One of the principal issues of interest to international lawyers in the International Tin Council cases decided by the English courts was whether member states of the International Tin Council (ITC) were secondarily or concurrently liable to third parties for the debts of the organization. This issue may arise when two or more states form an organization with legal personality that can perform functions with legal consequences. In the course of performing these functions, such an organization may incur liabilities to third parties. These third parties may be states, other organizations, individuals or legal persons. The states may be member states of the organization itself or other states, and the individuals and legal persons may be nationals of member states or not. The liabilities may emanate from transactions, such as international agreements between states and the organization, that take place at the international level and may be governed by international law; or they may stem from transactions governed by municipal law, whether between the organization and states, individuals or legal persons. Such liabilities may be contractual, quasi-contractual or delictual.

The history, operation and tasks of the International Law Commission (ILC) have often been described and its success in codifying general international law is well-known and widely acknowledged. The conduct of international relations today is unthinkable without such basic instruments, first drafted by the Commission, as the conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, the law of treaties and the law of the sea. Moreover, other ILC drafts that have not been adopted as treaties have had a long-term effect on the development of international law; for example, the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, and the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure.

The advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice on December 15, 1989, Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, has revived the topicality of the possible dual application of the Court’s advisory procedure. This procedure, provided for in Article 96 of the Charter, is governed by Articles 65-68 of the Statute of the Court.

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, concluded in Geneva in 1977, is the most important treaty codifying and developing international humanitarian law since the adoption of the four Conventions themselves; and it is the first such treaty since 1907 to deal with methods and means of warfare and the protection of the civilian population from the effects of warfare. As such, its contributions to the law were long overdue and, on the whole, are both positive from the humanitarian point of view and practicable from the military point of view. Moreover, it offers the prospect of improved compliance with international humanitarian law, which would greatly benefit the victims of war and would bring the law in action closer to the law in the books. Yet, in January 1987, the President of the United States informed the Senate that he would not submit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, calling it “fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed.” It is apparent that President Reagan’s decision resulted from misguided advice that exaggerated certain flaws in the Protocol, ignored the statements of understanding that would have remedied them, and misconstrued a humanitarian and antiterrorist instrument as one that could give aid and comfort to “terrorists.”

This was written shortly after the gulf war of 1990-1991 came to an end. The collective action taken under the aegis of the United Nations has been hailed as a vindication of international law and of the principle of collective security. At the same time, it has also been perceived by many as still another example of the dominant role of power and national self-interest in international relations. A plausible case can be made for each of these views. An optimist may conclude in the rosy glow of the desired outcome that law and power have happily converged in this case. Even so, the massive devastation of civilian life during the war and the threat of renewed violence are troubling features. The promise of a new world order based on the rule of law still seems far from fulfillment, but there is renewed hope that the UN Charter will be taken seriously as an instrument of collective responsibility.

Writers of science fiction have often speculated about what it would be like to discover, on a planet in outer space, a much higher form of intelligence. How would we react to those creatures? Would we be so fearful of them that we would try to kill them? Or would we welcome the opportunity to attempt to understand their language and culture? Stranger than fiction is the fact that there already exists a species of animal life on earth that scientists speculate has higher than human intelligence. The whale has a brain that in some instances is six times bigger than the human brain and its neocortex is more convoluted. Discussing the creative processes of whales, Dr. John Lilly says that a researcher “is struck with the fact that one’s current basic assumptions and even one’s current expectations determine, within certain limits, the results attained with a particular animal at that particular time.” Whales speak to other whales in a language that appears to include abstruse mathematical poetry. They have also developed interspecies communication with dolphins. Whales are the most specialized of all mammals.

The development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory. Few areas of domestic law have avoided the scrutiny of feminist writers, who have exposed the gender bias of apparently neutral systems of rules. A central feature of many western theories about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity. These attributes are held to give the law its special authority. More radical theories have challenged this abstract rationalism, arguing that legal analysis cannot be separated from the political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people live. Some theorists argue that the law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and economic inequalities appear natural. Feminist jurisprudence builds on certain aspects of this critical strain in legal thought. It is much more focused and concrete, however, and derives its theoretical force from immediate experience of the role of the legal system in creating and perpetuating the unequal position of women.

The law governing the admission of reservations to treaties has evolved over the past sixty years, as is demonstrated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which incorporates a regime on reservations that represents a significant change in the law as it was generally understood in the first part of this century. Whereas it was once widely considered that the unanimous consent of the other parties to a treaty was required to admit a reservation, the Vienna Convention implemented a new system in which this condition is generally not necessary. The regime on reservations is contained in section 2 of the Convention (Articles 19-23), which, together with the definitional article (Article 2(1)(d)), determines what constitutes a reservation, the criteria it must meet to be permissible, and the effect it will have, both in the event that it is accepted by other contracting states and in the more problematic event that it is not.

An “exclusive preserve” of a state in the UN Secretariat is a post that is continuously filled by nationals of the same state. Virtually from the founding of the United Nations, the Secretariat has observed an “unofficial” practice of exclusive preserves for many senior posts held by nationals of several influential states, including the United States; but its most persistent advocate, and with regard to a particularly wide range of posts, has been the Soviet Union. In view of the past underrepresentation of Soviet nationals in the Secretariat, largely because the Soviet Government insisted that its nationals be recruited only on fixed-term contracts based on secondment from the Government and Soviet institutions, a considerable number of posts were set aside to be filled on a replacement basis. The occupants of those posts were selected by the Secretary-General from a very short list of candidates submitted by the Soviet Government. The object of this Editorial is to assess the impact of the new Soviet policy toward the UN Secretariat, recent General Assembly resolutions and the jurisprudence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal on the practice of exclusive preserves.

Less than twenty years ago, a large majority of the United Nations General Assembly declared the customary international law of expropriation dead. Eighty-six governments supported a resolution holding that a state expropriating foreign property “is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and … any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of [that] State.” Scholars cited this and other General Assembly resolutions as evidence that international law no longer required full compensation for the expropriation of foreign property. This view had sufficient support to precipitate an acrimonious dispute in the preparation of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which reaffirmed only in its later drafts the traditional “Hull formula.”

The United Nations system is an elegant, carefully crafted instrument to make war illegal and unnecessary. To this end, in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, members are required to “refrain … from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

If such force is used despite that prohibition, the Charter envisages two kinds of military remedies: wars of self-defense and police actions. Article 51 authorizes members to use military force in exercise of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs” in violation of Article 2(4). This provision merely recognizes that the old war system may still be needed until the new system of global policing can secure the peace for all.

Leland Goodrich, a foremost authority on the United Nations, died in New York on November 16, 1990. His many books and articles on the United Nations have enlightened students, diplomats and officials for more than four decades. They exemplify meticulous scholarship and a deep understanding of practical ways and means in the world of international politics.

Does Security Council Resolution 678, read in conjunction with the United Nations Charter, confer authority on the President under United States domestic law to introduce the United States Armed Forces into hostilities? The operative part of the resolution provides that the Security Council:

• 1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

• 2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

• 3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

• 4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;

• 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Should the Persian Gulf war of 1990-1991 be characterized as an “international enforcement action” of the United Nations Security Council or as a campaign of collective self-defense approved, encouraged, and blessed by the Security Council?

This is not simply a nice and rather metaphysical legal issue, but an extremely practical one. The question it presents is whether the control and direction of hostilities in the gulf, their termination, and the substance of the settlement they produce were handled by the Council as the Korean War was handled, that is, as a campaign of collective self-defense, or as the United Nations’ first “international enforcement action.” According to some international lawyers, characterizing the gulf war as a Security Council “enforcement action” under the untried procedures of Articles 42-50 of the Charter would in effect eviscerate Article 51, make the exercise of each state’s “inherent” right of self-defense subject to the permission of the Security Council, threaten the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, and thus lead to extremely grave and perhaps insoluble political difficulty. It could even destroy the United Nations.

As these words are written, the use of armed force to liberate Kuwait, and all the suffering and waste such use implies, becomes more likely. Given the primacy of the peaceful settlement of disputes in international law, I consider in this brief essay how the rule of law could play a role in this crisis. The UN Security Council’s call for the collection of information regarding possible war crimes by Iraqi officials and possible claims for damages arising out of the invasion was a welcome innovative effort, although it has yet to have any perceptible effect. That move, however, did not fully embrace the rule of law as a solution or make clear to Iraq the force that the rule of law can bring to bear. If the Security Council made an effort to implement the rule of law more forcefully, in my view it would greatly diminish the felt need to use armed force against Iraq.

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines “legitimacy” as it applies to the rules applicable among states. “Legitimacy,” he writes, “is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.

In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with “generally accepted principles of right process.” It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the “new world order” that is claimed for tomorrow.