The aim of the present paper is to describe the regulative powers granted to state boards of health, and to consider the wisdom of these grants as well as their validity as tested by the principle that the law-making powers granted to legislatures may not constitutionally be delegated by them to other agents of government.

State boards of health, while primarily administrative bodies, have generally a more or less extensive power to make regulations in supplement to and having the force of statute law. Questions thus arise as to the extent and validity of the ordinance-making powers granted. Does the power to make these regulations, having the force of law, change the nature of these boards? Under what conditions may they exercise their power?

Like his colleagues generally in the social sciences, the political scientist has prided himself upon the subject-matter content of his teaching. His responsibility has been to enlarge the understanding of the dynamic process by which men govern and are governed. Teaching and research have been coördinate elements of that responsibility. Constantly seeking to find better techniques for observation and measurement of political phenomena, ever trying to define more exactly the field of interest and knowledge, the political scientist has always focused attention upon the subject-matter of his specialization. He has had little time to devote to the problems of teaching methodology.

The very fact that higher education has been selective is another possible explanation for our seeming indifference to improvements in teacher-student communication. From necessity, teachers' colleges and the educational profession have given considerable attention to teaching techniques. Primary and secondary schools are intended for mass education. If they fulfill their purpose, they reach virtually all of the population from six to sixteen years of age. The college teacher has had no such mass obligation. Traditionally, only some ten per cent of our high school population continue with higher education, and they are usually divided among the various fields of learning represented in colleges and universities. Selectivity and a limited audience have encouraged the college instructor to concentrate upon subject-matter and to ignore methodology.

Political scientists certainly have no reason to offer any apologies for their primary interest.

The commerce clause has been a double-edged tool of constitutional interpretation from the earliest days of judicial review of state and federal legislative activity. It is at once a positive source of federal power and, in the absence of federal exercise of that power, a source of implied limitations on state legislation. Any consideration of trends of interpretation of the clause in the past decade must treat both aspects of the matter. In general, it may be said that expansive implications of the Wagner Act decisions in the spring of 1937 have been elaborated and broadened until the commerce clause is today an ample source of federal legislative authority to deal with a wide range of problems arising out of or having any substantial effect upon interstate commerce. No such clear generalization may be made with respect to the nature of the limitations which the unexercised commerce power imposes on state police power and tax legislation. But the tendency, not yet consistently dominant, seems to be in the direction of upholding much state legislation that would formerly have been ruled a burden on interstate commerce. It is, of course, unnecessary to labor the fact that state legislation incompatible with a valid federal exercise of the commerce power is unconstitutional.

Both the above generalizations require some further examination. The first can perhaps best be looked at in terms of (1) changing definitions of interstate commerce, (2) the reshaping of familiar formulæ for determining the reach of the power to regulate, (3) the abandonment of the “dual federalism” concept, and (4) the broad application of federal statutes to businesses alleged not to be in interstate commerce. Discussion of the second general problem may perhaps best be considered in terms of the gradual, and still wavering, emergence of what may be called the “leaveit-to-Congress trend” in the review of state legislation alleged to burden interstate commerce.

Like other neutral nations of Europe, Spain has been tremendously affected by the war. Though she has not been brought into such close contact with the great struggle as have Holland and the Scandinavian countries, because of her distance from the battlefields and the comparative insignificance of her commercial interests, she has nevertheless felt and is still feeling a great strain, the chief characteristics of which are economic. The cost of living in Spain has increased several fold. This is due in part to the difficulty in obtaining both manfactured articles and coal for her own industries and in part to the great scarcity of agricultural products: the result of the short-sighted policy followed up to the present of exporting food products which should have been retained at home. Though possessed of a greater arable area in proportion to her population than any other country in Europe except Russia, the methods of agricultural production in Spain are wofully deficient. As a result of her own backwardness and her failure to develop either her industrial or her agricultural resources, Spain is now suffering, to a lesser degree possibly, the same inconveniences which are disturbing Germany, France and England: namely, a scarcity of food; and she does not possess the artificial stimulus which those countries have to aid in overcoming it.

The chief lesson of the war to date for constitutional interpretation is that the Constitution is an easily dispensable factor of our war effort—perhaps one might say an “expendable” factor. That the Constitution is not needed as a source of national power for war purposes has been stated by the Court itself. Speaking in 1936 for himself and brethren in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, Justice Sutherland said: “The investment of the Federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war [my italics], to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have been vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality” (299 U.S. 304, 318).