I have been asked to comment on the use of weapons in time of war or armed violence and to present some of the military viewpoints on the need for a continuation of the present efforts to regulate the use of weapons through general guiding principles rather than through a ban on specific weapons or a list theory. Why, it has been asked, is there some military opposition to the ban of specific weapons? I would like to make it clear that questions of weapons use are handled in a different manner than questions of weapons banishment and it is postulated that this is a key to the military viewpoint. I would also like to make it clear that the following views are my own and not necessarily those of the military profession or the U.S. Government.

Mr. Blix’s figures indicating that it is safer to be a soldier than a civilian are more than borne out by the irony of Mr. Aldrich’s observation with regard to the treatment of captured guerillas as if they were prisoners of war. It seems to me that we are returning to an age of chivalry where soldiers are treated a lot better than civilians even if those soldiers happen to be concealing their weapons, bearing no visible signs, and are captured while shooting at you. You may remember that the age of chivalry was an age of caste; you were very nice to the soldiers but not so nice to the peasants. That is very much what seems to be happening today.

I do not know of very many governments who have protested to the government of India concerning the treatment and detention of its prisoners. On the whole, and this may be an explanation of some of the attitudes reflected by my government, public opinion in my country is very concerned about armed conflict. This was true of the conflicts in Biafra and Bangladesh, and it is certainly very true of the conflict in Vietnam. When the government speaks up, as it frequendy does, this reflects an attitude held by a strong public opinion, nothing very peculiar in a democratic state. It is natural that this may sometimes lead to controversies with foreign countries that do not wish to hear all that is said.

With respect to my subject, Soviet perspectives on European Security, the first point to be made concerns the Soviet concept of strategy. It is far more explicitly comprehensive than most Western conceptions. It stresses the interrelations and interdependencies of military, economic, ideological, cultural and other factors, and sees politics as the umbrella composite of these factors. Furthermore, the composite is not only comprehensive in nature it is equally comprehensive in extent. Thus the Soviet view does not allow for any isolated consideration of, for example, Central Europe, whatever the character of the concern at hand. The topic of local military assymetry, which is related to the discussions on multiple and balanced forced reductions (MBFR), may serve as an example. The USSR stresses not only the more complex nature of the problem in Central Europe, but also insists that it must be viewed in a wider continental, and even global, context. Europe is not seen in isolation.