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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
At first glance, the Liberal Democratic Party's decades-long denial of clear evidence revealed by the U.S. government that it had secret agreements allowing the introduction and stationing of US nuclear weapons in Japan appears absurd. This was the reality, however, for the nation that long proclaimed the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” barring the production, possession or importation of nuclear weapons, as a bedrock of national policy. With the fall of the LDP looming in the September 2009 election, several former top officials of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were well informed of these secret deals, came forward to disclose the deal. Their motive was not protection of Japan's “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.” To the contrary, their view is that, as the “Three Non-Nuclear Principle” did not effectively prevent the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan, they should be scrapped.
[2] Kyodo News, “Japan limited sealanes at behest of U.S. Claims on five straits likely cut to let nukes pass: Archives,” October 12, 2009.
[1] See “Skeletons in the closet: Foreign Ministry launches probes into secret dealings with U.S.”, Mainichi Shimbun, September 18, 2009, available here. Further information on this subject can be found in at article in the Mainichi Shimbun in an article published on September 18, 2009, the English translation for which was kindly provided me by Daniel Sneider.
[2] See Revelations In Newly Released Documents About U.S. Nuclear Weapons And Okinawa Fuel Nhk Documentary, May 14, 1997, available here.
[3] Kei Wakaizumi, Tasaku nakarishi o shinzamuto hossu [There a were no other options], Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1994. The English translation of Wakaizumi's memoirs unfortunately does not include these documents, but the copy of the draft understanding reproduced in his memoirs can be found here.
[4] Korean Bilateral Meeting and Preview of the Japan Bilateral and Japan-Australia Trilateral Meetings at 2 p.m., Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, NY, September 21, 2009, available here.
[5] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XVIII, Japan; Korea (United States Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. vii-viii.
[6] Ibid; Document no. 130: Editorial Note, p. 258; and Document no. 131: Record of Discussion Prepared by the Embassy in Japan, January 6, 1960, p. 259. As seen in Document no. 3, this is the official U.S. record of the agreed secret interpretations of the consultation requirements under the new treaty.
[7] It is also possible that copies of the Nixon-Sato agreed secret minute may be found in the personal papers of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, held by the Library of Congress, but these are closed until 5 years after Kissinger's death.
[8] On this important issue, see the recent Asahi Shimbun article based on interviews with former Foreign Ministry officials who spoke about the differing understandings of the consultation requirements; Masaru Honda, “Secret nuclear deal originated from different interpretations of “prior consultation system“; U.S. understanding was that consultation was not required for port calls and passage;” Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2009; English translation provided by Daniel Sneider.
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