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“Exclusive Preserves” and the New Soviet Policy Toward the Un Secretariat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Theodor Meron
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Extract

An “exclusive preserve” of a state in the UN Secretariat is a post that is continuously filled by nationals of the same state. Virtually from the founding of the United Nations, the Secretariat has observed an “unofficial” practice of exclusive preserves for many senior posts held by nationals of several influential states, including the United States; but its most persistent advocate, and with regard to a particularly wide range of posts, has been the Soviet Union. In view of the past underrepresentation of Soviet nationals in the Secretariat, largely because the Soviet Government insisted that its nationals be recruited only on fixed-term contracts based on secondment from the Government and Soviet institutions, a considerable number of posts were set aside to be filled on a replacement basis. The occupants of those posts were selected by the Secretary-General from a very short list of candidates submitted by the Soviet Government. The object of this Editorial is to assess the impact of the new Soviet policy toward the UN Secretariat, recent General Assembly resolutions and the jurisprudence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal on the practice of exclusive preserves.

Type
Editorial Comment
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 85 , Issue 2 , April 1991 , pp. 322 - 329
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1991

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References

1 See, e.g., GA Res. 31/26, 31 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 147, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1977).

2 See generally T. Meron, The United Nations Secretariat 85–101 (1977); Meron, Charter Powers of the United Nations’ Secretary-General with regard to the Secretariat and the Role of General Assembly Resolutions, 42 Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 731,771–72(1982).

3 Soviet officials in the Secretariat are now in the midpoint of the “desirable range” for their representation. UN Doc. A/45/541, table 4 (1990).

4 Article 4.2,of the Staff Regulations tracks Article 101(3) of the UN Charter. See UN Doc. ST/SGB/Staff Rules/l/Rev.7 (1990).

5 Article 4.4 of the Staff Regulations states that in the recruitment of staff for vacant posts, the fullest regard shall be had to the persons already in the service of the United Nations.

6 In Upadhya v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/401, paras. III-IV (Nov. 12, 1987), the United Nations Administrative Tribunal stated, with regard to discrimination in matters of promotion:

[I]t is fundamental that no staff member should be subjected to discriminatory treatment and it is of the utmost importance to the integrity of the Organization that prompt action be taken to remedy such treatment when it is found to have occurred. Otherwise the impression becomes inescapable that little more than lip service is being paid to the principles of fair treatment. …

… It is simply not sufficient, in the face of a finding of discrimination in connection with the promotion process, for the Administration to argue that no staff member has a right to a promotion. Although that may be correct as an abstract proposition, it is also true that a staff member has a right not to be discriminated against in connection with a promotion.

7 GA Res. 31/26, supra note 1, 9th preambular paragraph.

8 Paragraph 1(4) of Resolution 35/210 (35 UN GAOR. Supp. (No. 48) at 236, UN Doc. A/35/48 (1981)) links the “replacement authorization” with the need to avoid underrepresentation. While the Soviet Union is no longer underrepresented (see supra note 3), as long as most Soviet nationals serve on fixed-term contracts its representation would probably be “adversely affected” if it could not benefit from its “exclusive preserves,” which can be filled quickly, and without vacancy announcements (see infra note 16), with Soviet “replacements.”

9 See UN Doc. A/C.5/45/12, para. 3 (1990).

10 This policy shift was reported by the New York Times as follows:

The Soviet Union has announced a shift in its policy towards the United Nations. … Under its new policy, Moscow is ready to allow its civil servants to join the United Nations, on a long-term basis, becoming in effect permanent international civil servants in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

N.Y. Times, June 4, 19.88, at 1, col. 2.

11 V. M. Nikiforov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Statement in the Fifth Committee, USSR Permanent Mission to the United Nations Press Release at 4 (Oct. 24, 1990).

12 Press Conference by Mr. Nikiforov (Oct. 25, 1990).

13 Within the UN Secretariat, the largest groups excluded from geographical distribution are staff in posts with special language requirements and staff in the Field Service, General Service and related categories (Trades and Crafts, Security and Safety, and Public Information Assistants). UN Doc. A/45/541, para. 7(1990).

14 In posts subject to geographical distribution, no career appointments of Soviet nationals were made in the period July 1, 1989-June 30, 1990. UN Doc. A/45/541, table 7 (1990). By June 30, 1990, one Byelorussian national, two Ukrainian nationals and one Soviet national had permanent contracts; additionally, one Soviet national had a probationary contract. Id., table 5. Thus, 5 Soviet nationals were career staff members out of the total of 190 in posts subject to geographical distribution. Id., table 4. By the end of 1990, this number increased to 9 (out of 194). Information obtained from UN Secretariat. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at A6, col. I.

15 The Soviet Union still submits short lists of candidates to the Secretary-General for all posts it regards as its “exclusive preserves.”

16 The Secretary-General has continued handling these lists as before. See text at note 30 infra. Moreover, in contrast to posts claimed by other states, which (except for D-2 and higher posts) have been advertised, he has maintained the practice of not issuing vacancy announcements for professional and higher posts that are considered as “belonging” to the Soviet Union.

17 Statement by Mr. Kofi Annan, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, UN Doc. A/C.5/43/SR.14, para. 4 (1988).

18 GA Res. 43/224, fifth preambular paragraph, 43 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 265, UN Doc. A/43/49 (1989).

19 Note the use of the past tense “served.”

20 Press Release USUN 108-(90), at 3 (Nov. 5, 1990).

21 UN Doc. A/C.5/45/12, para. 3 (1990). Resolution 35/210 continues to be reaffirmed, with several other General Assembly resolutions, in the annual resolutions on the composition of the Secretariat.

22 While emphasizing the prohibition of exclusive preserves, Mr. Abdou Ciss, the current Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, recently justified the replacement policy on the basis of the need to prevent underrepresentation of some states in the Secretariat: “there were countries which might still be underrepresented or not represented at all if some of their nationals were not replaced by others.” UN Doc. A/C.5/45/SR.28, paras. 14, 39 (Nov. 14, 1990).

23 Estabial v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/310, para. XIV (June 10, 1983).

24 Id., para. XIII.

25 Id., para. XVI.

26 Williamson v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/362, para. VII (May 14, 1986).

27 Abbas v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/447, para. VII (May 25, 1989). The Tribunal’s admonitions to issue vacancy notices for D–2 posts are still being disregarded by the Secretariat.

28 Id.

29 Id., para. XV.

30 Dauchy v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/492, at 2–3 (Nov. 2, 1990).

31 Id. at 3.

32 See supra note 16.

33 Judgement No. 492, supra note 30, para. IX.

34 Id., para. XII.

35 Id., paras. XIII–XIV.

36 Id., para. XI.

37 Id., para. XV.

38 Id., para. XVI.

39 Qiu, Zhou & Yao v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. AT/DEC/482, para. XXI (May 25, 1990).

40 See Meron, In re Rosescu and the Independence of the International Civil Service, 75 AJIL 910, 917–20(1981).

41 Judgement No. 482, supra note 39, para. XXV.

42 Id., para. XXIX. See also Reisman, International Law after the Cold War, 84 AJIL 859, 863 (1990).

43 The Tribunal justified its departure from the maximum amount that the Tribunal would normally award by the “exceptional cases” (id., para. XLVI) provision of Article 9(1) of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, UN Doc. AT/11/Rev.4 (1972).

44 Approximately 500 Secretariat staff members in the professional category and above are currently serving with the United Nations on secondment from their governments; as of July 1990, seven member states had approximately 430 nationals on secondment. UN Doc. A/C.5/45/12, para. 2 (1990).

45 Id., para. 13.

46 T. Meron, supra note 2, at 96.

47 Id. at 59.

48 Meron, The Role of the Executive Heads, 14 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 861, 868–69(1982).