Before British India can ever be given complete home rule, the knotty problem of the relation of the native states to such a dominion must be considered. Nationalists in British India maintain that whenever complete dominion status is offered to their country, it will assume in respect to the states the same position that the crown holds toward them; meanwhile, spokesmen for the princes insist that such a step can and should never be taken without their consent. Whatever viewpoint prevails, before India can function as an independent, self-sufficient unit, some arrangement, presumably of a federal character, must certainly be effected.

An analysis of the numerous views held concerning the legal relation of the native states to the British Empire enables one to discern three principal theories: first, that held by most crown officials and Indian nationalists, which maintains the sovereignty of the crown; second, the view of the Indian princes, which attempts to prove the retention by them of the “residuary” sovereignty; and, third, the intermediate opinion of many publicists, both of Europe and of India, which asserts the existence of a divided sovereignty.

Desiring to ascertain the location of the legal sovereign in the political tangle presented by the apparently anomalous position of the princes, one is obliged to discard the theory of a divided sovereignty. Speaking in juridical terms, it is necessary to posit in some agency the source of legal sovereignty, even though its political exercise may be vested in more than one entity. There thus remains but two diametrically opposed theories, one that predicates the existence of supreme legal authority in the crown, and the other which confers it upon the rulers of the Indian states.

The territory under Japanese mandate comprises the former German colonial possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the equator. This region is made up of three main groups of islands, the Marshall, the Mariana, and the Caroline, having a total estimated land area of approximately 800 square miles. Included in these groups are more than 1,400 islets, reefs, and atolls stretching across the Pacific from 130 longitude east to 175 longitude east, and from the equator to 22 latitude north. Lying west of Hawaii, east of the Philippines, and south of Japan, many of these islands are near the steamship lanes running from the Hawaiian Islands to Guam and to the Philippines.

A recent census shows that there are more than 60,000 inhabitants in the territory under Japanese mandate, about four-fifths being natives. More than 12,000 Japanese have gone to the islands, as well as a few Europeans and Americans. The Japanese, for the most part, are engaged in agricultural or commercial pursuits or are government officials, while the Occidental population is made up mostly of missionaries. Racially, it is believed that the natives come within the Micronesian or Polynesian classification, although in many instances the racial strain is not pure.

Prior to 1914, the Japanese had few interests of importance in these islands. Occasional tramp steamers, trading vessels, or fishing boats from. Japan sometimes visited them, but no regular trade relations existed. When, however, the World War broke out, Japan lost no time in sending a naval squadron to the islands, and, with comparative ease, she obtained control of them in October, 1914. At the time, the Tokio government explained that the seizure of the islands was only temporary, for military purposes, and that Japan had no desire to keep them. Later events indicate, however, that these mere dots in the Pacific took on an increased value in Japanese eyes; certainly, once having secured control of them, the conqueror was loath to give them up.

Shall the International Settlement of Shanghai be returned to China to become the prey of Chinese politics and civil disruption, or shall it be held in trust through a plan of Sino-foreign partnership until such time as China shall be able to preserve and protect its wealth and trade? This is the question now brought to the attention of Chinese and foreigners by the recently published report of Judge Richard Feetham, of South Africa, after eighteen months of intensive study of the problem. The report represents the most significant step yet taken toward solving the question of the future status of the International Settlement, the most important of all foreign concessions and settlements in China. For the first time in the history of the Settlement, China and the foreign powers have before them an adequate study of its development, and a definite plan upon which to base an agreement for future action.

The International Settlement is a foreign controlled and governed area on Chinese soil, located on the Whangpoo River and serving as the chief center for the vast trade and commerce of the Yangtze valley. Together with the French Settlement and the Chinese Municipality, it forms a part of the modern city of Shanghai. The International Settlement is an outgrowth of the British Settlement established in 1843 when Shanghai was first opened to foreign trade. Other foreigners were admitted to the original British area, and in 1863 the British and Americans pooled their interests after the French had set up a separate settlement of their own. The amalgamated British and American Settlement, extended in 1899, became the International Settlement of today, containing some eight and three-fourths square miles of land on which reside over one million people. In population, the Settlement is truly international. Although the Chinese comprise over ninety-five per cent of the total, more than forty different nationalities are to be found among the foreign residents. For seventy-three years, however, the Settlement was governed wholly by foreigners in spite of its over-whelming majority of Chinese residents, and it is only since 1928 that the Chinese have had any official voice in Settlement affairs.