The stagnation in the functioning of the International Court of Justice is only one of several indicators of the neglect by Members of the United Nations of the development and modernization of adjective law. There has been gratifying progress in the codification and progressive development of substantive law through the International Law Commission and other bodies, but substantive law without an adequate adjective law is bound to lack in effectiveness and uniform and predictable application.

It is seemingly easier to evoke aggression than to dispel it, and easier to commit aggression than to define it. What has been universally condemned as “the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world ” has yet to be consensually particularized. On the eve of its hundredth meeting, the U.N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, the fourth United Nations body to deal with the topic since 1952, adjourned without having carried out its instructions. It did conclude by irresolute acclamation that progress had been made and that it should continue its work in 1973. Despite the semblance of unanimity, both points were not free from doubt. Defining aggression has perplexed legal scholars for nearly half a century. Those who are dedicated to the rule of law and to a rational system of conflict management may wish to consider some of the current disputations aS well as the expectations and requirements of the days or years to come.

“Secrecy of the deliberation,” a term of art used widely in court procedure, is neither a universal principle nor one with a single meaning. Continuing an old Germanic tradition, courts in some Swiss cantons, as well as the Federal Court in Lausanne, deliberate in the presence of the parties. In most of the Western world, including the common law countries, Latin mAmerica, and Scandinavia, the principle of secret deliberations is accepted but does not cover the vote, that is, the position taken byeach judge. In all six Common Market states, however, the vote is secret and the individual judge is under an obligation not to reveal his position. Originally adopted under the regime of absolute government to protect the independence of the judge, this extended secrecy has come under attack recently, especially when applied to constitutional litigation. Legislation enacted in the German Federal Republic in December, 1970, giving members ofthe Federal Constitutional Court the right to reveal their vote, may be the precursor of changes in this matter.

The nature, form and utility of conventional commitments which states make to other states concerning international law continue to invite consideration by foreign offices and by students of this law. Recent formulation of rules concerning treaties provides instructive reminder of the need for clarifying to the greatest extent that is practicable the nature, form and utility of public international commitments. One purpose of a conventional agreement may be to commit the party states to act in accordance with the standard which is international law. Recent United States practice reveals relatively frequent resort to this method.

On May 21, 1970, President Nixon appointed a Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy to study the principal problems faced by the United States in this field, assess present U.S. policy, and produce a set of policy recommendations for the 1970s which would take account of the changes that have taken place on the world economic scene since the end of World War II. Twenty-seven members from business, labor, agriculture, and the universities (a substantial majority from business) were appointed, under the chairmanship of Albert L. Williams, Chairman of the Finance Committee of International Business Machines. The Williams Commission rendered its report in July, 1971: “United States International Economic Policy in an Interdependent World.”