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Adaptations of the United Kingdom Takeover Panel in Hong Kong and Singapore: Convergence or Divergence?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2021

Emma ARMSON Open the ORCID record for Emma ARMSON [Opens in a new window]
Emma ARMSON*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, [email protected]
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Abstract

This article examines the transplantation of the Takeover Panel model from the United Kingdom into the takeover regulatory systems in Hong Kong and Singapore. It focuses on the extent to which this has resulted in formal convergence between the Takeover Panel in the UK and those established in Hong Kong and Singapore. Formal convergence is assessed in terms of the institutional structures of these Panels and is based on their independence and roles, the powers of the Panels and their Executives, and review of their decisions. Applying these criteria, this article concludes that there are medium levels of formal convergence with the UK Panel in both the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels. This article also examines functional convergence, namely the extent to which the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels operate similarly to the UK Panel in practice. In relation to the procedural rules and processes implemented by the Panels, this article concludes that there is a medium form of functional convergence in the case of the Hong Kong Panel, and a weak form of this for the Singapore Panel. Finally, the study of functional convergence in decision-making also includes an examination of the extent to which the Hong Kong and Singapore Panels refer explicitly to the UK approach in their decisions.

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Article
Information
Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , December 2020 , pp. 281 - 309
Copyright
Copyright © National University of Singapore, 2021

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Footnotes

*

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney. Member, Herbert Smith Freehills China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre. I am thankful for comments received on an earlier version of this article from the anonymous referees and George Williams, and in meetings in Hong Kong and Singapore during a trip funded by CIBEL from 22–29 May 2019.

References

1. See generally eg Armour, John, Jacobs, Jack B & Milhaupt, Curtis J, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 219Google Scholar; Armour, John & Skeel, David A Jr, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727Google Scholar.

2. Manne, Henry G, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 110, 112–113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Fischel, Daniel R, ‘Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers’ (1978) 57 Texas Law Review 1, 5Google Scholar.

4. ibid.

5. Jurisdictions will generally have separate regulations dealing with concerns relating to competition, foreign investment, or particular industries (such as banking), which are not examined in this article.

6. See, for example, Armour & Skeel (n 1) 1734–1735.

7. ibid.

8. ‘The Takeover Panel’ (2020) <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk> accessed 30 May 2020.

9. The Takeover Panel, ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ (The Takeover Panel, 12 Sep 2016) <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/download-code> accessed 30 May 2020 (UK Code).

10. Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs’ (SFC, 13 Jul 2018) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/rules-and-standards/codes-and-guidelines/codes/?rule=The%20Codes%20on%20Takeovers%20and%20Mergers%20and%20Share%20Buy-backs> accessed 30 May 2020 (HK Code); Securities Industry Council, ‘The Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers’ (Securities Industry Council, 24 Jan 2019) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/securities-industry-council> accessed 30 May 2020 (Singapore Code).

11. See Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (SFC, 31 Mar 2020) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/organisational-chart/external-committees/takeovers-and-mergers-panel.html> accessed 30 May 2020.

12. See Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council’ (MAS, 6 May 2020) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic> accessed 30 May 2020.

13. See generally Armour & Skeel (n 1).

14. See eg ibid 1765–1767.

15. Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt (n 1) 222.

16. ibid 281.

17. See generally Varottil, Umakanth & Wan, Wai Yee (eds), Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2018)Google Scholar.

18. Varottil, Umakanth & Wan, Wai Yee, ‘Hostile Takeover Regimes in Asia: A Comparative Approach’ (2019) 15 Berkeley Business Law Journal 267, 269Google Scholar.

19. ibid 269–270.

20. ibid 305.

21. ibid 272–273. In relation to the important role of the state, see also Xi, Chao, ‘The Political Economy of Takeover Regulation: What Does the Mandatory Bid Rule in China Tell Us?’ (2015) 58 Journal of Business Law 142, 161–162Google Scholar.

22. See Varottil & Wan (n 18) 303–305.

23. ibid 270.

24. Gilson, Ronald J, ‘Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function’ (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Gilson also refers to an intermediate response achieved through contract, which is referred to as contractual convergence: p 356.

25. ibid 356. See also Anderson, Helen et al. , ‘The Evolution of Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Australia: An International Comparison’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 171, 202CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. Gilson (n 24) 356.

27. Pistor, Katharina et al. , ‘Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison’ (2002) 23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 791, 867, fn 328Google Scholar.

28. Gilson (n 24) 338.

29. See especially Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439, 457–458Google Scholar.

30. See especially Porta, Rafael La et al. , ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Porta, Rafael La, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 285CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For examples of scholarship examining this claim, see Armour, John et al. , ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 343CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berkowitz, Daniel, Pistor, Katharina & Richard, Jean-Francois, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 163, 166–167CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. See eg Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127, 129; John C Coffee Jr, ‘Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications’ (1999) 93 Northwestern University Law Review 641, 650.

32. See generally eg Gordon, Jeffrey N, ‘Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance’, in Gordon, Jeffrey N & Ringe, Wolf-Georg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Oxford University Press 2018)Google Scholar; Gordon, Jeffrey N & Roe, Mark J (eds), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hill, Jennifer, ‘The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 743Google Scholar. The original pro-convergence theorists have also subsequently published a response to the ensuing debate: see Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reiner, ‘Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law’, in Rasheed, Abdul & Yoshikawa, Toru (eds), Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects (Palgrave-MacMillan 2012)Google Scholar <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095419> accessed 30 May 2020.

33. See eg Hill (n 32) 748.

34. See Davies, Paul, ‘Control Shifts via Share Acquisition Contracts with Shareholders (Takeovers)’, in Gordon, Jeffrey N & Ringe, Wolf-Georg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Oxford University Press 2018) 554–563Google Scholar.

35. In relation to transplantation generally, see eg Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard (n 30).

36. See main text accompanying n 23 above.

37. Christopher Chen, Wei Zhang & Wai Yee Wan, ‘Regulating Squeeze-out Techniques by Controlling Shareholders: The Divergence Between Hong Kong and Singapore’ (2018) 18 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185.

38. See especially David C Donald, ‘Evolutionary Development in Hong Kong of Transplanted UK-Origin Takeover Rules’, in Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan (eds), Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2018) 381; Wai Yee Wan, ‘Legal Transplantation of UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore’, in Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan (eds), Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2018) 406.

39. See Emma Armson, ‘Assessing the Performance of Takeover Panels: A Comparative Study’, in Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan (eds), Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2018) 134.

40. See Wan Wai Yee, ‘Enforcing Public Takeover Regulation: Reconciling Public and Private Interests’ (2019) 31 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 285.

41. See also Varottil & Wan (n 18) 270–271, 277, 287, 293, 304.

42. ibid 271.

43. See eg ibid 270.

44. See eg ‘Irish Takeover Panel’ <irishtakeoverpanel.ie> accessed 30 May 2020; ‘Takeovers Panel’ (New Zealand) <www.takeovers.govt.nz> accessed 30 May 2020; ‘Takeover Regulation Panel’ (South Africa) <http://trpanel.co.za> accessed 30 May 2020.

45. See ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11); ‘Securities Industry Council’ (n 12); The Takeover Panel, ‘Panel Membership’ <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership> accessed 30 May 2020.

46. The Takeover Panel, ‘Report On The Year Ended 31st March 1969’ (The Takeover Panel, April 1969) 3 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/report1969.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020.

47. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 2(b).

48. ibid, r 9.1.

49. ibid, General Principles 1–2.

50. ibid, General Principle 3, r 21.1.

51. The Takeover Panel, ‘Executive’ <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/executive> accessed 30 May 2020.

52. The Takeover Panel, ‘Practice Statements’ <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/practice-statements> accessed 30 May 2020.

53. See, for example, The Takeover Panel, ‘Practice Statement No 31: Strategic Reviews, Formal Sale Processes and Other Circumstances in which a Company is Seeking Potential Offerors’ (The Takeover Panel, 7 Jul 2017), para 2.4 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PDF-of-Practice-Statement-No.31.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020.

54. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 5.

55. ibid, Introduction, s 4(c).

56. See ibid, Introduction, s 8; The Takeover Appeal Board, ‘Membership’ <http://www.thetakeoverappealboard.org.uk/membership> accessed 30 May 2020.

57. The constituent bodies appointing members to the Panel are The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (with separate representation for its Securities Trading Committee), The Association of British Insurers, The Association of Investment Companies, The Confederation of British Industry, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, The Investment Association, The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association, The Personal Investment Management and Financial Advice Association, The Quoted Companies Alliance, and UK Finance (with separate representation for its Corporate Finance Committee): UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 4(a).

58. In relation to the Committees’ role and members, see The Takeover Panel, ‘Code Committee’ <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/committees/code-committee> accessed 1 Jul 2020; The Takeover Panel, ‘Hearings Committee’ <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/committees/hearings-committee> accessed 1 Jul 2020; The Takeover Panel, ‘Hearings Committee Rules of Procedure’ (The Takeover Panel, 12 Sep 2016) <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Hearing-Committee-Rules-of-Procedure-12-Sep-2016.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (UK Hearings Committee Rules). Once appointed to the Code Committee, a Panel member cannot be a member of the Hearings Committee or Takeover Appeal Board either simultaneously or subsequently: see The Takeover Panel, ‘Hearings Committee Terms of Reference’ (The Takeover Panel, 17 Jul 2019), para 3.6 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/HCToR.17July2019.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (UK Hearings Committee TOR); The Takeover Appeal Board, ‘Rules of the Takeover Appeal Board’ (The Takeover Appeal Board, amended 2 May 2017), para 2.2 <http://www.thetakeoverappealboard.org.uk/rules/> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (Takeover Appeal Board Rules).

59. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 11(b).

60. See Donald (n 38) 383–384, 395–396.

61. ibid 383.

62. See HK Code (n 10), s 5.1; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 5.

63. See HK Code (n 10), s 9.1; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 4(c).

64. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 12.1; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 11(a).

65. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 12.2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 11(b).

66. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 14.2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 8.

67. See Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘The Takeovers and Mergers Panel Disciplinary Hearings Rules of Procedure’ (SFC) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_Rules%20of%20Procedure%20for%20disciplinary%20hearings%20(revised%20on%203.3.14).pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (HK Panel Disciplinary Rules); Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘The Takeovers and Mergers Panel – Non-Disciplinary Hearings Rules of Procedure’ (SFC) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_Non-Disciplinary%20Hearings%20Procedure%20(3.3.14).pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules); Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘The Takeovers and Mergers Panel Terms of Reference’ (SFC) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_Terms%20of%20ref%20-%20Panel_3.3.14.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Takeovers Appeal Committee – Rules of Procedure’ (SFC) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_TAC%20Procedures%20(revised%20on%203.3.14).pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules); Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Takeovers Appeal Committee – Terms of Reference’ (SFC) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_%20Terms%20of%20ref%20-%20TAC_3.3.14.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

68. This is done in consultation with the Hong Kong Panel: see HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 1.1.

69. See ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11).

70. See ‘Executive’ (n 51).

71. See Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) (Hong Kong), s 8(1); HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 11.1, 14.1.

72. See ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11); Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Takeovers Appeal Committee’ (SFC, 31 Mar 2020) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/organisational-chart/external-committees/takeovers-appeal-committee.html> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

73. See ‘Panel Membership’ (n 45); ‘Membership’ (n 56).

74. See ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11).

75. See Donald (n 38), 383, 395–396; HK Code (n 10), r 36 (definitions of ‘Acting in concert’, ‘Associate’, and ‘Associated company’).

76. See eg Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on a review of the decision of the Takeovers Executive to waive the mandatory general offer obligation which would otherwise have arisen for Mittal Steel Holdings AG in relation to the shares of China Oriental Group Company Limited’ (SFC, 19 Oct 2015) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20and%20Mergers%20Panel%20-%20Panel%20Decision/China%20Oriental%20-%20Panel%20Decision%20(Eng)%2020151019.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (‘China Oriental’); Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Cold shoulder order and public censure for the failure to make a mandatory general offer for Kong Tai International Holdings Company Limited’ (SFC, 24 Jun 1999) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Redact%20Statement/(Redact)%20Kong%20Tai%201999.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (‘Kong Tai’).

77. See eg Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the suitability of Anglo Chinese Corporate Finance, Limited to act as independent financial adviser in the conditional cash offer by Emperor (‘China Concept’) Investments Limited for Hong Kong Daily News Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 10 Oct 1994) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/HK%20Daily%20News%201994.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the suitability of Seapower Corporate Finance Limited to act as independent financial adviser in the offer for Success Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 13 Jan 1993) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/Success%20Holdings%201993.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

78. See eg Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the application of Rule 32.1 to an on-market share repurchase programme by CLP Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 17 Dec 2003) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/03pr284_decision.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on whether share repurchases constitute disqualifying transactions for the purposes of whitewash waiver applications in Regent Pacific Group Limited’ (SFC, 30 Mar 2000) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/regent-decision.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (‘Regent Pacific’).

79. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on whether SouthGobi Resources Limited should be considered a “public company in Hong Kong” within the meaning of the Codes’ (SFC, 30 Jun 2014) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20and%20Mergers%20Panel%20-%20Panel%20Decision/SouthGobi%20Panel%20Decision_EN_dated%2024%20June%202014.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on whether Husky Energy Inc is a “public company in Hong Kong” within the meaning of the Codes’ (SFC, 17 May 2001) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/011f-husky_panel_decison(final)clean.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

80. See Donald (n 38) 383, 392, 395.

81. Wan (n 38) 406.

82. Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289) (Singapore), s 139(5); Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2.

83. Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289) (Singapore), s 138; Wan (n 38) 406.

84. ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11); ‘Securities Industry Council’ (n 12).

85. Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289) (Singapore), s 139(6); Wan (n 38) 411.

86. These are two senior MAS officers, with one as an alternate: ‘Securities Industry Council’ (n 12).

87. Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2.

88. Wan (n 38) 410.

89. ibid.

90. ibid 421.

91. ibid 415.

92. See Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council Press Statement Jade Technologies Holdings Ltd’ (Press release, MAS, 14 Oct 2008) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/sic/Press-Statement_Jade-Technologies-Holdings-Ltd.pdf?la=en&hash=28DDD43FC0406094668270FCF5BFC1D1BF480B69> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (“SIC”) Press Statement Serial System Ltd (‘Serial System’ or the ‘Company’)’ (Press release, MAS, 23 May 2001) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/news_room/press_releases/2001/sicps_23May01.pdf?la=en&hash=E963E21DFDEEC6CA04D393525E529FA9F3339507> accessed 1 Jul 2020 (‘Serial System’); Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (“SIC”) Press Statement Serial System Ltd (“Serial System” Or The “Company”)’ (Press release, MAS, 8 Mar 2001) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/news_room/press_releases/2001/sicps_8Mar01.pdf?la=en&hash=09ED065C6DD5C4600EF0ED6A01379F4B93D99894> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

93. See, for example, Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (“SIC”) Public Statement On Portek International Limited’ (Press release, MAS, 14 Jun 2001) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/sic/press_releases/110614-Public-Statement-on-Portek-International-Limited.pdf?la=en&hash=E57C71ECFF77FF5C797E0745CB21812416FC6E90> accessed 1 Jul 2020; Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (SIC) Press Statement on the Take-Over Offer For Overseas Union Bank (OUB) By DBS Group Holdings Ltd (DBS)’ (Press release, MAS, 19 Oct 2001) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/news_room/press_releases/2001/sicps1_19Oct01.pdf?la=en&hash=45DC499008D71CDE4C1CB8FE16F991ED1A5AC933> accessed 1 Jul 2020.

94. cf n 26 and accompanying main text above.

95. Gilson (n 24) 356.

96. This is similar to the approach adopted in relation to the efficient capital market hypothesis, in which different forms of efficiency reflect the extent to which information is reflected in market prices: see eg Fama, Eugene F, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383, 383CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97. See (n 57). The UK Panel has also set up a Nomination Committee for other Panel appointments including its Chairman: see The Takeover Panel, ‘Nomination Committee – Terms of Reference’ (The Takeover Panel, 25 Apr 2018), para 2.1(c) <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Nomination-Committee-ToRs-as-amended-December-2017.FINAL_.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

98. See UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 4(a); UK Hearings Committee TOR (n 58), paras 3.1(c), (d).

99. See R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin Plc & Anor [1987] QB 815, 842 (Court of Appeal); Wan (n 38) 423.

100. Companies Act 2006, s 942.

101. See The Takeover Panel, ‘Fees and Charges’ <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/fees-and-charges> accessed 2 Jul 2020; The Takeover Panel, ‘PTM Levy’ <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/ptm-levy> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

102. See Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) (Hong Kong), s 8(1); HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 14.1.

103. See Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Nominations Committee Terms of Reference’ (SFC, 3 Mar 2014), para 2.1(c) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_Terms%20of%20ref%20-%20NC_3.3.14.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020; Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Appointments to SFC committees’ (SFC, 28 Mar 2019) <https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/corporate-news/doc?refNo=19PR25> accessed 2 Jul 2020; ‘Nomination Committee–Terms of Reference’ (n 97), para 2.1(c).

104. HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 11.10; Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Disciplinary Chair Committee Terms of Reference’ (SFC, 3 March 2014), para 2.1 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20Code/Eng_%20Terms%20of%20ref%20-%20DCC_3.3.14.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

105. HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 11.9, 11.12, 14.7.

106. ibid, Introduction, ss 11.9, 14.7.

107. ibid, Introduction, s 11.12.

108. ibid, Introduction, ss 11.9, 11.12, 14.7.

109. In relation to the fees charged, see HK Code (n 10), Sch IV.

110. HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 18.1.

111. See ‘Securities Industry Council’ (n 12).

112. Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289) (Singapore), s 138(3).

113. See Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289) (Singapore), s 138; Wan (n 38) 406.

114. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2.1; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 2, 4; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 2(b).

115. See HK Code (n 10), General Principle 2(1); Singapore Code (n 10), General Principle 3; UK Code (n 9), General Principle 1.

116. See HK Code (n 10), General Principle 2(5); Singapore Code (n 10), General Principle 10; UK Code (n 9), General Principle 2.

117. See HK Code (n 10), General Principle 2(9), r 4; Singapore Code (n 10), General Principle 7, r 5; UK Code (n 9), General Principle 3, r 21.

118. See HK Code (n 10), General Principle 2(8); Singapore Code (n 10), General Principles 2, 13; UK Code (n 9), General Principle 3.

119. See HK Code (n 10), General Principle 2(6); Singapore Code (n 10), General Principle 12; UK Code (n 9), General Principle 4.

120. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 5.1; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 5.

121. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 5.2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 2(c).

122. See Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, Note on s 2; SIC Secretariat, ‘Take-overs Bulletin, Issue No 1, Jul 2016’ (MAS), 3 <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/sic/Takeovers-Bulletin/Takeovers-Bulletin-Issue-No-1.pdf?la=en&hash=506A744909171B483D0FA9494EFD2B4C8FB4E150> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

123. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 12.1; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 11(a).

124. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 6.1; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 6(b).

125. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 4(b).

126. See eg HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 3.1; ‘Take-overs Bulletin, Issue No 1, Jul 2016’ (n 122) 1.

127. See HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 6.2, 13.6; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 5.2, 10.6; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 6.2; Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (“SIC” or the “Council”) Public Statement on Delong Holdings Limited’ (MAS, 29 Jul 2019), para 10 <https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2019/public-statement-on-delong-holdings-limited> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (‘SIC Delong Statement’); Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council (“SIC” or the “Council”) Public Statement on OSIM International Ltd’ (MAS, 24 Nov 2016), para 13 <https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2016/securities-industry-council-public-statement-on-osim-international-ltd> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (‘SIC OSIM Statement’); UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 3.6; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.11. See also the general power to give directions in HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 13.10; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 3.1, 3.2; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.6.

128. See text following n 148 below.

129. Except in Hong Kong, these sanctions also include a private reprimand: see HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 12.2, 13.13; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Code (n 9), Introduction, ss 10(c), 11(b).

130. See UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 10(b); HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 7.2.

131. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 11(a).

132. The other functions include hearing and determining proceedings, imposing sanctions, making and giving effect to rulings, and recommending amendments to its procedures: see UK Hearings Committee TOR (n 58), para 2.1.

133. UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 1.1(d).

134. UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 4(c).

135. HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 11.2.

136. Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, Note on s 2; ‘Take-overs Bulletin, Issue No 1, Jul 2016’ (n 122), 3.

137. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 7.1; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), Introduction, para 1.

138. Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.8.

139. As for the Hong Kong Panel, the Takeovers Appeal Committee is a committee of the SFC: HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 11.1, 14.1. The Takeovers Appeal Committee comprises the same members as the Hong Kong Panel: see ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel’ (n 11); ‘Takeovers Appeal Committee’ (n 72).

140. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 14.2; above main text accompanying (n 128).

141. Datafin (n 99). The other members of the Court agreed with the reasons of Donaldson MR for dismissing the application: see p 844 (Lloyd LJ), 849 (Nicholls LJ).

142. See Re Television Broadcasts Ltd v The Takeovers and Mergers Panel and Another [2017] HKCFI 1748; [2017] 5 HKLRD 541; [2017] 6 HKC 67 (High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List No 250 of 2017, 4 Oct 2017) (‘Re Television Broadcasts Ltd’); Wan (n 40) 292.

143. See Wan (n 38) 415; Wan (n 40) 292–293.

144. Datafin (n 99) 842.

145. See eg Emma Armson, ‘Certainty in Decision-Making: An Assessment of the Australian Takeovers Panel’ (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 369, 389–390; Re Television Broadcasts Ltd (n 142), para 75; Wan (n 40) 292.

146. Gilson (n 24) 356.

147. See ibid 329, 356.

148. See main text accompanying and following n 96 above.

149. See also main text accompanying n 128 above.

150. See n 67 above. There are also references to the Hong Kong Panel's procedures in the Hong Kong Code as set out below.

151. See especially n 58 above.

152. Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2.

153. These decisions are available on their respective websites: Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel and Takeovers Appeal Committee decisions and statements (full version)’ <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/regulatory-functions/listings-and-takeovers/takeovers-and-mergers/decisions-and-statements-by-the-takeovers-panel-takeovers-appeal-committee-and-the-executive/panel-and-appeal-committee.html> accessed 2 Jul 2020; Monetary Authority of Singapore, ‘Securities Industry Council’ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

154. However, the chairman for a hearing of the UK Hearings Committee and Takeover Appeal Board can direct otherwise: UK Code (n 9), Introduction, s 13.2; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 3.3; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.12. On the other hand, proceedings in relation to disciplinary matters conducted by the Hong Kong Panel and its Takeover Appeal Committee are held in public unless the Panel, committee, or hearing chairman decides otherwise for confidentiality reasons: see HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 13.3, 15.2.

155. See HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.1; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.1; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 10.1; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.4; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.9.

156. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 11.8, 14.6; SIC Delong Statement (n 127), para 9; SIC OSIM Statement (n 127), para 12; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.1; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.1.

157. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 13.6; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.3; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.3; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 10.2; Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.6; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.16.

158. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 6.5, r 6.8; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 3.4; HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 16.1.

159. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.8; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.16; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 12.1; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 9.1; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 9.1. The HK procedures also explicitly note that the body will consider written submissions that have been provided by the absent party: see HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 12.2; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 9.2; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 9.2.

160. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 3.7; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.7; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 7.2; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 6.2; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 7.2.

161. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.4; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.2; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.2.

162. See Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.9; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 10.1.

163. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), rr 5.9, 5.10; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.18; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.7; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.7; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 10.7.

164. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 6.1; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), s 3.1; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 14.1; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 11.1; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 11.1.

165. See generally Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Guidelines on conflict of interest of members and chairmen of the Takeovers and Mergers Panel (“Panel”) and the Takeovers Appeal Committee (“Appeal Committee”) (collectively referred to as the “Panels”)’ (SFC, 22 Sep 2010) <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/pdf/regulatory-functions/Conflict%20Guidelines_22.9.10%20(E).pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 4.1, 4.2; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.10.

166. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 1.5; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.5; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 8.1.

167. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 2.1; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 1.9; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 5.1.

168. See Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.4; HK Code (n 10), Introduction, ss 11.14, 15; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.5; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.5; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 10.5.

169. The other functions include hearing and determining proceedings, imposing sanctions, making and giving effect to rulings, and recommending amendments to its procedures: see UK Hearings Committee TOR (n 58), para 2.1.

170. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 13.4; UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 3.4; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.13.

171. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 5.7; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.17; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.4; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.4.

172. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 1.7; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 2.3.

173. ibid.

174. See HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 11.13; HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 2.1; HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 2.1; Takeovers Appeal Committee Rules (n 67), r 2.1.

175. See ‘Securities Industry Council’ (n 12).

176. HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 13.1(d); HK Panel Non-Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 10.1(c).

177. Singapore Code (n 10), Introduction, s 2.

178. See UK Hearings Committee Rules (n 58), r 6.1; Takeover Appeal Board Rules (n 58), r 3.1.

179. As noted in relation to the formal elements of the Hong Kong Panel, it also has a special committee from which the chairman of disciplinary proceedings is appointed: see main text accompanying n 104 above.

180. See HK Panel Disciplinary Rules (n 67), r 4.1, r 10.1, r 11.1.

181. HK Code (n 10), Introduction, s 13.11.

182. These comprise twelve out of a total of fifty-five decisions since 10 October 1990: ‘Takeovers and Mergers Panel and Takeovers Appeal Committee decisions and statements (full version)’ (n 153).

183. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Panel Decision in relation to Alibaba Health Information Technology Limited (formerly CITIC 21CN Company Limited, Stock Code 241)’ (SFC, 17 May 2016), para 31 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20and%20Mergers%20Panel%20-%20Panel%20Decision/Alibaba%20Group%20-%20Panel%20Decision_Eng_18%20May%2016.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (‘Alibaba’); Regent Pacific (n 78), para 14; Kong Tai (n 76), para 56.

184. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on a review of the decision of the Takeovers Executive that the offer for L&A International Holdings Limited need not be altered pursuant to Rule 24.2 of the Takeovers Code’ (SFC, 7 Oct 2016), para 23 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Panel%20Decision/Decision%20paper%20-%20LA%20International%20Holdings%20(ENG).pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (L&A).

185. The Takeover Panel, ‘Takeover Panel Requires Guinness To Make Payments To Former Distillers Shareholders’ (Panel Statement 1989/13, 14 Jul 1989) <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/panel-statements/ps1989> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

186. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Sanctions imposed following the enquiry made in respect of possible breach of Rule 33 in relation to Shun Ho Resources Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 20 Dec 1993), paras 114, 103–104, 128–129 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Redact%20Statement/(Redact)%20Shun%20Ho%20Panel%2019931220.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

187. However, the Hong Kong Panel has made it clear that this test should not be applied literally: see Kong Tai (n 76), para 56; China Oriental (n 76), para 25.

188. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Decisions in respect of disciplinary proceedings relating to allegations that certain parties were acting in concert in respect of Pacific Challenge Holdings Limited and that their failure to make a general offer was in breach of Rule 26.1’ (SFC, 16 Jul 2007), para 7 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/executive_statement_ruling_20070717.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

189. This sets out the circumstances in which the Executive will require a general offer to be made in relation to a second company where control is acquired directly or indirectly through the control of the first company: HK Code (n 10), r 26.1 Note 8.

190. ibid r 26.1, Note 8, para (a).

191. In this decision, the Committee on Takeovers and Mergers concluded that ‘the chain principle did not apply to a company representing only 24% of the gross assets of its parent’: see Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the application of the chain principle under Note 8 to Rule 26.1 to the acquisition of statutory control of The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia’ (SFC, 13 Apr 1995), para 11 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/National%20Mutual%20Life%20Assoc%201995.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020; Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the application of the chain principle under Note 8 to Rule 26.1 to the proposed voluntary offer for Seapower International Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 11 Aug 1994), para 8 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/Seapower%201994.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (‘Seapower’).

192. The UK Executive advised informally that it was also not aware of a similar precedent but it ‘would probably not apply the chain principle’ using this test in the circumstances: Seapower, ibid para 7.

193. ibid paras 9–10.

194. HK Code (n 10), r 26.1, Note 8, para (a); UK Code (n 9), r 9.1, Note 8.

195. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on whether Broadford Global Limited is permitted under the terms of its possible offer for the ‘H’ Shares in Dalian Port (PDA) Company Limited set out in its Rule 3.5 possible offer announcement dated 4th June, 2019 to deduct the dividend paid from the offer price in cash of HK$1.0127 for each ‘H’ Share in the Company’ (SFC, 2 Oct 2019), para 22 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/CF/pdf/Takeovers%20and%20Mergers%20Panel%20-%20Panel%20Decision/Dalian%20Port%20-%20Decision%20paper%20-%202%20Oct%202019%20(FINAL).pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (Dalian Port); L&A (n 184), para 23; Alibaba (n 183), para 31.

196. See Dalian Port (n 195), paras 33–34; L&A (n 184), paras 23, 30, 34; Alibaba (n 183), paras 31, 39, 41.

197. Alibaba (n 183), para 31.

198. HK Code (n 10), r 21.2.

199. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on the application of Rule 21.2 in respect of a placing of shares of Unisouth Holdings Limited during an offer’ (SFC, 1 Jul 1994), para 7 <https://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/Unisouth%201994.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

200. Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘A Consultation Paper on a Review of the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ (SFC, Sep 1999), Appendix, Rules <https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/> accessed 2 Jul 2020; cf UK Code (n 9), r 4.2.

201. Takeovers and Mergers Panel, ‘Ruling on whether consent should be given under Rule 28 for the making of a partial offer for 51% of Kong Wah Holdings Limited’ (SFC, 3 Jul 1995), 2–3 <https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/cfd/mergers/panel/Kong_Wah_1995_wEncls.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

202. ibid.

203. These comprise a total of twelve decisions since the first document dated 1 November 1999, available at Monetary Authority of Singapore, ‘Securities Industry Council’ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic> accessed 2 Jul 2020. cf the discussion at n 182 above.

204. Serial System (n 92).

205. ibid para 7.

206. ibid.

207. There are twenty press releases in relation to this guidance published at Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Securities Industry Council - Press Releases’ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

208. Securities Industry Council, ‘SIC Issues Guidelines on Partial Offers’ (MAS, 21 Nov 2000) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/news_room/press_releases/2000/sicps_21Nov00.pdf?la=en&hash=C37DB26D82B414F1AC4AD897A9ABB1C66A43A94C> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

209. ibid para 4.

210. These are published with accompanying press releases at: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Press Releases’ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

211. See eg Securities Industry Council, ‘Consultation Conclusions on Revision of the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers’ (MAS, 25 Feb 2016) para 6.3 <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/sic/2015-Code-Amendments-Response-Press-Release/Consultation-Conclusions-on-Revisions-of-the-Singapore-Code-on-Takeovers-and-Mergers-2016.pdf?la=en&hash=F49346B2CB6F6DEE390DB9609068EE4A23DF0F92> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (Consultation Conclusions 2016); Securities Industry Council, ‘Consultation Conclusions on Revision of the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers’ (MAS, 23 Mar 2012) paras 7.6, 7.11 <https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/resource/sic/press_releases/Consultation_of_the_Code_Response_Paper_23_Mar_2012.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2020 (‘Consultation Conclusions 2012’).

212. See, for example, Consultation Conclusions 2016 (n 211), paras 13.5-13.6; Consultation Conclusions 2012 (n 211), paras 10.2–10.3.

213. See above main text accompanying (n 126).

214. See Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), ‘Consultations’ <https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/> accessed 2 Jul 2020.

215. See, for example, above nn 152, 156.

216. See Varottil & Wan (n 18) 269, 270.

217. ibid 305.

218. Gordon (n 32) 13.