This article offers the first detailed history of the norm of treaty publication as it has evolved over the last century. Drawing on both public debates and archives of foreign ministries, it traces how, and why, secret treaties have persisted, even in liberal democracies. It challenges assumptions of ever-greater transparency over time, and complicates the associations made—by interwar reformers and international lawyers today—between the norm of treaty publication and ideals of legality in the international order.

Since 1993, the United Nations has promoted national human rights institutions (NHRIs); these have spread to almost 120 countries. We assess what makes NHRIs effective, using quantitative and qualitative methods. We find that formal institutional safeguards contribute greatly to NHRI efficacy even in authoritarian and transition regimes. Complaint-handling mandates are particularly useful because they help NHRIs build broad bases of support. Our findings show how international organizations can wield great influence with soft tools such as recommendations and peer-review mechanisms.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is controversial, acutely so in Africa. The first thirty-nine people it indicted were all African. It did not open any formal investigations outside Africa until the 2016 decision to investigate conduct related to the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. The first three notifications of withdrawal from the ICC Statute, each made in 2016, were by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia. While South Africa and Zambia reversed their initial intentions, Burundi in fact became the first state party to withdraw from the ICC in October 2017. These maneuvers are closely connected to country-specific political and legal considerations, but they overlap with concerns expressed by governments in other countries including Kenya and Namibia. Among these concerns is that “the ICC has become the greatest threat to Africa's sovereignty, peace and stability,” and that “the ICC is a colonial institution under the guise of international justice.”

On February 2, 2017, the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) delivered a judgment rejecting preliminary objections to its jurisdiction in Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean. The underlying contentious case between Somalia and Kenya concerns the establishment of a single maritime boundary between the two states. The decision on preliminary objections provides important insights on the Court's interpretation of optional clause declarations that include a reservation for alternative methods of dispute settlement.

On December 21, 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed an action brought by the Front Polisario challenging a decision of the Council of the European Union (EU) approving the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom Morocco on the reciprocal liberalization of certain agricultural products. The CJEU held, based on the relevant rules of international law applicable between the EU and Morocco, that the agreement did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara. Apart from its obvious political overtones, the judgment is significant in further developing the CJEU's approach to the law of treaties and the principle of self-determination in international law.

On June 3, 2016, the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court) rendered its first default judgment, in a case brought by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) against Libya for alleged violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter). The Commission had alleged that the Libyan government had violated its obligations under the Charter to protect one of its citizens, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi, from incommunicado detention and to provide him access to counsel. When Libya failed to respond to the Commission's complaint and to the Court's order of provisional measures, the Court proceeded to the merits and found Libya in violation of several articles of the Charter. Its decision reflected both a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights obligations even in situations of exceptional political and security instability.

On December 8, 2016, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal (the Tribunal) held that international human rights condition the treatment that an investor is entitled to receive from a state and that human rights impose obligations on the investor itself. The Tribunal's explicit recognition of these dual consequences of international human rights law breaks new ground. International investment tribunals have not previously held that human rights obligations have any effect on protections due to investors, much less that international human rights law might establish separate obligations for investors.

Shortly after President Trump was elected in November 2016, Australia and the United States finalized a bilateral agreement pursuant to which the United States committed to accepting refugees from Australian-backed immigration detention camps located in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. While Trump criticized the deal after his inauguration, his administration has nevertheless taken steps to implement it.

Throughout Donald Trump's presidential campaign and into the first months of his presidency, he has warned that the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may depend on whether its partner states increase their defense spending in line with previously adopted guidelines. While senior administration officials have reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense obligation on several occasions, President Trump himself did not so until mid-June. Separately, the Trump administration signaled its support for NATO by supporting the admission of Montenegro as a new member state.

On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that: (1) prohibited nationals from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the United States for ninety days; and (2) prohibited individuals from entering into the United States as refugees for 120 days. Courts stayed the order on constitutional and statutory grounds. In response to these stays, President Trump replaced the initial order with a new order that eliminated preferential treatment for refugees fleeing from religious persecution and narrowed the scope of persons prohibited from entering into the United States. Courts again issued stays, holding that the new order violated the Establishment Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Trump administration appealed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in October. Along with its grant of certiorari, the Court kept the lower court stays in place except as to people with no connection to the United States either personally or through family.

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.

On April 6, 2017, the United States launched air strikes against a Syrian government airfield, marking a new development in Syria's long-running civil war. U.S. involvement in the conflict had previously been limited to the provision of indirect support for some rebels and the use of direct force against certain nonstate actors, particularly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This changed in the wake of April 4, however, when a rebel-held town was hit by a nerve gas attack that killed more than eighty people—including at least thirty children—and injured hundreds more. The attack used Sarin or a Sarin-like substance, which causes death by asphyxiation, often accompanied by blue facial skin and foaming at the mouth. The United States concluded, along with many other states and the NGO Human Rights Watch, that the attack was perpetrated by Syria's Assad regime.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, obligates the parties “not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” In 2014, the State Department reported that Russia was in violation of its obligation not to possess intermediate- or short-range missiles. Russia denied the violation and expressed its own doubts about the United States' compliance with the INF Treaty; the meetings and discussions that followed did not resolve either state's concerns. Subsequent State Department reports in 2015 and 2016 continued to express concern about Russia's violation.