Resolving a controversy on the relationship of development to democratization, this article expands the time period under study with panel data running from the early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any country was democratic) to the end of the twentieth century, and shows a positive and significant effect of income on the likelihood of democratic transitions and democratic consolidations. The estimations hold after I control for country and time effects and instrument for income. Results reveal that the effect of income varies across income levels and across eras. First, income has a decreasing marginal effect on democratization. In already developed (and democratized) countries, any extra growth has no further effect on the level of democracy. Second, the structure of the international system affects the resources and strategies of pro-authoritarian and pro-democratic factions in client states. The proportion of liberal democracies peaks under international orders governed by democratic hegemons, such as the post–Cold War period, and bottoms out when authoritarian great powers such as the Holy Alliance control the world system.

We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected leaders to “posture” by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We find that judicial review may exacerbate posturing by rescuing leaders from the consequences of unwise policies, but may also discourage posturing by alerting voters to unjustified government action. We further find that judges will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless posturing is sufficiently likely. We then show how judicial review affects voter welfare, both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on the efficacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges.

Does globalization's impact on the labor market affect how people vote? I address this question using a new dataset based on plant-level data that measures the impact of foreign competition on the U.S. workforce over an 8-year period. Analyzing change in the president's vote share, I find that voters were substantially more sensitive to the loss of local jobs when it resulted from foreign competition, particularly from offshoring, than to job losses caused by other factors. Yet, I also find that between 2000 and 2004, the anti-incumbent effect of trade-related job losses was smaller in areas where the government certified more of the harmed workers to receive special job training and income assistance. The findings have implications for understanding the impact of international economic integration on voting behavior, as well as for assessing the electoral effect of government programs designed to compensate the losers from globalization.

The majority of the world's countries have implemented policies designed to advance the political representation of women and/or minority groups. Yet we do not yet understand how these disparate policies affect the election of minority women. In this article, I draw on theories of intersectionality to conduct the first worldwide analysis of the effects of gender and minority quotas on minority women's representation in national legislatures. Using hierarchical linear modeling, I analyze how quotas influence the election of women from more than 300 racial, ethnic, and religious groups across 81 countries. I find that policies designed to promote the political representation of women and minority groups interact to produce diverse but predictable outcomes for minority women. Although quotas are ostensibly designed to promote diversity and inclusiveness, the quota policies in effect today rarely challenge majority men's dominance of national legislatures.

This article argues that Hobbes constructed the sovereignty acknowledged among European states on the supposition of the absence of sovereignty in the New World. The notion of international anarchy found in Hobbes before the twentieth century was not the anarchy of interstate relations later posited by realism, but the anarchy of prepolitical societies outside the ordered system of European states. The modern geography of sovereignty that Hobbes established is demonstrated with reference to the cartographic traditions that informed his representation of the state of nature and the civil state, and to the historical context of the law of nations as it was understood to manage colonial rivalry in the seventeenth century. By constructing savages as absolutely free individuals in the state of nature, he precluded their recognition as free sovereign states. He thus contributed a set of premises to natural jurisprudence that denied indigenous societies statehood and excluded them from the family nations. A sketch of the Hobbesian legacy among theorists of the law of nations and international law is made, showing how his motif of savage anarchy remained central to our conceptualization of the sovereign state within the international realm into the twentieth century.

How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, he reduces the incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely; (c) public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression.

In this article, we explain the role of international law in the resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000. In doing so, we focus on three outcomes of interest. First, when do states choose to revise the territorial status quo through negotiations instead of force? Second, when are states able to reach a final settlement? Third, when do states prefer a process of legal dispute resolution (i.e., adjudication or arbitration) to bilateral negotiations? To answer these questions, we argue that when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are unambiguous and clearly favor one side, a law-based focal point will emerge. This focal point, in turn, facilitates the settlement process by helping leaders overcome distribution problems, a central obstacle in reaching a final agreement. We find strong and consistent empirical support for our hypotheses regarding international law and peaceful dispute resolution.

This response to Andrew Rehfeld's “Representation Rethought” (American Political Science Review 2009) takes up his criticisms of my “Rethinking Representation” (American Political Science Review 2003) to advance a more relational and systematic approach to representation. To this end, it suggests replacing the “trustee” concept of representation with a “selection model” based on the selection and replacement of “gyroscopic” representatives who are both relatively self-reliant in judgment and relatively nonresponsive to sanctions. It explores as well the interaction between representatives’ (and constituents’) perceptions of reality and their normative views of what the representative ought to represent. Building from the concept of surrogate representation and other features of legislative representation, it argues for investigating, both normatively and empirically, not only the characteristics of individual representatives emphasized by Rehfeld's analysis but also the representative–constituent relationship and the larger representative system, including both elected and nonelected representatives, inside and outside the legislature.

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice (in general) are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice (in particular). Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice.

The American Political Science Review peer review process relies on the professionalism and generosity of those who contribute their time to read and evaluate the work of others. The Co-editors thank these scholars for serving as manuscript reviewers between September 1, 2010, and August 31, 2011.

In this reply to Jane Mansbridge's “Clarifying the Concept of Representation” in this issue (American Political Science Review 2011). I argue that our main disagreements are conceptual, and are traceable to the attempt to treat the concept of representation as a “single highly complex concept” as Hanna Pitkin once put it. Instead, I argue, it would be more useful to develop the various concepts that emphasize the underlying forms of representation. Against the view that empirical regularity should guide concept formation, I suggest that the failure to find instances of the cases I conceptualize is not itself a reason to reject them. Instead, I argue in favor of concepts that emphasize one side or other of a relationship, rather than treating both sides simultaneously, defending the view that “promissory” and “anticipatory” may usefully describe the activity of “representing” but ought to emphasize only one side of the representative–voter relationship. I also explain why adding substantive accounts of representation to any of Mansbridge's modifying concepts dilutes their practical value. I conclude by indicating the importance of developing concepts that stretch beyond the democratic contexts that feature prominently in her response.