The tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty is reflected in the debate on whether state officials should be held responsible in external fora for international crimes committed while in office. This debate involves the interplay between two branches of international law. Firstly, there is the well-established law according immunities to the state and its agents from the jurisdiction of other states (state and diplomatic immunities). This law proceeds from notions of sovereign equality and is aimed at ensuring that states do not unduly interfere with other states and their agents. On the other hand, there are those newer principles of international law that are based on humanitarian values and define certain types of conduct as crimes under international law (international criminal law). One of the challenges in this latter area has been to develop international and national mechanisms by which individuals who commit these crimes may be held responsible. Since states often fail to institute domestic prosecution of their own officials and agents alleged to have committed international crimes, renewed attention has been paid to the possibility of subjecting state agents to prosecution in foreign domestic courts or in international courts. For such prosecution in foreign domestic courts to take place, it will usually have to be shown (1) that those courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners (i.e..universalorquasi-universal jurisdiction),and (2) that such jurisdiction extends to state agents (i.e., that international law immunities are unavailable). Recent years have seen a significant increase in attempts to institute prosecutions for alleged international crimes in the national courts of states other than that where the acts occurred. However, it has not proved easy to establish the two propositions identified above. Indeed, it has become apparent that the views that states possess universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed abroad and that incumbent and former state officials are subject to foreign domestic prosecution for such crimes are by no means universally held.

Commentators on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) note that cases of noncompliance with final judgments are very rare. The ICJ registrar Philippe Couvreur, however, recognized that compliance is often hard to determine because judgments are varied, declarations may not reflect actual conduct, effects may only become apparent long after the judgment is given, and the legal or political situation may substantially change after the judgment. In this vein, Judge Jennings asked:

Should all internationally recognized human rights—economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights—be subject to the same individual-complaints procedures? This issue is now before a newly convened working group of the UN Commission on Human Rights. At its first meeting, from February 23 to March 5,2004, the Working Group debated the feasibility of elaborating an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that would provide for the adjudication of individual and group complaints against states under that Covenant. Participating states were in sharp disagreement over the viability of the proposal, however, and the session ended in disarray. Since the Commission has recommended renewal of the Working Group’s mandate for two years, the issue remains open.

Every impulse to protect the weak and help the infirm is noble. The impulse to use the means at our disposal to liberate a people from a government that poses no imminent or prospective threat to us, but is so despotic, violent, and vicious that those suffering under it cannot shake it off, is also noble. The action that gives effect to that impulse may sometimes be internationally lawful. It may sometimes be feasible. It is often—but not always— misconceived.