1 German and Russian versions of the text: 1972 Bundesgestzblatt, Pt. II, 354. English translation: 18 Bulletin 212 (Press & Information Office of the F.R.G., 1970); 9 ILM 1026 (1970).

2 German and Polish versions of the text: 1972 Bundesgestzblatt, Pt II, 362; 1972 Dziennik Ustaw, No. 24, Item 168. English translation: The Times, Nov. 21, 1970, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1970, at 11, col. 1; 10 ILM 127 (1971). In the present article quotations from the two treaties follow the unofficial translations by the signatories. The treaties entered into force on June 3, 1972.

For Polish comments reflecting the official attitude, see Klafkowski, A., Uklad Polska-NRF o podstawach noralizacji stosunków jako element uznania status quo w Ewopie , 24 Spbawy Miedzynohodowe 5 (1971, No. 9)Google Scholar, and Uklad Polska-NRF w swietle prawa miedzynarodowego, 27 Państwo I Pbawo 5 (1972, No. 6) and Rotfeld, A. D., Wokól ratyfikacji uktadu PRL-NRF: Problemy politiyczno-prawne , 25 Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 27 at 29–30 (1972, No. 4)Google Scholar. See also the various papers published in Volksrepublik Polen Bundesbepublk Deutschland: Problems deb Normalisierunc Gegenseitiger (J. Rachocki and J. Muszynskil eds., Poznan, 1972). The present article does not deal with the constitutional aspects of the treaty and its ratification and for that reason it omits references to writings, German and Polish, on this subject.

3 This point is rightly emphasized by Steinberger, H., Völkerrechtliche Aspekte des deutsch-sowjetischen Vertragswerks vom 12. August 1970, 31 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 63, at 108 and 134 (1971)Google Scholar and Uschakow, A., Die Ostverträge in östlicher Sicht, Ostverträce Berlin-Status, Münchener Abkommen, Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der DDR , 66 Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel ([Menzel, E. ed.], 1971) 91 at 94 Google Scholar.

4 Die Welt, May 18, 1972, at 8, col. 2. English translation: [1972] Latest from Germany: Facts, Figures, Background No. 82, at 1, German Embassy, London.

5 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt, Pt. II, 353 and 361.

6 Ibid. 365; 1970 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1816. This fact is emphasized by Steinberger, supra note 3, at 136–137, and Colard, D., Considérations sur les “traitéa de normalisation” signés par la R.F.A. avec l’U.R.S.S. et la Pologne , 75 Rev. Gén. Droit Int. Public 333 at 352 (1971)Google Scholar. Whether the formula “western frontier” of Poland gives expression to the view that the future all-German Government is not bound by the Treaty, is another matter. Cf. Meyrowitz, H., Le Traité de Varsovie du 7 Décembre 1970 Google Scholar, ibid. 944, at 997.

7 Art. 7, para. 3, of the Convention on Relations in the unratified version of 1952, Germany No. 6 (1952) Cmd. 8571. Bathurst, M. E. and Simpson, J. L., Germany and the North Atlantic Community, 190–191 (1956)Google Scholar. This paragraph was deleted when the unratified Convention was amended in 1954.

8 331 U.N.T.S. 327.

9 Para. 4 also mentions the West German-Soviet Agreement of 1955 on the establishment of diplomatic relations and related matters, 1955 Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1445.

10 E.g. Air Transport Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Washington, July 7, 1955, Art. 16, 7 U.S.T. 527, T.I.A.S. 3536, 275 U.N.T.S. 3

11 The words are taken from a government memorandum submitted to the Bundesrat in 1954, Bundesrat-Drucksache No. 400/54. This attitude has been repeated in several official documents, e.g., des Deutschen Bundestages, Verhandlungen, 2 Wahlperiode, Anlagen zu den stenographischen Berichten, Drucksache No. 2915; Memorandum of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 1961, [1961]Google Scholar Monatsschrift der Vereinigung Deutscher Auslandsbeamten 205; Directives of the Minister for All-German Affairs, 24 Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt 227 (1965).

12 Schuster, R., Deutschlands Staatliche Existenz im Widerstrerr Politischer und Rechtlicher Gesichtspunkte 1945–1963 (1963)Google Scholar.

18 E.g., 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts at 56 and 277 (1953); 3 ibid, at 88 and 319 (1954); 5 ibid, at 118 and 126 (1956); 6 ibid, at 338 (1957); 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen at 294 et seq. (1954).

14 In the communiqué of Sept. 19, 1950 the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the British Foreign Secretary, and the American Secretary of State made the following statement “the three Governments consider the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.” [1949–1950] Docs, On Int. Affairs 333 at 334 ( Carlyle, M. ed.). This statement was repeated in Part V of the Final Act of the London Conference of 1954, 31 Dept. State Bull. 515 (1954)Google Scholar. In 1964 the British Foreign Secretary explained that “[t]his statement [did] not constitute recognition of the Government of the Federal Republic as the de jure Government of all Germany.” Certificate of the Foreign Secretary, Nov. 6, 1964, submitted in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. and Others, [1967] A. C. 853 at 859.

15 Statement of 1950 quoted in note 14 supra.

16 J. A. Frowein, Die Grenzbestimmungen der Ostverträge und ihre völkerrechtliche Bedeutung, Ostvertbäge, supra note 3, 27 at 31: “Ein wiedervereinigtes Deutschland ist an die Verträge zunächst dann gebunden, wenn es rechtlich mit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland identisch ist. ”

17 The concept of identity between the German State of 1945 and the Federal Republic and the concept of continuity between the two are inevitably weakened when emphasis is laid on the Republic’s acting in its own name only and exclusively, cf. id. at 32 and D. Rauschning, Die Endgiiltigkeit der in dem Vertrag mit Polen getrofjenen Gebietsregelung, Ostvertrace, supra note 3, at 164 passim. It has also been observed that by pointing out that Federal Germany has no common frontier with Poland one discards the concept of continuity. Cf. J. Hacker, ibid, at 146. E. Menzel, ibid, at 147 draws a distinction: “Kontinuitätsthese und Grenzen vom 31.12.1937 haben . . . nichts miteinander zu tun.” On problems of succession in connection with the West German-Polish Treaty see also Bretton, , Le traité germano-polonais du 7 décembre 1970, 17 Ann. Français de Droit Int. 171 at 200 (1971)Google Scholar.

18 Cf. 2 O’Connell, D. P., State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law at 54, 56–60, 71 and 79–87 (1967)Google Scholar. As to present day Germany, see Rauschning, supra note 17, at 166.

19 The official West German communique on the negotiations and the Treaty with Poland states: “Ein wiedervereinigtes Deutschland kann . . . durch den Vertrag nicht gebunden werden,” “Zum Vertrag mit der Volksrepublik Polen,” 1970 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 1818 at 1819, para. III (4). There is no obligation, for reunited Germany, by virtue of action undertaken by the FRG. But such obligation can follow from the law of state succession or other provisions of international law.

20 E.g., Art. 25 of the Agreement on the German External Debts of 1953, 333 U.N.T.S. 4. The assumption probably was that an all German Government would be or would become bound by the Agreement. Cf. Bathuhst and Simpson, supra note 7, at 189.

21 Statement by the Chancellor, Federal, Sept. 20, 1949, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1 Wahlperiode 1949, Stenographische Berichte 28 (D) Google Scholar. For subsequent statements, see reports on the “Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” published in Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht.

22 508 U.N.T.S. 14 and 26, English translation at 148.

23 9 Intebnational Legislation 314 (M. O. Hudson & L. B. Sohn eds., 1942–1945).

24 2 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, at 1491 and 1509.

25 Convention on Relations of 1952, supra note 8; Paris Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Régime of 1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 253.

26 Treaty concerning Relations between the USSR and the GDR of 1955, 226 ibid. 201.

27 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt, Pt. II, 356 and 365; 18 Bulletin 213 (Press & Information Office of the F.R.G., 1970); 25 Europa-Archiv D 396 (1970); 1970 Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1816.

28 1972 Bundesgestzblatt, Pt. II, 357 et seq.; 25 Europa-Archiv D 397 (1970).

29 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt, Pt. II, 365 et seq.

30 Declarations by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sept. 17, 1946 and April 9, 1947, Molotov, V., Questions de Politique Exterieure 244 and 429 (1949)Google Scholar.

31 For French approval of the Potsdam decisions, see supra note 23, at 1551 and 1562. During the meetings of the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs its representative emphasized the irreversible nature of the Potsdam settlement, e.g., Déclarations de Georges, M. Bida’ult, Conseil des Ministres des Affaires & rangeres, Session de Moscou 34 (1947)Google Scholar. Pres. Charles de Gaulle was emphatic in expressing his country’s accord to the frontier, see his statements of March 26, 1959 and Sept. 11, 1967, Le Monde, March 27, 1959, at 3, col. 1 and Sept. 12, 1967, at 2, col. 4.

32 The Times, Nov. 21, 1970, at 1, col. 7.

33 The Stuttgart speech by the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Sept. 6, 1946, 8 Docs, On Amer. For. Rel. 210, at 216–217 (R. Dennett and R. K. Turner eds.). Statements made by the Secretary of State George C. Marshall before the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, March 27, 1947 and April 9, 1947, 9 ibid. 45, at 46 and [1947–1948] Docs, On Int. Affairs 462 (M. Carlyle ed.).

34 319 U.N.T.S. 93.

35 See below, Section IV. Federal Germany acted lawfully because it had the consent of the great powers, cf. Meyrowitz, supra note 6, at 994.

36 Id. at 1002. He rightly observes that Art. 1, para. 3, of the Bonn-Warsaw Treaty “enlève toute porté à la réserve du traité de paix,” at 998–999.

37 For a different view, see Steinberger, supra note 3, at 134–137 and Frowein, note 16, at 32. On the other hand, Bretton, supra note 17, at 194, correctly distinguishes between agreement on the peace settlement and agreement on the frontier. Nobody could seriously contest his view, which is also the West German official view, that the treaty is not a peace treaty, ibid. 177.

38 Such as the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, 332 U.N.T.S. 220; Franco-West German Agreement on the Saar, 161 B.F.S.P. 639; Belgian-West German Treaty, 314 U.N.T.S. 195; the complex of Dutch-West German Treaties (the Ausgleichvertrag), 508 ibid 14, etc.

39 11 ILM 5 (1972). For comment, see Doeker, G., Melsheimer, K., and Schroder, D., Berlin and the Quadriparttte Agreement of 1971: “Modus Vivendi” and International Law , 67 AJIL 44 (1973)Google Scholar.

40 The Times, Feb. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 2.

41 The Times, April 29, 1972, at 1, col. 4.

42 Cf. “Germans Seek a Compromise,” ibid., May 1, 1972, at 15, col. 1.

43 Ibid., April 28, 1972, at 1, col. 3.

44 Supra note 41.

45 Ibid., May 10, 1972, at 1, col. 3 and May 11, 1972, at 1, col. 2; The Observer, May 14, 1972, at 5, col. 2.

46 Die Welt, May 18, 1972, at 1 and 8; The Times, May 18, 1972, at 7, col. 1; Le Monde, May 19, 1972, at 1, col. 2.

47 The Times, May 20, 1972, at 1, col. 6.

48 Renegotiation was excluded by both the USSR and Poland, see declarations by the Soviet Minister, A. Gromyko, April 12, 1972, The Times, April 13, 1972, at 7, col. 1, and the Polish Minister, Olszowski, S., April 27, 1972, 1972 Polish Facts and Figures, No. 899, 5 (Polish Embassy, London)Google Scholar.

49 The Guardian, May 17, 1972, at 4, col. 8.

50 “Bonn Treaties Nearly Home,” The Times, May 18, 1972, at 19, col. 1, at col. 3.

51 1963 Bundesgesetzblatt, Pt. II, 705.

52 The binding force of that preamble was emphasized during the debate in 1963, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 4 Wahlperiode 1961, Stenographische Berichte at 3423 D, 3436 D and 3745 C (speeches by Majonica, Mende, and Schmid).

53 Cf. explanations by the spokesmen for the Government (Scheel) and Opposition (Kiesinger), Die Welt, May 18, 1972, at 8, col. 6. In 1963 H. Wehner, who later became a member of Brandt’s Government, insisted on the relevancy of the preamble voted by the Federal German Parliament for the interpretation and application of the Franco-German Treaty. Supra note 52, at 3746 C.

54 The Times, May 11, 1972, at 1, col. 2 and May 12, 1972, at 5, col. 1. During the debate in the Bundestag at which the Resolution was adopted the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that that instrument would be formally transmitted to a representative of the USSR, Die Welt, May 18, 1972, at 8, col. 6.

55 The Times, May 10, 1972, at 1, col. 3.

56 See Polish statement referred to in note 48 supra. The Premier’s declaration was made on May 14, 1972 during a visit in the GDR.

57 1972 Polish Facts and Figures, No. 900, at 2, col. 2.

58 West German Professors W. Kewenig and, to a lesser degree, J. A. Frowein seem to regard the Resolution as an instrument falling under the provision of Art. 31, para. 2(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (not in force at the moment of this writing). This view is wrong. The Resolution was not accepted by Poland, and such an acceptance is essential, according to the Vienna Convention, to make the instrument part of the context in which the Treaty can be interpreted. See Die Welt, May 17, 1972, at 2, col. 1.

59 The declaration by the State Secretary in the West German Foreign Office, Bundesrat, Stenographische Berichte 40 (1963).

60 6 R.I.A.A. 85, at 89. 1 Rousseau, C., Droit International Public 250 (1970)Google Scholar points to the conflicting official interpretations of the Peace Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871 by the Governments of the German Reich and France. Each of the two states refused to consider itself bound by the unilateral interpretation of the other.

61 Steinberger, supra note 3, at 111 and Zur allgemeinen Zweckbestimmung und Auslegung des deutsch-sowjetischen Vertragswerks vom 12. August 1970, Ostverträce, supra note 3, at 19 is of the opinion that, in view of the highly political nature of the Treaties and the competence of the Great Powers, a strict interpretation should be applied.

62 Art. 31, para. 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Die Welt, May 17, 1972, at 1, col. 4, welcomed the adoption of the Resolution in the following words: “Der politische Gehalt der Verträge ist relativiert, neues Licht fällt auf alte Texte.” Le Monde, May 19, 1972, at 3, col. 1: “Ce texte . . . dénature le traité qu’il prétend piéciser.” See also Neumaier, E., “Resolution zu vielen Zweclcen: Regierung und Opposition interpretieren sie unterschiedlich,” Die Zeit, May 19, 1972, No. 20, at 5 Google Scholar.

63 The Conference of Berlin, supra note 23, at 534 and 539.

64 Cf. the earlier version of the American draft of the Potsdam Agreement, ibid., at 1150, and the American map showing the Oder-Neisse line, he. cit.

65 The Zgorzelec Agreement of 1950, supra note 34, and the Demarcation Act of 1951, 319 U.N.T.S. 100.

66 The use of the word “frontier” is not accidental nor is it without legal significance. Bretton, , Le Traité germano-soviétique du 12 aout 1970, 16 Ann. Fitangais de Droit Int. 125 at 136 (1970)Google Scholar rightly reminds one that the Final Declaration on Indo-China adopted by the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 contained the following statement (Para. VI): “The conference recognizes . . . that the military demarcation line [separating the northern and southern zones of Viet Nam] should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.” [1954] Docs, on Int. Affairs 138 (D. Folliot ed). Cf. Professor Wengler’s observations on. the term “western state frontier,” Wengler, W., Tier Moskauer Vertrag und das Völkerrecht , 25 Juristenzeitunc 632 at 634 (1970)Google Scholar. On the other hand, Steinberger supra note 3, at 111 denies that the term “frontier” determines the legal status of the territory involved. According to him, Art. 3 of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty uses the word “frontier” in the sense of geographical line.

67 This conclusion is borne out by other provisions. In the Treaty with the Soviet Union the Federal Republic regards the Oder-Neisse frontier as inviolable (“today and in future”) and it also undertakes “to respect without restriction the territorial integrity” of the Polish State (Art. 3). The Treaty with Poland likewise contains a clause on the inviolability of the frontier and the pledge “to respect unreservedly [the] territorial integrity” of Poland (preamble).

There is a shade of difference between the meaning of the terms used in the German and the other versions of the text, especially the Russian. Unverletzlich means inviolable in the sense of protection against and immunity from unlawful measures that would effect a change. The Russian nerushimye probably means more. It conveys the idea of immutability. It implies a state of things that cannot be destroyed or altered whether the means conform to law or not. The divergence, if any, between the German and Polish versions is less conspicuous. See Wengler, supra note 66, at 634; Bretton, supra note 66, at 137; Albert, E. H., Bonn’s Moscow Treaty and Its Implications , 47 Int. Affairs 316, at 323 (1971)Google Scholar; Colard, supra note 6, at 340 and 352; Steinberger, supra note 3, at 102–103; Frowein, supra note 16, at 28–29; and Uschakow, in the discussion in Ostvebtrage, supra note 3, at 105.

68 Cf. Meyrowitz, supra note 6, at 1011.

69 The duties under Arts. 2 and 3 exclude the interpretation according to which Federal Germany, in questioning the definitive nature of the frontier, does not raise any territorial claim in the strict sense of the term, in that the territory administered by Poland under the Potsdam Agreement is, according to some West German views, subject to the titular sovereignty of Germany. Meyrowitz, supra note 6, at 1011, speaks of Federal Germany’s obligation “de s’abstenir, dans ses actes officiels, d’ordre législatif, administratif ou judiciaire, de toute prise de position qui traduirait une contestation de cette souveraineté, en affirmant que les territoires en question continueraient d’être, politiquement et juridiquement, allemands.”

70 Steinberger, supra note 3, at 103 and 109 admits peaceful change. At 72 he refers to Art. 3 of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty and says: “Der Vertrag schreibt nicht die Grenzen in Europa volkerrechtlich fest.” He upheld this view in his other contribution on the subject, supra note 61, at 24, footnote 12. Cf. H. Kriiger’s contribution to the discussion, Ostverträge, supra note 3, at 37–39. F. Münch, ibid., at 34 said: “. . . Steinberger hat die Grenzklauseln als Verzicht auf Gebietsansprüche interpretiert. Aber das solle keine Politik hindem, die Gebiete spater wieder zu erlangen.” Colard, supra note 6, at 352 emphasizes that the parties to the Bonn-Warsaw Treaty “confirment l’ ‘inviolabilité’ et non l’ ‘intangibilité’ de leurs frontières.” According to Meyrowitz, supra note 6 at 1000–1001, Art. 2 of that treaty not only prohibits a modification of the frontier through means contrary to international law but it also excludes “la contestation de celle-ci par la formulation d’une revendication.” In the final discussion on the ratification of the Treaty the spokesman for the Social Democratic Party, C. Schmid, declared: “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird nach diesem Vertrag die Oder-Neisse-Linie als Westgrenze Polens nicht mehr in Frage stellen.” Welt, Die, May 18, 1972, at 8, col. 2. However, this clear language is difficult to reconcile with the ambiguities in Paragraph 2 of the Bundestag Resolution Google Scholar.

71 This interpretation is one which sees in the words the sense they would normally have in their context. It is an interpretation that does not lead to anything unreasonable or absurd. Cf. the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Polish Postal Service in Danzig, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 11, at 39 and the restatement by Sir Fitzmaurice, Gerald, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points , 33 Brit. Yr. Bk. of Int. Law 203, at 211 (1957)Google Scholar.

72 The West German State Secretary E. Bahr invoked the Soviet Union’s declaration that “a modification of frontiers effected by mutual consent is an expression of the sovereignty of the States.” See his letter to the Editor of Le Monde, Aug. 23–24, 1970, at 4, col. 5, cited by Bretton, supra note 66, at 137. Bahr seemed to envisage relations with the GDR only, not those with Poland, for he referred to a voluntary union by two states which would result in the abolition of the frontier between them. However, not all Federal German spokesmen limit the possibility of modification of frontiers through peaceful change to an intra-German situation alone. See also Whetten, L. L., Germany’s Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries 144 and 148 (1971)Google Scholar.

73 The so-called Bahr Paper, 1970 Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1096, para. 5, and the Statement by the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers’ Party, 1972 Polish Facts and Figures, No. 900, at 2, col. 2, are among the official documents which consider the two treaties as forming part of “ein einheitliches Ganzes,” i.e. “one political whole.”

74 Commenting on the “Letter on German Unity” (Brief zur deutschen Einheit), 1970 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1094, which the Federal Government sent to the Soviet Government on the signing of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty, Albert, supra note 67, at 316 wrote: “Thus, Bonn accepted the status quo with the declared intention to change it, if possible. As it was put at the time—the best way of knocking down frontiers may be to recognize them first.”

75 Fitzmaurice, supra note 71, at 211.

76 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 63 AJIL 875, 885 (1969).

77 C / . Die Welt, May 17, 1972, at 2, col. 1: “Erne mehrdeutige Vertragsklausel, etwa die Grenzformel im Moskauer Vertrag. . .”

78 See the official comminqué referred to in note 19 supra; “ein streitiges Grenzproblem zwischen der Bundesrepublik und Polen damit nicht mehr besteht.” The British recognition of the frontier immediately after the initialling of the Bonn-Warsaw Treaty is to be noted, note 32 supra. Until then the British position was that the “final delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland [could] not be formalized until there is a peace settlement,” 613 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser., 394, col. 2 (1959).

The attitude of the Holy See is equally worthwhile noting. It is the established policy of the Holy See not to proceed with the reorganization of the ecclesiastical structure of a territory until that territory’s status in international law is, in the eyes of the Holy See, absolutely beyond doubt. Up until June 1972 the Holy See did not change the ecclesiastical structure, including the limits of the dioceses, of the former German territories administered by Poland. The structure established as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and the then German-Polish frontier had been maintained although Polish prelates were appointed as apostolic administrators of the former German bishoprics; the latter arrangement was, by nature, provisional. After the Bonn-Warsaw Treaty entered into force the Holy See announced a permanent transformation of the ecclesiastical structure, including the setting up of new bishoprics, The Times, June 29, 1972, at 5, col. 4. Bretton, supra note 66, at 132; Meyerowitz, supra note 6, at 945, 997–998 and 1010; Frowein, supra note 16, at 31; Steiger, H., ‘Rechtsfragen der Ostverträge 1970 Google Scholar, Ostverträge, supra note 3, at 46; and F. Miinch, Ostverträge und neues jus cogens, ibid. 109 at 113, all admit recognition as a result of the clauses referred to, though the latter writer does raise the issue of the lawfulness of such recognition. On the other hand, cf. the views relating to Art. 3 of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty (in contradistinction to Art. 1 of the Treaty with Poland), Steinberger, supra note 3, at 109 and Colard, note 6, at 341. The West German side avoids the very word “recognition.” See, for instance, Chancellor Brandt’s interview with the Bheinische Post, reprinted in 1970 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bulletin 1977 at 1978. But recognition can be granted without using the word itself.

79 The Bonn-Warsaw Treaty does not operate a cession of territory nor does it in any other manner create a Polish title to it. Cf. Steiger, supra note 76, at 47; Kewenig, W., Die deutsche Ostpolitik und das Grundgesetz , 26 Europa-Ahchiv 469 at 478 (1971)Google Scholar; Kimminich, O., Der Warschauer Vertrag—Grundlage oder Vemichtung privater Entschädigungsforderungen? , 26 Juristenzeitung 485 at 488 (1971)Google Scholar; Meyrowftz, supra note 6, at 997. It may be added that the frontier was not an invention of the Zgorzelec Agreement either.

80 One of the differences between the Zgorzelec Agreement and the Treaty of 1970 concerns the role and function of the Potsdam Agreement in settling the border issue. The former clearly points to the Potsdam Agreement as establishing the German-Polish frontier while the latter passes over the matter in silence. Cf. Frowein, supra note 16, at 30–31 and Colard, supra note 6, at 352. The formula of Art. 1, para. 1, is a compromise between the divergent views of Bonn and Warsaw on the Potsdam Agreement. The differences between the two instruments (Zgorzelec and Bonn-Warsaw) are not the subject of the present article.