This is a claim for compensation, preferred by the Government of the United States of America on behalf of one, Benson Robert Henry, an American citizen, arising out of the disallowance of his title to 480 acres of land in the Island of Fiji. We propose to state the facts of this case only in detail sufficient to explain the character of the claim and to elucidate our decision which turns, as will presently appear, on one single question, namely,whether on October 10,1874, the date of the cession of Fiji to Great Britain,the claimant was, in his own right, proprietor of the lands in question or any part of them.

As regards two parcels of land involved in this claim, held that no title sufficient to justify an award could be found. As regards a third parcel, the title held to be good and claimant awarded damages for the refusal of British authorities to recognize it.

This claim is presented by the United States on behalf of Isaac M. Brower for the sum of $1,250, with interest. It arises out of the disallowance of Brower's application for a Crown grant to certain lands in Fiji. The facts are as follows:

In 1863, two American citizens, Thompson and Gillam, purchased from a Fiji chieftain known as Tui Cakau, a group of small islands, six in number, forming a part of the Fijian group. The islands were designated on the charts as the Ringgold Islands, the native appellation being Yanuca-i-Lau, meaning “bad islands.” They were not inhabited. Not more than three of them were of any potential value, the rest being described as “ mere rocks” (Memorial, p. 439), or “ sand banks” (Memorial, p. 424). The natives appear to have gone there intermittently to get turtles.

The contentions and applicable principles in this case are practically the same as in the claim of the Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Co., except that in this case the company's enterprise as a Spanish public service having a military and strategic interest is more clearly apparent. The right of the United States to take measures of admittedly legitimate defense against these means of enemy communication was fully justified.

Not only does the cutting of cables appear not to be prohibited by the rules of international law applicable to sea warfare, but such action may be considered to be implicitly justified by that right of legitimate defense which forms the basis of the rights of any belligerent nation.