In the past decades, Europe has been the site of multiple drug policy innovations and cannabis policy experimentation. Most of the policy reforms in this area are taking place at the national and subnational levels. They have not resulted from agreements or harmonization initiatives at the EU level, but rather from bottom-up adoption of cannabis policies and practices that deviate from punitive approaches. Cannabis regulation has been only marginally debated by European institutions and is not discussed in depth in any EU document. On the one hand, the diversity of European drug policies is a positive development: it serves as a policy laboratory and reflects adaptations to local contexts in light of drug market-related challenges. On the other hand, a greater EU consensus would be helpful for policy coordination and international engagement.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having serious and disproportionate effects on nationals abroad and their families globally. Many states have adopted positive measures including temporarily suspending forced returns as well providing visa and work permit extensions, temporary residence, or other forms of regular status to ensure that migrants are accounted for in national responses to the pandemic. Nevertheless, the human rights of nationals abroad and nationals with foreign family members have faced significant challenges. Some states have fully or partially closed entry to all of their own nationals and their foreign family members, in violation of nationals’ right to return and their right of family unification. Other states’ nationals abroad have been unable to enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health. Many have also encountered the burdens of hate speech in both their home states and the states in which they live, the effect of which has been to undermine freedom of opinion and expression and the right to equality and non-discrimination. This essay identifies and explains these threats to human rights in the era of COVID-19. The essay encourages states to recommit to rights protection.

The international law of mobility has by and large been focused on the question of immigration. Its emphasis has therefore been on what I will call, for convenience's sake, the host state. It is there that some of the most intense dilemmas around the question of mobility have arisen in a context of populism, xenophobia, and racism. The state of nationality is not invisible in that context, but this has not typically been the primary variable in trying to understand and assess the normative challenges of global mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has refocused attention on distinct patterns of mobility, particularly return mobility, of nationals to their country of origin as well as limitations on leaving that country in the first place. The state of nationality has increasingly been asked to mediate demands for security and public health that are extra-territorial and that implicate its nationals in sometimes far-flung locations. I argue that the pandemic is a further opportunity to shift attention onto the state of nationality as a locus of key decisions concerning transnational mobility and thus to rebalance our sense of what goes into the global “mobility equation.”

COVID-19 has had a profound impact on migrants and refugees the world over. Their pre-existing vulnerabilities were immediately exacerbated as national health systems were often overwhelmed and many disease control measures were either inaccessible to them or had disproportionate socio-economic effects. But migrants and refugees have also been framed as prima facie causes for the transboundary spread of the virus, and public health exception and derogation clauses in both national and international refugee and human rights instruments have been used to block their entry, suspend asylum processing, or trigger deportations. Taking the example of Brazil as a point of departure, the present contribution argues that (for at least some states) the appearance of the virus seems to have served as a legal carte blanche for fundamentally reconfiguring or closing down border regimes. More specifically, we argue that the strategic mainstreaming of global health regulations into border regimes points to the emergence of a “pandemic law” that encroaches upon already fragile transnational legal regime complexes, with the potential to upend or hollow out existing frameworks for migrant and refugee protection.

As the COVID-19 crisis developed, the International Labor Organization estimated that 4.7 percent of the global labor pool, comprising 164 million people, were migrant workers who were living and working outside their home country. While some were laid off and sent home for the lockdown, others continued working. These others were migrants performing crucial jobs in the front line of the crisis. They help to produce our food, pack our orders, and build or clean our houses, among other tasks. Many COVID-19 infections appear to be labor-related, with many of the crucial sectors exhibiting an extra-high risk of virus transmission. Migrant workers on the frontline can be low-waged, hold a temporary job, lack knowledge of their legal position and the local language, and have a limited social network and high dependency on others—such as recruiters or temporary employment agencies—for work and housing. This essay addresses these migrant vulnerabilities in the labor market and identifies measures that might simultaneously curb the vulnerabilities and account for industrial needs for labor in essential sectors. We argue that the vulnerability of migrant laborers is structural; the COVID-19 crisis has put a magnifying glass on a preexisting vulnerability and clarified the need for solutions.

Immediately after the first signs of COVID-19 in West Africa in March-April 2020, twelve countries officially closed their borders. Other countries, such as Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal, adopted a more pragmatic approach by merely limiting to essential crossings any arrivals or departures over land, and by adopting humanitarian corridors. Many of these measures are based on Article 4 of the 1979 Dakar Protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Article 91 of the amended Treaty of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known under its French acronym UEMOA), which authorize states to limit the freedom of movement and residence for reasons of public order, public security, or public health. The measures, however, have heavily impacted the legal regime of free movement of persons throughout the ECOWAS area. In the following analysis, I will show that the measures have (1) contributed to the disintegration of the legal regime of free movement of persons in ECOWAS and (2) instrumentalized COVID-19 for political ends in ways that are counterproductive for the region.

The European Union's external border regime is a manifestation of continuing imperialism. It reinforces particular imaginaries of Europe's wealth as somehow innate (rather than plundered and extorted) and of Europeanness itself as whiteness—euphemistically packaged as a “European Way of Life” to be protected. This exposes international law's structural limitations—if not designs—as bound up with racial borders in the global context. In the wake of COVID-19 and with a climate apocalypse already underway, these realities need to be urgently ruptured and reimagined.

One measure of how and whether the COVID-19 pandemic reshapes the emerging field of international migration law will be the extent to which transnational civil society and activist movements can counteract the intensification of state border controls that the pandemic has triggered. Before the pandemic, transnational efforts to establish a new normative framework for migration seemed to be accelerating. These efforts included new, if non-binding, global compacts on refugees and migration, and new, if modest, efforts at facilitating global cooperation, alongside innovative approaches to scholarly engagement. Such developments arguably contributed to an emerging framework for protecting migrants under international law. Has the pandemic defeated this potential? State responses to the pandemic have eschewed multilateralism, brought migration to a near standstill, and ignored well-established human rights obligations. Moreover, states are poised to deploy a range of new border management technologies and even more assertively manage migration in the name of “health proofing” borders. Yet at the same time, some progressive state practices have emerged alongside a call from the UN Secretary-General to “reimagine human mobility for the benefit of all.” In this essay, we chart some areas of potentially progressive expansion beyond the status quo, noting not only the substance but also the process by which these norms are emerging.

The Paris 2024 Summer Olympics will be the first Olympic Games for which human rights provisions were added to the Host City Contract (HCC). The Milano/Cortina 2026 Winter Olympics will be the first edition of the Games that were awarded with human rights requirements forming part of the candidature process. The inclusion of human rights provisions into hosting and bidding regulations can be seen as a reaction of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to the increasing pressure from civil society to address adverse human rights impacts of these events. This essay provides an analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of this development and reveals that from a rights-holder perspective, the benefits are meaningless. More specifically, it argues that potential benefits are cancelled out by the shortcomings and most importantly that there is a mismatch between intended and actual beneficiaries of these provisions.

Olympic Games do not happen in a vacuum or a sports bubble. They are embedded in both local and global realities of a social, economic, and environmental nature. Environmental factors, in particular, have impacted the Olympic Movement for several decades. In this context, climate change is a more recent, yet increasingly important, issue on the agenda. This essay examines the Olympic Movement's multi-level climate change policy. Based on the goals established in the Paris Agreement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched the Sports for Climate Action Initiative in 2018. In the context of the Olympics, this Initiative is implemented through the interplay between the IOC and actors at the local, host city level. Consequently, the system is highly dependent on local organizers’ capabilities to meet the Initiative's ambitious targets, as well as on the IOC's willingness and ability to take an active role in steering and supporting host cities in this process.

The network of institutions that comprise the Olympic Movement include several whose authoritative scope now extends far beyond the mere staging of the Olympic and Paralympic Games to govern some important aspects of virtually all major regional and global competition and to foster the development of a comprehensive body of international sports law. The issues include nationality, which is the focus of this essay. More broadly, the proper resolution of nationality issues in the sports arena offers a limited model for reconciling tensions between national and international interests in the progressive development of international law.

One can hope that the convening of the Tokyo Olympics will be a cause for global celebration. Tokyo could prove a focal point for international solidarity, a moment of relief and release after all of humanity faced down an insidious, invisible, and largely indiscriminate attacker. Unified as we otherwise may be, athletes will still come to the Games as representatives of nation-states. That may be an unavoidable organizing principle. Less justifiable will be the requirement that athletes be nationals of the states they play for. Under the Olympic Charter and the rules of particular sporting federations, athletes are subject to a non-state nationality regime that restricts the capacity of individuals to compete for countries for whose delegations they would otherwise qualify. This regime looks to maintain the putative integrity of Olympic competition by maintaining the unity of sporting and sociological national identity. But that legacy of the twentieth century no longer works in the twenty first. Nationality and associated criteria for participant eligibility undermine the autonomy of athletes and the quality of participation. The rules can no longer guarantee any affective tie between athlete and nation, instead arbitrarily enabling some, but not all, to compete on the basis of citizenship decoupled from identity. We don't require that athletes playing for our professional sports teams hale from the cities they represent. There's no reason why we need to require more of our Olympic athletes.

Sport is a useful area of study to test assumptions of international law. International law has traditionally focused on states and on international organizations that oversee specialized areas of human activity. International sport is overseen by an NGO—the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Yet sport is of great interest to states, serving as a testing ground of national superiority by providing a simple narrative of “winners” and “losers” in competition. Meanwhile, entities that are not yet states have historically been able to participate in international sport more readily than in other areas of international relations. This essay will examine the connection between participation in the Olympic Games and claims to statehood. In doing so, this essay will outline the modern approach to statehood, consider sport's role in that approach, and examine two case studies: the German Democratic Republic, and Kosovo.

The Olympic Movement has been self-regulated from the beginning, and its private ordering is governed by the domestic law of the nations in which its organizations are domiciled and operate. Nevertheless, it is also an institution of global governance, with important ties to international law. This essay examines the nature of those ties and the push for additional alignment between the norms of the Movement and international legal norms. I first provide a taxonomy of Olympic Movement organizations, centered on the attributes that are helpful to understanding the place of each in the global governance of sport and the value the organizations produce for their diverse stakeholders. I then describe demands from international law for additional alignment with human rights and governance norms and the standard response from sport. In the final section, I argue that regulatory autonomy is necessary for sport to produce the values expected by its stakeholders; domestic law, including as it reflects international law, is generally an adequate check on abuses of that autonomy. International norms are useful not as binding law that would displace the Movement's autonomy, but as pressure for Movement organizations to consider aligning their policies and procedures with the public interests those norms reflect.