Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-03T16:51:46.643Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Rein Taagepera  and
Matthew Soberg Shugart
Rein Taagepera
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine and Tartu University
Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The mechanical effect of electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 455 - 464
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Cox, Gary. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34:903–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duverger, Maurice. 1951. Les partis politiques. Paris: Le Seuil.Google Scholar
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Trans. Barbara, and North, Robert. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Epstein, Leon. 1967. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.Google Scholar
James, Bill. 1984. Baseball Abstract. New York: Ballantine.Google Scholar
Katz, Richard S. 1980. A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitzinger, Uwe. 1959. “The Austrian Electoral System.” Parliamentary Affairs 12:392–404.Google Scholar
Laakso, Markku, and Taagepera, Rein. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12:3–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, Arend. 1990. “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85.” American Political Science Review 84:481–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, Thomas, and Rose, Richard. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, G. Bingham Jr., 1989. “Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1:107–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, Douglas W. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Reed, Steven R. 1990. “Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case.” British journal of Political Science 20:335–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76:753–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Giovanni. 1986. “The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?” In Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. Grofman, Bernard and Lijphart, Arend. New York: Agathon.Google Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S. 1988. Duverger's Rule, District Magnitude, and Presidentialism. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine.Google Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S. 1992. “Electoral Reform in Systems of Proportional Representation.” European Journal of Political Research 21:207–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S., and Carey, John M.. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taagepera, Rein, and Shugart, Matthew S.. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.