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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Okinawa was administered by the United States military between the end of the Battle of Okinawa in June 1945 and its reversion to Japan in May 1972. Matthew R. Augustine's article covers the period stretching from the start of American military planning prior to the Battle of Okinawa to the return of the Amami Islands, the northernmost portion of the occupied Ryukyu Islands, in 1953. The article outlines the consequences of the American decision to administratively separate the Ryukyu Islands from Japan proper, and allow the military to run it as a military colony, along with the social and political currents that were set in motion as a result. As Augustine explains, this involved not only isolating Okinawa from Japan, but also the different islands of the Ryukyus from one another, in the process disrupting the economic, social, and political networks that had earlier sustained Okinawa's economy and society. However, as he details in the section that follows, Okinawans did not accept these conditions passively, and in their struggle for survival revived earlier links with Japan to the north and neighboring countries to the south through illicit smuggling networks. From there, Augustine discusses how the Cold War confrontation of the late 1940s led to a partial re-establishment of economic links with the mainland while rigorously continuing (or perhaps more accurately systematically monitoring) political separation.
1 For recent scholarship on the subject, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Frontiers of Democracy: Migration, Border Controls, and Citizenship in Postwar Japan,” JCAS Symposium Series 22 (2005).
2 Separate policy studies were prepared for such Japanese-held island territories as the Kurile Islands, Bonin Islands, and the Spratly Islands.
3 This introduction to the Territorial Subcommittee's report, “T-343 Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands,” is cited from Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations (New York: Garland, 2001), p. 52.
4 The report ended by considering three policy proposals for the Ryukyu Islands: 1) transfer to China; 2) international administration; and 3) conditional retention by Japan. For further details, see Ota Masahide, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Japan Proper.” In Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 296-297.
5 The OSS, which was the predecessor of what later became the CIA, had been conducting ethnographic research on the large immigrant Okinawan community in Hawaii since the spring of 1944. A copy of the final report by the OSS can be found in Okinawa kenritsu toshokan shiryō henshūhitsu (ed.), Okinawa kenshi shiryō hen 2, The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands (Yūgen gaisha san insatsu, 1996).
6 According to the OSS report, “Psychological Warfare in its various aspects might well be brought to bear upon the cleavage … between the two Japanese groups, each with its own physical type, its own history, its own dynasties, mores and attitudes.” The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands, p. 122.
7 David John Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa: Politicizing and Contesting Okinawan Identity, 1945-1955” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Iowa, 2006), pp. 87-89.
8 The directive also stated that all property belonging to the Japanese government and military was to be treated as public property and controlled as military requirements dictated. Directive from CINCPAC-CINCPOA to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, subject: “Political, Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters,” March 1, 1945. A copy of this directive can be found in Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), pp. 262-271.
9 This is the title of a book written by Urasaki Jun, who was an official employed by Okinawa Prefecture. Urasaki Jun, Kieta Okinawaken (Okinawa jiji shuppansha, 1965). The division between Japan and the Ryukyus was actually formalized on July 2, 1945 when Japanese military officials signed surrender documents at Kadena, Okinawa.
10 Okinawans hardly ever referred to themselves as “Ryukyuan,” many having seen through the US military's adoption of this name as part of a heavy-handed effort to separate them from Japan. Furthermore, Okinawans were disinclined to identify themselves as “Ryukyuan” because mainland Japanese since the prewar era had used the name, Ryukyu-jin, as a pejorative term implying that they were inferior to the Japanese. The indigenous name for Okinawans is Uchinaachu, a term that was discouraged from usage by those who advocated assimilation to Japan before the war, but is used today by Okinawans who are proud of their distinctive identity. I would like to thank Steve Rabson for this clarification.
11 Okinawan men and women over twenty-five years of age were eligible to vote, a historical event that preceded universal suffrage in Japan by three months, as enfranchised women turned out to vote in high numbers.
12 Quoted from Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), p. 34.
13 Geographically speaking, as shown in Figure 1, Okinawa and Amami Oshima are the two largest islands among what the Japanese refer to as the Nansei Islands; the former belongs to the subgroup called Okinawa Islands while the latter are referred to as the Satsunan Islands. The Nansei Islands consist of the entire island chain southwest of Kagoshima Prefecture in Kyushu, Japan. The Amami Islands are located approximately halfway between Kagoshima and Okinawa, while the Tokara Islands are closer to Kagoshima than they are to the Amami Islands.
14 In fact, the Amami and Tokara Islands had not been a part of the Ryukyus since 1609. As a result of a military expedition led by Shimazu Iehisa against the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1609, the Amami and Tokara Islands were incorporated into the Satsuma domain. From 1609 until shortly after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Amami and Tokara Islands remained a part of the Satsuma domain, which also dominated the Ryukyu Kingdom. When the Meiji government established modern-day prefectures in 1871, the Amami and Tokara Islands were included in Kagoshima Prefecture while the Ryukyu Islands south of 27° North Latitude became known as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.
15 This SCAP directive, “Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan” (SCAPIN 677), formally separated the Ryukyus, the Ogasawaras and other former Japanese territories.
16 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 111-112.
17 Namihira Tsuneo, “Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō: 1950 nen zengo no okinawa, soshite amami.” In Nakano Toshio and Yakabi Osamu (eds.), Okinawa no senryō to Nihon no fukkō: shokuminchishugi wa ikani keizoku shitaka (Seikyūsha, 2006), pp. 221-223.
18 Following the Nimitz Proclamation that administratively separated the Ryukyus from Japan, Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 4 prohibited foreign trade and financial transactions.
19 The free movement of residents in Okinawa during daytime was first permitted in March 1947, and the curfew at night was finally lifted in March 1948. Until then, even local residents traveling to a neighboring district without permission from the police were arrested for trespassing. Miyagi Etsujirō, Okinawa senryōo no 27-nenkan: Amerika gunsei to bunka no henyō (Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 11-17.
20 According to Wakabayashi Chiyo, the expression “off-limits” held two meanings in symbolizing the American occupation of Okinawa. One was an Okinawa under the exclusive control of the US military, cut off from international society. Another aspect referred to the internal manifestations of this condition by which people were driven out and swept out of their villages, and which became off-limits in their own native island. See Wakabayashi Chiyo, “’Ofu-rimittsu’ no shima,” Gendai shisō, March edition (Seidosha, 1999), p. 24.
21 Murayama Iekuni, Amami fukkishi (Nankai Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 2006), p. 50.
22 According to a military government proclamation on February 3, 1947, unauthorized travel between Okinawa and Amami became a punishable offense. Satake Kyōko, Gunseika amami no mikkō, mitsubōeki (Nanpō shinsha, 2003), p. 222.
23 SCAP explicitly prohibited unauthorized immigration and directed the Japanese government to mobilize its police force to be on guard against illegal border-crossers. SCAPIN 244, November 8, 1945.
24 According to Arnold Fisch, by early 1946 the Navy found that the anchorages in Buckner Bay, Okinawa, were “not as desirable as originally thought,” and subsequently “lost interest in the Ryukyus except as a location for minor facilities.” Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 174. On January 1, 1947, the Army's command in the Pacific was reorganized as the Far East Command (FECOM). RYCOM was placed under the jurisdiction of the general headquarters of FECOM in Tokyo.
25 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Treatment of Foreign Nationals,” History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945 through 1950. Volume VI, Part 4, pp. 133-134.
26 Edith Kaneshiro, “Our Home Will Be the Five Continents”: Okinawan Migration to Hawaii, California, and the Philippines, 1899-1941” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1999).
27 Wakabayashi Chiyo convincingly argues that one of the major transformations of postwar Okinawan society was that residents were prevented from maintaining such transnational links with overseas Okinawans. Wakabayashi Chiyo, “Jeepu to sajin: senryōshoki okinawa shakai no henyō to hen'i,” Okinawa bunka kenkyū, vol. 29 (March 2003), pp. 244-45, 254.
28 The amount of rations authorized to Okinawans was initially set at 1990 calories per day, but was later reduced to 1530 calories per day due to food shortage. From the Deputy Commander for Military Government to the Commander, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG Officer, “Final Report of Military Government Activities for Period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946.” Dated July 1, 1946. Found in Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, RG 260, Box 25.
29 Okinawa Taimusu (ed.), Shomin ga tsuzuru okinawa sengo seikatsu-shi (Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1998), pp. 32-38.
30 For a short time after the war this currency was used simultaneously with the new yen being circulated in Japan proper. From 1948, however, the circulation of the new Japanese yen was prohibited and the B yen became the only legal currency used in Okinawa.
31 Okuno Shūji, Natsuko: Okinawa mitsubōeki no jō’ō (Bungei shunjū, 2005), pp. 138-139. Trafficking senka was so common that from February to September 1946, 1200 out of the 1260 cases handled by the Okinawa civil courts involved senka and trespassing. Namihira, “Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō,” p. 221.
32 This Ryukyuan poem, or Ryūka, and its explanation can be found in Yakabi Osamu, “Ekkyō suru okinawa: Amerikanizumu to bunka hen'yō,” Kindai nihon no bunka-shi, vol. 9 (Iwanami Shoten, 2002). p. 249.
33 Okinawa Taimusu, Okinawa no shōgen: gekidō 25-nenshi, vol. 1 (Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1971), pp. 205-206.
34 By the time the Chinese Communists drove the Nationalists into Taiwan in 1949, the smuggling activities in the Taiwan and Hong Kong routes gradually came to a halt, replaced by the Japan route via Kuchinoshima. Yakabi Osamu, “Kokkyō no kengen: Okinawa yonaguni no mitsubōeki shūsoku no haikei,” Gendai shisō, vol. 31, no. 11 (September 2003), pp. 187-188.
35 Okinawa Taimusu, Okinawa no shōgen, pp. 205-206.
36 “Round-table discussion on the age of smuggling,” Satake, Gunseika amami no mikkō, mitsubōeki, pp. 209-233.
37 Military Government Special Proclamations No. 29 and 30, dated July 21, 1948, stipulated that Japanese yen had to be converted to the Type “B” military yen under penalty of law.
38 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 149-150.
39 For more details, see Itoman City's official website, “The Development of Itoman's Fishing Industry.”
40 Ishihara Masaie, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi: senka to mitsubōeki no jidai (Banseisha, 2000), p. 239. Itoman residents in Kagoshima often came in contact with Amami residents, who had an equally well-organized base for their smuggling network.
41 Asahi shinbun, December 31, 1949. The editorial section of the Asahi shinbun on March 18, 1950 carried another article describing a high-profile arrest of nineteen people involved in the Ryukyus-Japan trade based in the Hanshin area. The authorities in this case estimated that the total amount of trade was worth anywhere between 200 to 500 million yen.
42 The apathy and neglect that characterized U.S. military rule helped Okinawa earn the nickname, the “forgotten island,” during the early postwar years. This nickname was coined by journalist Frank Gibney after his visit to Okinawa in 1949. See Frank Gibney, “Forgotten Island,” Time. November 28, 1949.
43 MacArthur's quotation is from The New York Times, March 2, 1949.
44 U.S. Military Government, Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 30, October 1, 1949.
45 The four guntō, literally meaning island group) governments, with directly elected governors and assemblymen, were inaugurated in November 1950. The Provisional Government Assembly, made up of representatives hand-picked by U.S. authorities from throughout the Ryukyus, was inaugurated in April 1951. Both were replaced by the establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in April 1952.
46 For further details, see Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 128.
47 Yakabi, “Kokkyō no kengen,” pp. 193-194.
48 Namihira, “Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō,” p. 237. The Japanese word, zensei means “good governance.”
49 Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy (Continuum, 2002), p. 513.
50 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 162-163.
51 John Dower provides a more detailed list of these tokujū, which he estimates brought an estimated $2.3 billion into Japan between June 1950 and the end of 1953. See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (W. W. Norton: New Press, 1999), pp. 541-542.
52 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 144-145; 164-165.
53 Another figure showed that Japanese laborers at military bases earned, at the minimum, $0.83 (99.6), which was eight to nine times more than Okinawan laborers who earned $0.10 (11.0). Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” pp. 216-217.
54 Further destruction caused by strong typhoons as well as other war-damaged military vehicles from the Far East Command dumped in Okinawa resulted in an estimated 2.5 million metric tons of available scrap iron, copper, brass, and other non-ferrous metals.
55 Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 234-235.
56 In the meantime RYCOM's export of scrap metals increased dramatically until it surpassed sugar as the number one export from Okinawa in 1951. Okuno, Natsuko, pp. 337338.
57 American G.I.'s also sold military-issued supplies to civilians on the black market. The Military Police were on guard against such illicit transactions, especially when they involved the loss of US munitions.
58 Yakabi, “Kokkyō no kengen,” pp. 195-196.
59 Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 236-238.
60 SCAP's Civil Intelligence Section included the Public Safety Division, the Civil Censorship Detachment, and the 441st Counter-Intelligence Corps. See Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 167.
61 Okuno, Natsuko, pp. 87-88.
62 Okinawa Times, December 13, 1951. Cited in Okuno, Natsuko, p. 271.
63 Violators were imprisoned or fined 30,000 Yen. For further details, see Edith Kaneshiro, “‘For Compassionate Reasons’: Okinawan Repatriations during American Occupation of Japan.” In Ryukyu University, Kenkyū seika hōkokusho, sengo okinawa to amerika: ibunka sesshoku no sōgōteki kenkyū (Ryukyu University, 2005), pp. 330-331.
64 The Japanese government's ordinance (seirei) no. 85 issued on April 27, 1947 recognized the family registries (koseki) in Okinawa as Japanese family registries. The possession of a Japanese family registry has been the basis for Japanese citizenship both in the prewar and postwar eras.
65 Yoshida Shien was a public official for Okinawa Prefectural Government before the war. With the “disappearance of Okinawa Prefecture” after the war, he was employed by the Okinawa Prefectural Office in Fukuoka.
66 Governor Shikiya did not meet with Yoshida out of fear of potential repercussions if the military government discovered that Yoshida had illegally entered Okinawa. Matayoshi Hirokazu, the Vice Governor, was among seven or eight people who met with Yoshida Shien. This episode of illegal entry into Okinawa was retold by Zukemura Tomonobu, who accompanied Yoshida Shien on the journey. See “Hikiagesha no kikan to mikkō,” Yonabaruchōshi, shiryō-hen, 1, Imin (Yonabaru-chō kyōiku iinkai, 2006), pp. 217-228.
67 One exception was Nakayoshi Ryōkō, former mayor of Shuri, who submitted a petition to the military government on August 4, 1945, requesting that Okinawa be reunited with Japan. Realizing that his repeated appeals were falling on deaf ears, however, he left Okinawa on July 23, 1946 and moved to Tokyo where he took his case directly to SCAP and the Japanese government.
68 Ota Masahide, “The American Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Mainland Japan,” Essays on Okinawa Problems (Yui shuppan, 2000), pp. 191-192.
69 Yamashiro Zenkō and Kuwae Chōkō, for example, were a part of the League's leadership before repatriating from Tokyo, and soon thereafter became actively involved in the Democratic Alliance.
70 Aharen Yukitomo, for example, was a labor union organizer and member of the leftist Okinawan organization called the Sekiryūkai in the Kansai region in the 1920s. He repatriated to Okinawa in 1946 and was subsequently selected as a central committee member of the People's Party.
71 Kuru returned to Japan in June to become a liaison between the ACP and the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. For further details, see Kato Tetsuro, “Aratani hakken sareta ‘Okinawa/Amami higōhō kyōsantō bunsho’ ni tsuite,” Okinawa no higōhō kyōsantō shiryō (Fuji shuppan, 2004).
72 In August 1948 Nakamura was arrested for being in possession of Communist Party journals and other materials that had been smuggled into Amami Oshima. See Nakamura Yasutaro, Sokoku e no michi: Kōbei 8 nen Amami no fukki undōshi (Tosho shuppan, 1984). pp. 164-176.
73 Tokuda Toyomi was one of Nakamura Yasutarō‘s former students and a member of the youth organization who made a speech at the rally calling for reversion. See Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 117. Cited in Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lexington Books, 2004), p. 35.
74 As David Obermiller argues, the protest movements that preceded the reversion movement reveals the core impulse that propelled the reversion movement; namely, “popular resistance to foreign occupation and Okinawa's neo-colonial status.” See Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” p. 201.
75 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (Routledge, 2006), p. 58.
76 After the Okinawa Assembly resigned en masse on March 2, 1949, Senaga and Nakasone conducted a public meeting on May 1, 1949. At the May Day demonstration, the popular front adopted the following three slogans aimed at obtaining greater democracy and economic relief: 1) direct elections for governor and assemblymen; 2) rollback of the 1948 income taxes; and 3) increase rations of supplementary military goods. For more details, see Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” pp. 226-235.
77 Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 109. Citation found in Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 67, footnote 29.
78 Fukasa Genzō and Morita Tadamitsu entered Japan by sneaking aboard the Kanato Maru, a ferry liner which was to be docked in Kobe for repairs from June 1948. For a full treatment of this incident, see Satake, “Kanato Maru to kyokasho mikkō jiken,” pp. 87-133.
79 The Okinawa Youth Alliance published the original version of this book in November 1946. Shinmon Minoru, a full-time member of the Okinawan Youth Alliance in Kanagawa Prefecture, smuggled in Iha Fuyū's books. Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 219228.
80 See Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 218.
81 Based on his groundbreaking book, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, I was able to confirm with Ishihara Masaie that the Ryukyuan residents’ economic struggle for survival through smuggling in the early postwar years was later replaced by a more socio-political resistance as witnessed by the reversion movement. Author's interview with Ishihara Masaie, September 26, 2006.
82 Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 125. For further details, see Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 41.
83 Murayama, Amami fukkishi, p. 248. According to Eldridge, while this figure was probably exaggerated, it nevertheless shows the residents’ overwhelming support for returning the islands to Japan. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 71, footnote 88.
84 In addition, 88 percent of those in Miyako signed similar petitions. See Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 514.
85 One such activist was Hayashi Yoshimi, an Amami native and member of the underground Amami Communist Party, who entered Okinawa in March 1952 as a laborer while mobilizing Okinawan laborers to form a united front in the reversion movement. For a comprehensive treatment on Hayashi's underground political activities in Okinawa, see Mori Yoshio, “Ekkyō no zen'ei, Hayashi Yoshimi to ‘fukki undo no rekishi,” in Nishi Masahiko and Hara Takehiko (eds.), Fukusū no Okinawa: Diaspora kara kibō e (Jinbun shoin, 2003), pp. 311-347.
86 After the announcement on July 10 that the trusteeship clause in Article 3 could indefinitely isolate the Ryukyus from Japan, over 200 households are said to have similarly departed illegally from the Amami Islands between August 1 - 20. See Satake, Gunseika amami no mikkō mitsubōeki, pp. 137-144.
87 As a result of the deluge of appeals that poured in from the Japanese public, the police eventually released the arrested the men, who were allowed to join the rest of the Amami delegates in Tokyo. Satake, Gunseika amami no mikkō mitsubōeki, pp. 144-145.
88 USCAR, CI&E Department, “The Reversion Movement on Amami Oshima, Final Report,” Scientific Investigations in the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI), March 1952. Copy of this report is available in the Amami Branch of the Kagoshima Prefectural Library in Naze City.
89 Douglas G. Haring, “The Island of Amami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus,” SIRI (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, October 1952), p. 86. A copy of this report is also available in the Amami Branch of the Kagoshima Prefectural Library.
90 USCAR Proclamation No. 27, dated December 25, 1953, subject: “Geographical Boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands.”
91 Robert Eldridge demonstrates that the Amami reversion movement not only exercised “a clear influence on the policies of the Japanese government, but also had a significant impact on the decision making process of the US government …” The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 31.
92 Haring, “The Island of Amami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus,” pp. 17-18. The CI&E Department's public opinion survey found that 89 percent of respondents never identified themselves as Ryukyuan because Amami was historically an integral part of Kagoshima Prefecture. CI&E Department, “The Reversion Movement on Amami Oshima, Final Report,” p. 8.
[93] Eldridge argues that the support and lobbying that the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, Shigenari Kaku, undertook would prove critical in raising awareness of the issue throughout the prefecture and Japan. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 32.
94 “Kizoku mondai meguri machi no koe wo kiku,” Uruma shimpō, dated April 23, 1951. Cited from Naha shishi: Shiryō-hen, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 435-437. This quotation is evidence that the Japanese military's enforcement of collective suicide and false accusations of Okinawans as “spies” during the Battle of Okinawa weighed heavily on the minds of ordinary people when thinking about their future political disposition.
95 Koji Taira has argued that the U.S. effort to force Okinawans to choose a semi-colonial, marginalized Ryukyuan identity over a Japanese identity was “a thinly veiled racist contempt for Okinawans as an inferior people.” For further details, see Koji Taira, “Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans,” in Michael Weiner (ed.), Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (Routledge, 1997), pp. 160-161.
96 This quotation from Okinawan economist, Takamine Akitada, can be found in Ikemiyagusuku Shūi, Okinawa hankotsu no jyānarisuto: Ikemiyagusuku Shūi serekushon (Niraisha, 1996), p. 22.
97 Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, p. 243.
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