By the time of the establishment of the American Government the practice of the nations with regard to their mutual obligations had begun to resolve itself into fairly well-defined principles. Among these was one to the effect that one state must prevent the use of its territory and resources for hostile attacks upon its neighbors with which it is at peace. In the beginning this rule was evolved from the relations of neutrality; for the more pressing needs of the time of war tended to crystallize usage applying to it, while other practice was still incoherent. But obviously the law thus defined was only a phase of the general duty of a state to prevent injurious and offensive acts against friendly countries. The obligation is based upon the complete and exclusive control which the sovereign is presumed to exercise over its subject persons and territory. The authority of the sovereign exists alike in time of war and time of peace; and the requirement of the law extends as well to normal relations as to the exceptional conditions of neutrality.

So long as the rule of capture of private property at sea exists unimpaired, states with mercantile marines of any importance will find that one of the problems they have to face in war is to defend their sea-borne commerce, and to attack that of their adversary. On the 26th March, 1913, Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, made an important statement in the House of Commons regarding the methods proposed by Great Britain for the protection of trade. As reported in the Times Mr. Churchill’s speech was as follows:

Until quite recent times, it would have been unprofitable, in the case of most nations, to inquire what the philosophy of government held by the people was, or what effect it had on the foreign relations of the nation, or on international relations generally. There were few nations in which the people were so enlightened and expressed themselves so fully that it was possible to distinguish and define the particular philosophy of government held by them; and even if it had been possible to do so, it would have been of little use to try to discover what effect this philosophy had on international relations, since the fact was that it had little or no effect. The people of each nation, ignorant of foreign affairs by reason of the difficulties of travel and communication, allowed the executive to control the foreign relations under the advice of a council in the selection of which they had no voice, and representing certain privileged classes of persons who used the power of the nation as means to accomplish such ends as they thought desirable.

I ask your attention for a few minutes to some observations upon the Monroe Doctrine. If I am justified in taking your time it will be not because I say anything novel, but because there is occasion for restating well settled matters which seem to have been overlooked in some recent writings on the subject.

We are all familiar with President Monroe’s famous message of December 2, 1823.

The above is the title of a very instructive article in this Journal for April, 1913, by Dr. Hans Wehberg, who points out and analyzes the special grounds for the different reservations contained in several arbitration treaties concluded up to the present time, with the suggestion that such reservations might henceforth be restricted merely to two, that is to say, the exceptions of “vital interests” and “national honor.”

Oceans have ever been the chief theater of universal history. The terrestrial sphere known to antiquity lay around the Mediterranean which, as its name indicates, was destined to remain the center of events, until the famous sea-heroes, impelled by a desire to explore, undertook bold voyages to distant, unknown regions, and Christopher Columbus finally discovered the Western Hemisphere, bringing it in contact with the considerations, hopes, needs of expansion and, last but not least, also, fears of Europe.

The building of the Panama Canal has not been a one man’s work by any means. In its inception the preparation of the field, the elimination of impossible routes, and in the actual construction work, it has drawn forth some of the best brains of the country.

Noted engineers from civil life have had an important influence in determining the locality best suited for the purpose, and also in the plans adopted for building the canal; and the names of these men will go down in history as a part of its constructive force. But as the principal object of building the canal was to augment means for the national defence, it was eminently proper that the Army and Navy of the United States should have paramount influence in its establishment. For nearly forty years naval men have been engaged in surveying different parts of Central America and the Isthmus of Panama to find a practical route which should offer the fewest obstacles in cutting a channel between the two oceans. Finally, by a process of elimination, which brought the problem to a choice between the Nicaragua and Panama routes, the construction of a canal was actually begun by an American company on the Nicaragua line, and the work of construction put in the charge of naval officers.

The growth of international law, both in precision and in scope, has been one of the marked features of the general development of law in the nineteenth century. It is true that even at the present day the reproach is often cast upon international law that its content is unsettled, its authority vague, and its method unscientific. But one has only to compare the standard text-books of the present day with the treatises that were quoted as authorities in the beginning of the nineteenth century to realize the great progress which has been made towards the establishment of international law upon a truly scientific basis. It cannot fairly be expected that international law should have as yet attained, or shall in the near future attain, the precision and definiteness of municipal law. The last decade of the century did indeed witness the first sitting of an international legislative body in the form of a conference at The Hague, which enacted what may be called international statutory law. But apart from the fact that this body was composed of the representatives of independent, not of federal, states, and therefore its rulings could not be final, the subject-matter with which it dealt was in many cases not such as would admit of definition and analysis after the methods of municipal law. The states composing the family of nations present differences of physical, mental and moral characteristics far more marked than those exhibited by the individuals within a given state, and it is but natural therefore that it should be correspondingly difficult to codify in a precise and scientific manner the rules governing their mutual relations. But while the difficulties attending the codification of international law cannot be denied, there is reason to believe that the growth of international law during the twentieth century will proceed towards its appointed goal as steadily as it has done during the nineteenth century.

The manner of the performance of the duty of preventing hostile expeditions, and the means to be employed for that purpose, are matters largely or entirely for the discretion of the individual state. It cannot be said that any particular method is required or sanctioned by international law. This discretion is limited, however, by practical necessity and by the exigency of good faith.

The confusion of thought in which the modern world likes to dwell is nowhere greater than in those things which come within the survey of the peace movement. Even its most enthusiastic supporters are unable to show that their efforts have tended to make wars less frequent than heretofore. Neither can they prove that any nation has yet submitted a single question to arbitration over which it would have gone to war if the Hague Tribunal had not existed. They must honestly acknowledge that wars occur less often now than in the past, partly because a great number of questions, as, for example, those of nationality and of colonization, which formerly led to war have now, to a great extent, been solved, and partly because the civilized nations have reached such a stage in their development that they no longer are inclined to draw the sword for the comparatively unimportant objects for which they were unsheathed at a time when the death and ruin of thousands meant little to the government.