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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
On the night of March 26, 2010, the 1,200 ton Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy corvette Cheonan was severed in the middle and sank off Baengnyeong Island in the West Sea (or Yellow Sea). Forty-six crew members died in the incident. After almost two months of investigation, the ROK government released an interim report that traced the cause of the Cheonan's sinking to the explosion of a North Korean (DPRK) torpedo. The report, however, contains a number of inconsistencies that call into question the government's conclusion and the integrity of its investigation. In order to address these inconsistencies and to restore public confidence in the investigation, the ROK government must form a new team to restart the investigation from the beginning. We recommend that the international community continue its insistence on an objective and thorough investigation while reiterating its commitment to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
Japanese translation available https://apjjf.org/data/Cheonan_Japanese_Text_JJSuh3382.pdf
1 The May 20th report released by the ROK is actually an interim report. It plans to issue the final report by the end of July, 2010. Not only did the ROK government rush to judgement on the cause of the Cheonan incident, as we argue in this article, but it has also rushed to punitive measures against the DPRK, including urging the United Nations Security Council to act on the basis of the interim report.
2 One of the 3 civilian experts, recommended by the opposition Democratic Party, was expelled from the JIG before it released its report. The person expelled was then charged by the South Korean Navy with “defaming” it for propagating the “false allegation” that the Cheonan had been grounded. Kim Kwikŭn, “Haegun, sinsangch'⊖lwiwon ‘my⊖ngyehueson' hy⊖mŭi koso [Navy Charges Shin Sang-Chul of ‘Defaming’ It,”] Yonhap News, May 19, 2010.
3 CSI or Crime Scene Investigation is a popular U.S. TV series that depicts police use of advanced forensic and scientific techniques to investigate and solve crimes.
4 Yun D⊖kyong, co-chairman of the JIG, admitted at the hearing of the Parliament's Special Committee on the Cheonan on May 24 that “we are continuing our simulation and the final result of the simulation will come out in July,” conceding that “the simulation is not yet completed to show the water column [that is allegedly produced as a result of the bubble effect], but it will be all shown when the simulation is completed.” Pak J⊖ngi, another co-chairman, added that “the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials [that is in charge of the simulation] said it would complete the simulation by July 15th.” Kim Namgwon and Kim P⊖mhy⊖n, “Kimgukpang, ‘Puk, simnij⊖n konggy⊖khamy⊖n chŭkkak taeŭng [Defense Minister Kim, ‘Will Immediately Respond if North Attacks [Our] Psychological Warfare'],” Yonhap News, May 24, 2010. The latter quote is from “Ch'⊖anhamt'ŭkwi, ‘mulgidung chonjaey⊖bu' nonnan [Cheonan Special Committee, Controversy over ‘Presence of Water Column‘], Yonhap News, May 24, 2010.
5 The JIG's simulation results are available here. Although the ROK defense ministry (MND) has updated the simulation, as of July 2, 2010 it still fails to show how the Cheonan was severed.
6 Suh Jae-Jung, “B⊖bŭlhyogwanŭn ⊖bss⊖tta [There was no bubble effect],” Pressian, May 27, 2010. Ch⊖n Tonghy⊖k, “P'okbalhu 1ch'okkaji … ch'⊖nanham paemit ir⊖tke jjigŭr⊖jy⊖tda [Up to a second after explosion … The Chonan's bottom deformed this way],” Dong-a sai⊖nsŭ [Dong-A Science], May 28, 2010.
7 Suh, op.cit.
8 Suh's calculation on the basis of the formula in the Australian report, Reid, Warren D. “The Response of Surface Ships to Underwater Explosions.” Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Department of Defence, 1996.
9 Ibid., page 1. The Ministry of National Defense initially stated that 70% of a torpedo's explosive energy will be a shock wave effect. After Suh's article asked why the Cheonan betrays no signs of shock wave damage, the MND decreased the ratio to 54% and 46%. The ratio varies depending on the kind of explosive and the mix of other ingredients such as aluminum powder. For the MND's initial position, see Kim By⊖ngnyun, “⊖roi kiroi, sujung p'okbalŭi wiry⊖k [Torpedo and Sea Mine, the Power of Underwater Explosion],” Ministry of National Defense, April 28, 2010. For its newer numbers, see Kim By⊖ngnyun, “Ŏroi sujungp'okbal ch'ungby⊖kp'a b⊖bŭlhyogwaro s⊖nch'e p'agoe [Torpedo's Underwater Explosion Destroys Ship with Shock Wave and Bubble Effect],” Ministry of National Defense, May 22, 2010.
10 S.-H. Lee, “Comments on the Section “Adsorbed Material Analysis “of the CheonAn Report made by the South Korean Civil and Military Joint Investigation Group (CIV-MIL JIG),” ArXiv, June 6, 2010 here.
11 “Adsorbed materials” does not appear in the English version of the ROK's Cheonan investigative report but does appear as an English insertion in the Korean version. AM-1, AM-2 and AM-3 are designations created by Seunghun Lee in a scientific paper authored by him that discusses the JIG's analysis of the adsorbed materials.
12 Kang Yanggu, “Ch‘⊖anham deit‘⊖ ch'imy⊖ngj⊖k oryu… aluminyumŭn k⊖jitmal anhae [The Cheonan data has fatal flaws… aluminum does not lie],” Pressian, June 24, 2010.
13 Yang suspects, on a careful analysis of the JIG's EDS data, that the AM-1 and AM-2 are not aluminum oxides but more likely aluminum hydroxide, Al(OH)3, found in nature commonly as gibbsite. Kang Yanggu and Hwang Chunho, “Isanghan naraŭi ch‘⊖nanham … ‘aluminium sanhwamulŭn ⊖bss⊖tta [The Cheonan in Wonderland … There was no aluminum oxide],” Pressian, June 30, 2010 and Hankyere, June 30, 2010.
14 Lee, June 6, 2010, op. cit.
15 S.-H. Lee and P. Yang, “Was the “Critical Evidence “presented in the South Korean Official Cheonan Report Fabricated?” June 28, 2010.
16 S.-H. Lee, “Ch'⊖nanham habjodanŭi ‘gy⊖lj⊖ngj⊖k chŭngg⊖'nŭn chojaktoetta [The JIG's ‘critical evidence' is fabricated],” Pressian, June 16, 2010. For the Ministry of National Defense's response, see “Mo int'⊖net maech'ees⊖ pododoen ‘isŭngh⊖n kyosu chujang(1)'e daehan dapby⊖nimnida [Response to ‘Professor Lee Senghun's allegation (1) reported in an internet media],” Ministry of National Defense, June 21, 2010.
17 Lee and Yang, op. cit.
18 The JIG argues that when the torpedo exploded, it produced heat higher than 3000 degrees Celsius and that aluminum powder in the explosive material melted and transformed into amorphous aluminum oxides, which bonded with the propeller of the torpedo. Since aluminum oxides in powder form cannot bond with another metal, it must be in liquid state. Given that aluminum's melting temperature is 660 degrees and aluminum oxide's melting point is 2000 degrees Celsius, the rear part of the torpedo must have been subjected to heat of at least somewhere between 660 and 2000 degrees Celsius, if the JIG claim is right. Whether 660, 2000 or 3000 degrees Celsius, it cannot be scientifically explained that none of this heat affected the ink marking.
19 The ROK defense ministry reported on June 29 that the ink is made of “solvent blue-5.” Recognizing that it is a common ingredient used in markers worldwide, the ministry conceded that “it might be difficult to conclude that the ink is made in North Korea.” A military official added that the result of the ink analysis will not be included in the final report on the Cheonan incident due to be completed by the end of July. “‘1b⊖n'ingkŭs⊖ solbentbŭlu5 s⊖ngbun g⊖mch'ul [Solvent Blue-5 Detected from ‘1b⊖n' Ink],” Yonhap News, June 29, 2010.
20 Despite its name – the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group – the absolute majority of its members, 65 out of 74, work for the Ministry of National Defense or MND-related think tanks and institutes. One of its two heads, Pak Ch⊖ng-I, was a three star general at the time of the investigation, and was subsequently promoted to a four star status after the release of the report.
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