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A Model of the Political Economy of the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Alberto Alesina ,
John Londregan  and
Howard Rosenthal
Alberto Alesina
Affiliation:
Harvard University
John Londregan
Affiliation:
Princeton University
Howard Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
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Abstract

We develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the United States. The formal model, which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters, leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections. Our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on-year and midterm elections to balance the two parties. On the other hand, we find no support for “rational” retrospective voting. We do reconfirm, in a fully simultaneous framework, the “naive” retrospective voting literature's finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting. We find congressional elections unaffected by the economy, except as transmitted by presidential coattails.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 12 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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