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Extended optima and equilibria for continuous games
II. A class of economic models
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Abstract
For the class of continuous games where σi and fi {σi, φ(σ1, …, σN)} are the strategy of and payoff to player i for i = 1, …, N, it is proved that the set of weak type I optima defined in Paper I conicide with the set of solution of a matrix condition. The latter condition restricts the equilibrium solutions of an adjustment process. Numerical results for N = 2 and N = 3 indicate that the set of all equilibrium solutions coincides with the above sets. The optima of types I to IV from Paper I are described fairly completely for the given class of games.
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- Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 1981
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