this article demonstrates how authoritarian practices in Cambodia are framed in terms of adherence – even fidelity – to the Constitution. Further, it explores how ideas of ‘stability’ and ‘law and order’ often elide with those of rule of law in discourses and practices that simultaneously exalt and hollow out the normative power of the Constitution. This article posits that a socio-legal approach that pays particular attention to discourse can shed new light on the empirical fact of authoritarian constitutionalism, but also the processes of meaning-making that accompany, facilitate, and legitimize its practice. Far from merely a sham, then, Cambodia's Constitution – like many others – is imbricated in a complex web of contestation and legitimation that extends far beyond the walls of any courtroom.

Parties to a dispute that goes to court typically seek to retain the best lawyer they can afford. But do the ‘best’ lawyers get better results? This article surveys the literature across various jurisdictions before introducing a recent study of determinants of litigation outcomes in Singapore. The focus is on whether there is a correlation between various measures of lawyer quality (size of law firm, professional status, years of experience, etc) and actual success in court. Consistent with past studies, larger and better-resourced law firms tend to do better on average – though Singapore is unusual in that the Government Legal Service functions like the largest and best-resourced law firm. Individual lawyers, however, yield unusual results, with more experienced lawyers sometimes having a lower success rate in court – perhaps due to them taking on more complex cases. The study also shows that women are significantly underrepresented as lead counsel in Singapore, but on average may outperform men.

This article examines the transplantation of the Takeover Panel model from the United Kingdom into the takeover regulatory systems in Hong Kong and Singapore. It focuses on the extent to which this has resulted in formal convergence between the Takeover Panel in the UK and those established in Hong Kong and Singapore. Formal convergence is assessed in terms of the institutional structures of these Panels and is based on their independence and roles, the powers of the Panels and their Executives, and review of their decisions. Applying these criteria, this article concludes that there are medium levels of formal convergence with the UK Panel in both the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels. This article also examines functional convergence, namely the extent to which the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels operate similarly to the UK Panel in practice. In relation to the procedural rules and processes implemented by the Panels, this article concludes that there is a medium form of functional convergence in the case of the Hong Kong Panel, and a weak form of this for the Singapore Panel. Finally, the study of functional convergence in decision-making also includes an examination of the extent to which the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels refer explicitly to the UK approach in their decisions.

With the global proliferation of antitrust law enforcement, multinational businesses, scholars, and practitioners have clamoured for stronger due process protection in competition adjudication. Often, the argument assumes the existence of a due process standard applicable internationally to all competition jurisdictions. The standard comprises certain features typical of adversarial adjudication, including a neutral decision-maker, a live in-person hearing before such decision-maker, and the right to present and cross-examine evidence and witnesses. This paper challenges this alleged due process standard on two different levels by comparing the competition adjudication procedures of the United States Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission, and the Korea Fair Trade Commission. First, the paper shows that such a standard, which advances certain features of Anglo-American adversarial adjudication, is at odds with the local due process laws of the European Union and South Korea. Second, the paper shows that implementing such adversarial features would pose significant practical problems in jurisdictions where existing administrative procedures are largely inquisitorial or ‘continental.’ While the supporters of the due process argument identify a number of procedural problems that should be addressed, framing these problems as a due process issue would only be counterproductive.

The rise of China's tech companies in the global economy raises an urgent need to understand how China incubates its tech startups. China's tech startup ecosystem presents two puzzling legal arrangements for human capital in light of Silicon Valley's experience, the co-existence of enforceable non-compete agreements and the high-velocity labour market, and the common use of stock options with a buyback norm. This article delves into the peculiarities of China's legal and political institutions to resolve these legal puzzles. This article also speaks to a global policy debate about the replicability of Silicon Valley and the necessity of such replication. The Chinese experience offers opposite examples showing the replication complexity: replication yet with deformed practices, and non-replication yet with similar outcomes. The findings suggest that there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all model for creating an innovation economy.

While Atiyah's and Summers’ concepts of form and substance in the context of constitutional law are often associated with constitutional interpretation, they can also be fruitfully applied to other areas of constitutional and administrative law. The intent of this paper is to apply the concepts of form and substance to Singapore constitutional and administrative law to illustrate that beyond constitutional interpretation, formalism is an apt description for several key areas of constitutional and administrative law doctrine and reasoning in Singapore, even to the extent of being formalistic. This article will argue that formalism in legal reasoning obtains in several important constitutional and administrative law doctrines in Singapore – specifically in the grounds of judicial review, ouster clause doctrine, and the rules on standing. This article will also evaluate the implications of these findings for the development of constitutional and administrative law in Singapore.

This marvellous book by Rohit De flows from the meeting of two important aspects of Indian constitutional practice. First, the organization of the republic fashioned at independence as an instrument of socio-political change granting the state vast power over social, economic, and cultural activity. Second, a state organized to separate institutional powers and to protect individual freedom in order to check the runaway exercise of institutional power. In De's own words, the book is organised as a ‘dialectic between the Indian Constitution as “politics of state desire” and the Constitution as “articulating insurgent orders of expectations from the state.”’ Set against these tensions in Indian constitutional practice, through a set of detailed ethnographies, De foregrounds citizen efforts to defend rights and freedoms that have operated to deepen constitutional culture in the early years of Indian independence.

I am grateful to Professor Mathew John for his deep and rigorous engagement with A People's Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic, and to the editors of this journal for giving me the opportunity to be in dialogue with some of the questions he raises.