There are probably few members of the learned professions who do not feel the urge to contribute, if they can, to the existing store of knowledge regarding their chosen field, or, more ambitious still, to advance yet further that body of thought constituting the fundamental principles by which it is sought to interpret the data dealt with, to trace relationships between cause and effect, to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, to evaluate action by results—in a word, to give philosophic coherence to what would otherwise be disconnected and unrelated thinking.

In the case of many, this urge is supplemented by a positive obligation. Those holding academic positions calling for the direction of students engaged in advanced or postgraduate work, and those at the head of institutions of research, not only have the desire themselves to engage in work of original research, but are under the responsibility of encouraging, if not compelling, work of a like character by others.

It is in connection with Occam's elaborate theory of property that we can most readily grasp the importance of his theory of higher law, particularly as embodied in the jus gentium. We must, therefore, investigate this subject in considerable detail.

In Occam's view, God is originally the source of all property. But, as in the case of law and government, this is true only in the most general and indirect sense. Most property rights arise from human law and only mediately from God, although in a few special cases such rights follow directly from special divine ordination or from lex divina. Occam cites a passage from St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theol. II, II, Qu. 44, Art. 2) stating that separate possessions are not according to natural law but are founded upon human or positive law, and are added to natural law through the exercise of human reason. In the primal condition of mankind, or in the state of innocence in the Garden of Eden, all property was common and none was discrete or private. Before Eve came, Adam had only a de facto right of user and no greater right of private property than a sole remaining monk would have in the property of a monastery.

In its decision in United States v. Smith, the Supreme Court has given final victory to President Hoover in his bitter fight with the Senate in January, 1931, over his appointments to the Federal Power Commission. On December 3, 1930, the President sent to the Senate Smith's nomination to the Federal Power Commission. On Saturday, December 20, 1930, the Senate advised and consented to the appointment and ordered the resolution of confirmation sent to the President. The Senate thereupon adjourned to Monday, January 5, 1931. On Monday, December 22, 1930, the President received the notification that the appointment had been confirmed and on the same day issued Smith's commission. Smith immediately took the oath of office and entered upon his duties. While the record of the Court does not disclose this fact, it will be recalled that one of the very first “duties” entered upon by Smith and his colleagues was the summary dismissal of two subordinates of the Commission generally admitted to have been active in the protection of the public against the aggressions of the so-called power interests. Accordingly, when the Senate convened on January 5, 1931, a majority of its members very much wished to recall the confirmation of Smith's appointment.

On November 8, 1932, Minnesota, for the first time in her history, chose Democratic presidential electors. The breach in the ranks of the Solid South in 1928 was hardly more of a break with tradition. That, however, was not the only interesting feature of the recent election. In the first place, all nine of the state's representatives in Congress were elected at large. That alone would not confer any great distinction, but the importance of an election at large was magnified in the present case by the fact that Minnesota is the only state in the Union in which a genuine three-party system prevails. The third party, or Farmer-Labor party is in this instance not only a factor in state politics, but at present the dominant one.

An earlier note in the Review indicated the desirability of minority party activity in the interval between campaigns and appraised the organization and functioning of the publicity bureau of the Democratic national committee from June 1, 1929, until September 1,1930. During the period from September, 1930, to the convening of the Democratic national convention on June 27, 1932, the bureau continued, as a party agency, to criticise the policies of the Hoover administration and to assume, in a limited degree, the educational function of the minority party. In addition, it was necessary during the first session of the Seventy-second Congress to explain and justify the work of the Democratic House of Representatives.

In response to public criticism of the operation of local government in Michigan, particularly in units other than cities and villages, the legislature, by Act 156 of the Public Acts of 1931, authorized the governor to appoint a commission of inquiry into county, township, and school district government. The commission was instructed to give special attention to changes that would reduce the cost of maintenance of such governmental units and increase their efficiency; and authority was given to examine the files and records of any county, township, or school district in the state. The commission's membership consisted of Clarence L. Ayres of Detroit (chairman), C. E. Bement of Lansing, Judge P. C. Gilbert of Traverse City, M. B. McPherson of Lowell, and A. E. Petermann of Calumet. A legislative appropriation of $5,000 was supplemented by financial assistance from the University of Michigan, Michigan State College, the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, and the Spelman Fund of New York; and Dr. Lent D. Upson was chosen director of the survey. Committees utilized in the inquiry included those on (1) social and economic trends, (2) organization and cost of county and township government, (3) rural school government, (4) local government in the metropolitan area, (5) school government in the metropolitan area, (6) debt and taxation in local government, and (7) organization and administration of the following services: public welfare, public health, public works, and justice. The report of the commission went to Governor Wilber M. Brucker late in December, 1932, and the expert studies have been transmitted to the legislature during the current session. All will be available in a series to be known as Local Government in Michigan, and will be published as separate documents.

In his famous letter to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote concerning the principle of local self-government as follows: “The organization of our county administrations may be thought more difficult. But follow principle, and the knot unties itself. Divide the counties into wards of such size as that every citizen can attend, when called on, and act in person. Ascribe to them the government of their wards in all things relating to themselves exclusively. A justice, chosen by themselves, in each, a constable, a military company, a patrol, a school, the care of their own poor, their own portion of the public roads,…” “We should, therefore,” Jefferson summarizes, “marshall our government into (1) the general federal republic for all concerns foreign and federal; (2) that of the state for what relates to our own citizens, exclusively; (3) the county republics for the duties and concerns of the county; and (4) the ward republics for the small and yet numerous and interesting concerns of the neighborhood. In government as well as in every other business of life, it is by division and subdivision of duties alone that all matters great and small can be managed to perfection. And the whole is cemented by giving to every citizen, personally, a part in the administration of public affairs.”

The justice of the peace is one of the most important public officials in Kentucky. He is an officer whose election, compensation, term, and qualifications are set forth in the constitution. He is both a judicial and an administrative officer, presiding over his own court for the trial of petty civil and criminal cases, and serving as a member of the fiscal court, or county board. County judicial, legislative, and administrative functions are rolled into one in the person of the justice of the peace. In this respect, the county system of government in Kentucky has a striking resemblance to the English county of the thirteenth century.

The Kentucky fiscal court is normally a body consisting of the justices of the peace in a county together with the county judge, and having the usual powers conferred upon boards of county commissioners or supervisors in the other states. The constitution provides that each county shall be divided into districts in such manner as the general assembly may direct, and that in each district one justice of the peace shall be elected, with the further requirement that no county shall have fewer than three nor more than eight districts. But in addition, the constitution provides that a county may have a fiscal court composed of three commissioners, elected at large from the county, and the county judge.