Latin America's part and problems in the international order that is now emerging have not taken final shape at the present writing (March, 1945), and may not do so for some time after the United Nations Conference scheduled to open at San Francisco on April 25. Nevertheless, most of the main outlines seem to have been sketched in by recent developments, notably by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of October, 1944, and two subsequent conferences: the Great-Power conference held at Yalta in February of this year, and the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (commonly called the Chapultepec Conference) held at Mexico City in February and March.

I

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, although neither complete nor definitive, did give an official and rather detailed picture of the kind of general international organization the Great Powers were planning to establish. From the point of view of this paper, the two principal features of the plan were (1) that it established a pattern of Great Power ascendancy in the general organization, particularly with reference to its central organ, the Security Council, and (2) that it encouraged the development of regional arrangements and agencies, such as the inter-American system, within the framework of the general organization (Proposals, Chap. VIII, Sec. C). The former feature was reinforced by the Yalta Conference, the latter by the Chapultepec Conference, which was devoted primarily to the task of strengthening the inter-American system and adapting it to the projected general organization outlined by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

The first session of the Seventy-seventh Congress witnessed much activity in both houses, resulting, however, mainly in appropriation measures and defense legislation. Most of the bills carried through to enactment were calculated to meet the expectations of the President as set forth in his annual message of January 6, 1941. In that message, the President assured Congress that the “future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders…. The immediate need,” he said, “is a swift and driving increase in our armament production.” Before the session came to a close, joint resolutions declaring war on Japan, Germany, and Italy were passed. Thus it was perhaps the most epoch-making and influential legislative year, for the future affairs of our people, of any since the “founding fathers” assembled in New York City on March 4, 1789, to start legislating under the new national constitution.

The essence of Hacker's construction is the theory of the ruling class. Immediately, one thinks of Marx, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and several Americans who have espoused, in one form or another, oligarchic doctrines. What most sharply distinguishes Hacker from most theorists of this persuasion is the absence of presuppositions of historical inevitability. Seeking only to describe sequences and relations of the past and present, he makes no claims of omniscience, of knowing what the social process must unfold. Neither is his theory normative.

Yet, apart from details and variations, there is a crucial framework of meaning which discloses Hacker's close affinity with the essence of conventional oligarchic doctrines: the few rule, the many simply obey; the governors, in substance if not in form, are free from compulsion to answer to the governed. Historically, and indeed currently, Hacker asserts, genuine power has been and is the exclusive or, at least, the primary possession of a privileged few. True, the composition and foundation of the governing class have changed, but this change, he continues, did not bring in its wake a widening or deepening of the structure of power in American culture. It merely means the substitution of one set of masters or controllers for another. After all, a monopoly of power is a monopoly, whether its source be deference or manipulation. Both, he avers, “permit a few men to rule many men.” Neither system of power allows the personnel and the general policies of government to be the product of voluntary and active consent. In both contexts, the ruled, not the rulers, are the object of control. “Both deference and manipulation are similar in that they are control.” Such, then, is Hacker's relation to the essence of oligarchic thought. What can be said of the validity of his formulation?

In continuation of a previous study, the rôle of some nationality groups in the last three presidential elections has been investigated. Whereas the previous study was based upon political behavior by counties within eight states, the present work is based upon political behavior by wards within four cities. The cities were chosen because they contained large proportions of certain nationality groups, and because in these cities it was possible to order census tract material from the 1940 census by wards. Only four cities (Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh) were examined because of limitations of time and expense. New York City is not included because of appreciable changes in the boundaries of Assembly districts between elections.

In order that a group be amenable to our procedure, it was necessary that there be proportionately great enough concentrations within wards so that the actual voting behavior of the group could possibly induce a shift in the election results. In this respect, it must be remembered that the proportion of foreign-born is usually about one-third of the total stock of any given group in the localities. Of the fourteen nationality groups studied here, therefore, not every one could be tested by our method.