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The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Paul Huth ,
Christopher Gelpi  and
D. Scott Bennett
Paul Huth
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Christopher Gelpi
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
D. Scott Bennett
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Buffalo
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Abstract

Realism has been the dominant paradigm in the study of international conflict. Within this paradigm, two leading alternative approaches have been deterrence theory and structural realism. We test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984. We derive a set of hypotheses from each model, operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis, and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great-power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis. The results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support, whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 609 - 623
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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