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The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Bryan D. Jones ,
Frank R. Baumgartner  and
Jeffery C. Talbert
Bryan D. Jones
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Frank R. Baumgartner
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Jeffery C. Talbert
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
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Abstract

Scholars studying congressional committees have noted the potential for members to seek membership on particular committees, leading to bias. Underpinning this line of scholarship is what might be termed a theory of comparative committee statics, characterized by a cross-sectional empirical approach. We present a new approach that focuses on the dynamics of jurisdictional control. By following a series of issues through the committee hearing process, we show that there is indeed significant issue bias in particular committee venues. However, we also find that new committees often claim jurisdiction over issues as they are redefined in the political process. The degree of jurisdictional monopoly enjoyed by different committees has been overlooked in the literature on this topic in spite of its importance in determining the nature of representation of interests in Congress.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 657 - 671
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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